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ABSTRACT
Although the individual Justices of the Supreme Court frequently speak to the public, the Court as an entity holds
fast to the purportedly ancient principle that courts should speak only through their official written opinions—the
meaning of which is for others to figure out. Over the years, the Court’s decisions have become more complex,
prolix, and fractured, making it difficult and time-consuming for anyone outside the professional elites to determine
what the Court has held. Even journalists, who attempt to explain the Court’s decisions to the public, struggle to
make sense of the Justices’ opinions under the pressures generated by new demands for instant news. As a result,
the Court’s interpretations of the Constitution remain shrouded in mystery and beyond the ken of many. The
Court’s approach is hard to square with its own teaching on the importance of an informed public to a democratic
government, let alone with the Court’s central obligation to expound the Constitution in a way that is intelligible
to the people.
We therefore argue that the Court’s communication practices are both unjustified and self-defeating. The
underlying principle—that courts speak only through their written opinions—has never been categorically true.
The early Court did not deliver written opinions at all, and Justices from the time of John Marshall have offered
out-of-court defenses of their decisions. Some Justices have indeed recognized that the Court suffers when it fails
to help the media understand and disseminate its decisions. But the Court has insistently maintained its aloofness.
It has shown little concern for the changing needs of the press, and it has steadfastly rejected any suggestion that it
should make its work more accessible to the people. Meanwhile, the constitutional courts of other countries—
including Canada, Germany, and Israel—have risen to the challenge. These courts have adopted innovative
procedures, such as press “lock-ups” and plain language opinion summaries, to ensure that their decisions are
more intelligible, and they have not suffered the loss of dignity or respect that the Supreme Court apparently fears.
These trends reflect a growing understanding that the legitimacy of constitutional courts depends on their ability to

*
**

Cooney & Conway Chair in Advocacy and George Anastaplo Professor of Constitutional Law and
History, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
E. David Fischman Fellow, J.S.D. Candidate, University of Chicago Law School. The authors
wish to thank Raz Agranat, Everette E. Dennis, Richard Michael Fischl, Tom Ginsburg, Lena
Hornkohl, William Hubbard, Michael J. Kaufman, Alfred S. Konefsky, Corinna Barrett Lain,
H. Jefferson Powell, Doug Rendleman, Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Cristina Tilley, Wiebke Voss,
and Spencer Weber Waller for helpful comments on an earlier draft; Julienne Grant and Savannah
Theil for expert research assistance; and the Cooney & Conway Chair Fund and the Loyola
University Chicago Law School Faculty Research Support Fund for financial support. The authors
are also grateful to Benjamin L. Berger, Tania Groppi, Shinegori Matsui, Dan Rosen, Craig Smith,
Miki Tanikawa, and Heinrich Wolff for sharing their knowledge concerning the practices of other
constitutional courts. The usual stipulation applies.
1

2

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 24:1

make their decisions comprehensible to other participants in the political process—the executive, the legislature,
and especially the people. Our Supreme Court is not immune from the realities to which other constitutional courts
have responded, and, like them, it must find a way to make its decisions more easily reported and better understood.
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INTRODUCTION
On the morning of June 28, 2012, the last day of the last week of October
Term 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States announced its much
anticipated ruling in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.1 The
case involved the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, the controversial law that Congress had passed in 2010, in a
predominantly party-line vote, to lower the cost of health insurance and
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make access to healthcare more broadly available in the United States.2
Central to the constitutional challenge was the so-called “individual
mandate” provision of the Act, which required those not otherwise covered
by health insurance (through Medicare, Medicaid, or a group plan) to
purchase a subsidized health-insurance policy or pay a penalty for failing to
do so.3 The individual mandate was thought essential to the economic
viability of the overall legislative scheme4 that was the signature achievement
of the Obama administration.5
The final weeks of the Supreme Court Term is the time of year when the
Court customarily announces its most important decisions—those over
which the Justices have wrestled the most, those on which they may have
thought and debated and written the most, as the Court Term has ground
on. Thus, the timing of the decision in Sebelius was not unusual. Because the
case was argued late in the Term, and it was one in which the Justices were
likely to be deeply divided both as to the outcome and the justifications for
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See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, With a Flourish, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 23, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/health/policy/24health.html
[https://perma.cc/3HPQ-TH4S].
As Chief Justice John Roberts noted, the case involved challenges to the constitutionality of two
provisions of the Act: “[T]he individual mandate, which requires individuals to purchase a health
insurance policy providing a minimum level of coverage; and the Medicaid expansion, which gives
funds to the States on the condition that they provide specified health care to all citizens whose
income falls below a certain threshold. We do not consider whether the Act embodies sound
policies.” Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 530–32. As part of the individual mandate, the Act also required
small employers to purchase insurance for their employees to remedy a market defect in that area.
See Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1580 (2011).
Baker, supra note 3, at 1586 (“The individual mandate is an important part of the solidarity equation
because it requires everyone to be in the health insurance risk pool, addressing the adverse selection
problem that would follow from other provisions of the Act that make it possible for high-risk people
to enter the health insurance pool.”). Opponents of the law claimed that Congress had exceeded
its constitutional authority by requiring consumers to buy insurance or pay a penalty. See, e.g.,
Robert Moffit, Obamacare and the Individual Mandate: Violating Personal Liberty and Federalism, HERITAGE
FOUNDATION (Jan. 18, 2011), https://www.heritage.org/health-care-reform/report/obamacareand-the-individual-mandate-violating-personal-liberty-and
[https://perma.cc/YD3S-7WKF].
Those who supported the individual mandate claimed that Congress was authorized to impose that
duty under either the Commerce Clause or the taxing power. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; id.
art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Court also considered and rejected a third claim, namely, that the challenge
to the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C.
§ 7421(a). See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 543–46.
See, e.g., PAUL STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION: THE PECULIAR AMERICAN STRUGGLE OVER
HEALTH CARE REFORM (rev. ed. 2013); TOM DASCHLE WITH DAVID NATHER, GETTING IT
DONE: HOW OBAMA AND CONGRESS FINALLY BROKE THE STALEMATE TO MAKE WAY FOR
HEALTH CARE REFORM (2010).
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it, Sebelius was expected to be one of the last cases to be decided before the
Court rose for its summer recess.6 One way or another, the decision in Sebelius
was likely to be momentous, and the case had been closely watched since the
petitions for certiorari had been filed many months before.7 What did prove
unusual, however, was the media drama that the announcement of the
decision precipitated.
Because June 28 was the last day of the Term, there could be no further
delay; the decision was certain to be handed down that day. Members of the
news media presumably had done whatever they thought necessary to
prepare for covering the decision, and millions of viewers, accustomed to
receiving their news in “real time,” had tuned in—or gone online—to learn
the result. The diligence of those viewers was to be rewarded by the spectacle
of two major news outlets initially reporting that the outcome of the case was
the very opposite of what it really was.8
In a rush to report the decision, CNN and Fox News both originally
informed their viewers that the Supreme Court had struck down the
individual mandate.9 “The mandate is gone!” a Fox News correspondent
announced from the courthouse steps, as a graphic pronouncing the mandate
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See, e.g., Adam Liptak, In Court, Sharp Questions on Health Care Law’s Mandate, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27,
2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/28/us/hard-questions-from-conservative-justicesover-insurance-mandate.html [https://perma.cc/G3CC-UHNV] (anticipating a June decision).
Three separate petitions for a writ of certiorari were filed: Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
No. 11–393, cert. granted, Nov. 14, 2011; Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv. v. Florida, No. 11–398, cert.
granted, Nov. 14, 2011; Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv., No. 11–400, cert. granted, Nov. 14,
2011.
Richard Davis, The Symbiotic Relationship Between the U.S. Supreme Court and the Press, in COVERING THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN THE DIGITAL AGE 4, 22 (Richard Davis ed., 2014)
[hereinafter, Davis, The Symbiotic Relationship] (calling the press’s reporting on Sebelius “a case study
in failure to report accurately the Court’s decision due to time pressures”).
RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND
SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE 14 (2016) (“When Chief Justice Roberts read the first part of
his opinion . . . most everyone in the courtroom assumed that the challengers had defeated
Obamacare. Indeed, both CNN and Fox News issued news flashes that the challenge had
succeeded, and my thrilled mother texted me congratulations. But sitting in my office reading the
report of the written opinions on SCOTUSBlog, I knew better.”) (Professor Barnett was co-counsel
for NFIB); Brian Stelter, CNN and Fox Trip Up in Rush to Get the News on the Air, N.Y. TIMES (June 28,
2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/29/us/cnn-and-foxs-supreme-court-mistake.html
[https://perma.cc/BA8H-J9WG]; Tom Goldstein, We’re Getting Wildly Differing Assessments,
SCOTUSBLOG (July 7, 2012, 10:04 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2012/07/were-gettingwildly-differing-assessments/ [https://perma.cc/2XA8-SQCX]; Tony Mauro, Opinion
Announcements, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 477, 477 (2013) (veteran reporter describing the scene at the
Court).
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unconstitutional flashed on the screen.10 At the same time, CNN displayed
a banner that read in all capital letters, “Breaking News: Supreme Ct. Kills
Individual Mandate.”11 A couple of minutes later the network posted
another headline, also in all capital letters, “Individual Mandate Struck
Down: Supreme Court Finds Measure Unconstitutional.”12
Among the millions of real-time viewers was President Barack Obama,
who was watching several networks from the White House.13 Like so many
others in that instant, the first word that President Obama received
concerning the Court’s ruling was that his most significant legislative
achievement had been struck down.14 The effect of the networks’ erroneous
early reporting was also felt on Wall Street: several health care stocks spiked
upward—moves that were rapidly reversed when the actual result, that the
Court had upheld the individual mandate in a 5-4 decision, was reported a
few minutes later.15
The confusion that followed the erroneous reporting of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Sebelius produced an admittedly rare moment for the
Court and the press. Still, the error and the confusion it caused were not
entirely surprising. The opportunities for significant reporting errors increase
exponentially in connection with the coverage of particularly salient cases,
when reporters may be required—within minutes of the Court’s
announcement of its decision—to digest the contents of several complicated
opinions (sometimes amounting to several hundred pages of text), grasp both
the reasoning of the various Justices and the ways in which the opinions fit
together, determine the bottom-line result in the case, and then prepare a
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11
12
13
14
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AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION TODAY: TIMELESS LESSONS FOR THE ISSUES OF OUR
ERA 2 (2016) [hereinafter AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION TODAY]; Stelter, supra note 9.
AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION TODAY, supra note 10, at 1; Stelter, supra note 9.
AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION TODAY, supra note 10, at 2.
Id.
Carol E. Lee & Daniel Lippman, In Moments After Decision, Confusion, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2012,
9:43 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303649504577495170204412562
[https://perma.cc/QD2B-YSGY].
See AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION TODAY, supra note 10, at 3; James Saft, When Investing, Keep an Eye
on
Supreme
Court
Decisions,
STAR
TRIBUNE
(Jan.
9,
2016,
8:50
PM),
https://www.startribune.com/when-investing-keep-an-eye-on-supreme-courtdecisions/364678051/?refresh=true [https://perma.cc/9UTR-GG55]; see also Daniel Martin
Katz, Michael J. Bommarito II, Tyler Soellinger & James Ming Chen, Law on the Market? Abnormal
Stock
Returns
and
Supreme
Court
Decision-Making
(Dec.
19,
2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2649726.
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story.16 The challenges are even greater at the end of the Court’s Term,17
when the decisions in several important cases, each with numerous opinions,
may be announced on the same day.18 Often the Court will announce the
coming release of one or more opinions in argued cases only the evening
before and without identifying which cases will be decided.19 To report
accurately on the outcome and reasoning in such cases is challenging, not
only because of the time pressure, or the number, length, and complexity of
the opinions, but also because of the subtle ways in which concurrences and
16

17
18

19

Davis, The Symbiotic Relationship, supra note 8, at 12 (“[T]he reporters who regularly cover the Court
lack the ability to analyze when faced with intense pressure to read an opinion, determine its
outcome, and then write a story within a few minutes of the announcement of a decision.”).
At the end of October Term 2020, for example, the Court issued 20 decisions in the last two weeks
of June 2021 (between June 14 and June 29, 2021).
See MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN
AMERICAN CULTURE 366 (1986) (noting that the Court handed down 21 decisions in about two
hours on June 7, 1965); Linda Greenhouse, Telling the Court’s Story: Justice and Journalism at the Supreme
Court, 105 YALE L.J. 1537, 1558 (1996); Paul J. Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term—Foreword:
The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 56 (1965)
(“In quite human fashion, the Supreme Court typically leaves decision of some of its most difficult
and controversial cases until the last day of the Term. That day arrived a bit earlier this June than
usual in recent years, but the end-of-Term pattern continued: June 7, 1965, witnessed the rendition
of at least three opinions immediately recognizable as constitutional landmarks.”).
According to the Public Information Office, “During most of the Court Term, opinions are
typically released on Tuesdays, Wednesdays or the third Monday in the cycle.” PUB. INFO. OFF.,
SUP.
C T.
U.S.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/PIOServices.pdf
[https://perma.cc/82N9-2VBP] (last visited Oct. 21, 2021). But the Court does not announce in
advance which cases will be decided on a particular day. Reporters and the public therefore do
not know which or how many opinions to expect. See, e.g., @SCOTUSblog, TWITTER (June 28,
2021, 4:05 PM), https://twitter.com/scotusblog/status/1409619001479634944?lang=en
[https://perma.cc/J75F-L2LV] (“As of the close of business on Monday, the court remains mum
about when it will next release opinions. Five argued cases remain outstanding. Traditionally, the
court issues all opinions in argued cases by the end of June (though last year the court wrapped up
in early July).”); Amy Howe (@AHoweBlogger), TWITTER (June 28, 2021, 5:58 PM),
https://twitter.com/AHoweBlogger/status/1409647320811982848 [https://perma.cc/WC6TPHT4] (“#SCOTUS *finally* announces that it will release one or more opinions in argued cases
tomorrow at 10 am Eastern. Still waiting on 5 cases, including Arizona voting rights & California
donor disclosure policies.”). Reporters are nonetheless invited to check with the Public Information
Office late on Friday before a Court week or telephone over the weekend for a recorded message
concerning the next week’s outlook, including the days opinions may be issued. PUB. INFO. OFF.,
SUP. CT. U.S., supra. Recently, Amy Howe has noted that reporters with a “hard pass”—a special
credential to cover the Court—enjoy a privileged position compared to other reporters.
Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States, Panel on Access to Justice
and Transparency in the Operation of the Supreme Court (June 30, 2021) (Testimony of Amy
Howe),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Testimony-of-AmyHowe.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BQL-DZY2] [hereinafter Testimony of Amy Howe] (“The Court’s
Public Information Office works hard to keep reporters with hard passes informed about issues such
as emergency applications, the cases set for a particular conference, and the Court’s schedule.”).
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dissents may be noted. It is not unusual for the Justices to note their
agreement and disagreement on particular issues by concurring with, or
dissenting from, particular parts of specific numbered or lettered sections or
subsections of another opinion.20 When several Justices express their
agreements and disagreements in that way, it can be difficult and timeconsuming simply to ascertain the holding of the case.21 One additional
complication in Sebelius, of course, was that the Chief Justice joined one
group of four Justices to form a majority with respect to one of the two
constitutional issues in the case, but joined an entirely different group of four
Justices to form a majority as to the other.22

20

21

22

In his foreword to Joseph Goldstein’s The Intelligible Constitution, Burke Marshall gives as an example
of this phenomenon the summary set forth in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991):
WHITE, J., delivered an opinion, Parts I, II, and IV of which are for the Court, and filed a
dissenting opinion in Part III. MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined Parts
I, II, III, and IV of that opinion; SCALIA, J., joined Parts I and II; and KENNEDY, J., joined
Parts I and IV. REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered an opinion, Part II of which is for the Court,
and filed a dissenting opinion in Parts I and III. O’CONNOR, J., joined Parts I, II, and III
of that opinion; KENNEDY and SOUTER, JJ., joined Parts I and 1I; and SCALIA, J., joined
Parts II and III. KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
Burke Marshall, Foreword to JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION: THE
SUPREME COURT’S OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN THE CONSTITUTION AS SOMETHING WE THE
PEOPLE CAN UNDERSTAND, at xi (1992).
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL PERSONAE 141 (2015) (“If there is no majority opinion,
and if a number of different justices write separately, it might be exceedingly difficult to know the
content of the law. That is a genuine problem. The law cannot be certain if there is no opinion
for the Court.”); see also Meg Penrose, Goodbye to Concurring Opinions, 15 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 25 (2020) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s increased issuance of separate concurring
opinions); Nina Totenberg & Eric Singerman, The Supreme Court’s Term Appeared to Be Cautious. The
Numbers
Tell
a
Different
Story,
NPR
(July
9,
2021,
5:00
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2021/07/09/1013951873/the-supreme-courts-term-appeared-to-becautious-the-numbers-tell-a-different-sto [https://perma.cc/ER2A-GZL3] (“Though the court
reached unanimity in 43% of cases, many of those cases saw the justices reach the same outcome,
but for different reasons. In Fulton v. Philadelphia, for instance, the court reached a joint result in
favor of a Catholic charity that refused to consider LGBTQ couples for foster care, but it generated
four separate opinions. And in just two cases about the police and their ability to enter a home
without a warrant, the justices wrote eight separate opinions, all coming to the same conclusion by
different routes.”).
Indeed, the syllabus in Sebelius is somewhat misleading in that it begins by stating that:
ROBERTS, C. J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the
Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III–C, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR,
and KAGAN, JJ., joined; an opinion with respect to Part IV, in which BREYER and KAGAN,
JJ., joined; and an opinion with respect to Parts III–A, III–B, and III–D. GINSBURG, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined, and in which BREYER and KAGAN, JJ., joined as
to Parts I, II, III, and IV, post, p. 589. SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., filed
a dissenting opinion, post, p. 646. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 707.
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What happened in the immediate aftermath of the Supreme Court’s
announcement of its decision in Sebelius was unusual by any measure. Even
on its worst days, the press has rarely reported that the Supreme Court
reached a result that was the exact opposite of what the Court really held.23
On the other hand, the proper functioning of a democratic society requires
the best possible reporting on the work of government, including the
Supreme Court, and the obstacles to achieving that goal seem particularly
formidable at the present time. Those obstacles include the twenty-four-hour
news cycle and its insatiable demand for instant reporting; the increased
balkanization of the news media along ideological lines; and the changing
economics of the news media, which has broadly resulted in substantial

23

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 524 (2012). While the syllabus seems to suggest
that Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito simply dissented, and that there was no point of
agreement between the dissenters and the Chief Justice, the fact is that the Chief Justice indicated
his concurrence with Justice Scalia’s dissent insofar as the Commerce Clause issue was concerned.
See id. at 561.
That is, of course, exactly what the press also did in connection with the Court’s 1935 decision in
the “Gold Clause cases,” when the Associated Press “misinterpreted the majority opinion and
transmitted a bulletin stating the opposite of the Court’s intent.” DAVID L. GREY, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE NEWS MEDIA 37 (1968). The press has had other bad days. For example,
Corinna Barrett Lain has described the shortcomings of the press’s reporting on Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962):
The first wire service reports on Engel went out within five minutes of the decision’s
announcement, feeding what would become the lead story in all news outlets by the end
of the day and front-page news the following morning. Unfortunately, none of the reports
stressed the limited nature of the Court’s ruling; indeed, the AP bulletin failed to note the
state-sponsored nature of the prayer at all. . . . Newspapers sensationalized the ruling with
headlines such as “No praying in Schools, Court Rules” and “Supreme Court Outlaws
Prayers in Public Schools” that exaggerated the holding of the case and provided terse,
oversimplified accounts of the decision that were at best incomplete. Radio and TV
quickly followed suit.
Corinna Barrett Lain, God, Civic Virtue, and the American Way: Reconstructing Engel, 67 STAN. L. REV.
479, 517–18 (2015); see also STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT: SOME PERSPECTIVES 95 (1970) (“In initial bulletins concerning Engel v. Vitale, UPI
reported that the freedom-of-religion clause rather than the establishment clause was involved. The
error remained in subsequent releases.”); id. at 96 (“[T]he papers, and radio and TV as well,
portrayed a decision far broader than what the Court had in fact issued.”). Equally problematic
was the press’s reporting of the controversy that followed. As “several news magazines noted at the
time: Engel was hated ‘not so much for what it said as for what people thought it said.’” Lain, supra,
at 519. Chester Newland has observed that the Justices’ split opinions were a significant source of
the confusion in the press’s reporting of the Engel decision. Chester A. Newland, Press Coverage of the
United States Supreme Court, 17 W. POL. Q. 15, 24–25 (1964); id. at 25 (“While separate opinions
sometimes provide useful alternative expositions of legal concepts, the individual opinions in this
case were such that apparently even the justices did not fully understand[] one another.”). Professor
Newland has further noted that on June 25, 1962, the day the Engel decision was handed down, the
Court announced decisions in 16 cases with signed opinions and 257 memorandum cases. Id. at
32.
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reductions in staffing and resources.24 The press is more partisan, has fewer
resources, and is under greater pressure to report more quickly than ever
before. At the same time, the Court’s opinions are longer, more complicated,
and more difficult to decipher.25 Generally speaking, the Court’s recent
opinions fall far short of the ideal, which holds that, at least when courts
speak to the nature of our constitutional system, the limits that the
Constitution places on our elected officials, or the rights and duties of
citizenship, they should speak in a way that can actually be heard and
understood by those to whom the Court’s opinions necessarily are addressed.
As Joseph Goldstein has written,
[T]he justices, as members of a collective body, have an obligation to
maintain the Constitution, in opinions of the Court and also in concurring
and dissenting opinions, as something intelligible—as something that We the
People of the United States can understand. Whether the justices be activists
or passivists, they have a professional obligation to articulate in
comprehensible and accessible language the constitutional principles on
which their judgments rest. The Court’s goal is to render opinions, whether
or not based on original understanding, that contemporary society can

24

25

See Amy Mitchell et al., Political Polarization & Media Habits, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 21, 2014),
https://www.journalism.org/2014/10/21/political-polarization-media-habits/
[https://perma.cc/6WP5-3BGZ] (noting political polarization); Gregory J. Martin & Ali
Yurukoglu, Bias in Cable News: Persuasion and Polarization, 107 AM. ECON. REV. 2565 (2017)
(discussing the 24-hour news cycle); Newspapers Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 29, 2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/fact-sheet/newspapers/
[https://perma.cc/FKH3MANH]; Elizabeth Grieco, Fast Facts About the Newspaper Industry’s Financial Struggles as McClatchy Files
for Bankruptcy, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2020/02/14/fast-facts-about-the-newspaper-industrys-financial-struggles/
[https://perma.cc/4YKF-NG85]; Caitlin E. Jewett & Paul Goren, Ideological Structure and Consistency
in the Age of Polarization, 44 AM. POL. RES. 81 (2016); Erik P. Bucy, Walter Gantz & Zheng Wang,
Media Technology and the 24-Hour News Cycle, in COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL
CHANGE 143 (Carolyn A. Lin & David J. Atkin eds., 2007).
See, e.g., Meg Penrose, Supreme Verbosity: The Roberts Court’s Expanding Legacy, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 167
(2018). The length of contemporary Supreme Court opinions may be attributable to the law clerks.
LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 240 (2004) (“The detailed legal analysis is done almost exclusively by the clerks, recent law
school graduates with at most a year or two of experience. Opinions are drafted by a single
chamber, with minimal input from other chambers (except via conversations among the clerks).
The Justices almost never meet to discuss a drafted opinion and they never work out their reasoning
as a group. The veneer of careful deliberation is generated almost entirely by the law clerks, who
draft most of the long opinions that constitute the Court’s only public statement.”); Barry Sullivan
& Megan Canty, Interruptions in Search of a Purpose: Oral Argument in the Supreme Court, October Terms
1958–60 and 2010–12, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 1005, 1071 (2015) (noting that the Supreme Court has
increased its complement of law clerks, while reducing the number of cases on its merits docket,
thereby permitting the law clerks to devote more time to each individual opinion).
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understand—opinions in which the principles formulated are linked in an
intelligible manner to the Constitution as amended.26

The Supreme Court has been largely oblivious to the perfect storm that
these developments have left in their wake. The Court seems to have fallen
into the trap of thinking that the quality of reporting on its work is the press’s
problem, rather than a problem in which both the Court and the public are
also heavily invested. If the press’s coverage of the Court is inadequate, it is
the Court, and ultimately the public that will pay the price. The Court’s
indifference is short-sighted. The Court is necessarily dependent on the press
because, as the Canadian scholar Peter Russell has said, “Journalists are the
managers of the political life of judicial decisions.”27 The Court’s apparent
lack of concern is indeed surprising, and also self-defeating, at a time when
many suspect that there is no distinction between law and politics, that the
Justices are simply “politicians in robes,” and that judicial expertise consists
simply in the “science” of using legal jargon to dress up political
preferences.28

26

27

28

GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20, at 19; see also TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW 37, 42–43 (2010)
(“The law must be accessible and so far as possible intelligible, clear and predictable. . . . The
length, elaboration and prolixity of some common law judgments (not just here [in England] but in
other countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) can in themselves
have the effect of making the law to some extent inaccessible.”); Joel K. Goldstein & Charles A.
Miller, Brandeis: The Legacy of a Justice, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 461, 494 (2016) (“Brandeis believed that
the Supreme Court was ‘a teacher to the nation of both scholarly and moral truths.’ That
understanding of the institution shaped his conception of his duty as a justice. He sought to make
his opinions instructive, not simply convincing, and he continued to rework them so they would
teach, not simply persuade.”); Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 SUP.
CT. REV. 127, 180 (1967) (“By their decisions—and especially through a coherent explanation of
the grounds of their decisions—the judges [of the early Republic] could partially introduce the
language of the law into the vulgar tongue. What is more important, they could transfer to the
minds of the citizens the modes of thought lying behind legal language and the notions of right
fundamental to the regime. The political sophistication needed, then and now, for conveying these
lessons is surpassed only by the sense of political responsibility that continues to set judges the task
of being republican schoolmasters.”).
FLORIAN SAUVAGEAU ET AL., THE LAST WORD: MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF CANADA 8 (2006) (quoting Peter Russell, Comments at the Media–Supreme Court Research
Workshop, Ottawa (Nov. 7, 2002)).
See, e.g., Charles Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial Politics?, 97 CORNELL L. REV.
191 (2012); Randall Kennedy, Cynical Realism: Randall Kennedy on the Biases of the Supreme Court,
LONDON REV. BOOKS, Jan. 2021, at 24; Jason Johnson, The Supreme Court: Anti-Democratic, AntiAmerican, Immoral?, SLATE (Oct. 12, 2021, 10:39 AM), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2021/10/supreme-court-preview-gun-rights-new-york-civil-rights-abortion.html
[https://perma.cc/2VJ2-QNRL] (noting the historically low public approval of the Supreme
Court); Robert Barnes & Seung Min Kim, Supreme Court Observers See Trouble Ahead as Public Approval
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The Supreme Court’s apparent lack of concern is mystifying for another
reason, namely, that some prominent constitutional courts in other countries
have seized on the problem and have adopted new methods of
communication aimed at helping journalists inform and educate the public
about judicial decisions. More specifically, those constitutional courts have
put aside the judiciary’s traditional view that judicial opinions must always
speak for themselves, without further elaboration or explanation. Many
constitutional courts have moved beyond the initial step of using basic press
releases to guide public perceptions of their decisions. Some have chosen to
of
Justices
Erodes,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
26,
2021,
5:36
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-publicopinion/2021/09/25/379b51ec-1c6c-11ec-bcb8-0cb135811007_story.html
[https://perma.cc/L645-5TA2] (“A Gallup poll released last week said Americans’ opinions of the
Supreme Court have dropped to a new low, with only 40 percent approving of the justices’ job
performance.”). Criticism of the Court has increased during the Covid-19 pandemic, and several
of the Justices have responded, sometimes angrily. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Alito Responds to Critics of
the
Supreme
Court’s
‘Shadow
Docket’,
N.Y.
TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/30/us/politics/alito-shadow-docket-scotus.html
[https://perma.cc/SJP7-RLS3] (Oct. 4, 2021) (“In a combative speech on Thursday, Justice
Samuel A. Alito Jr. defended several of the Supreme Court’s recent rulings on what critics call its
‘shadow docket,’ saying the news media had created the impression that ‘a dangerous cabal is
deciding important issues in a novel, secretive, improper way in the middle of the night, hidden
from public view.’”); Adam Liptak, Justice Barrett Says the Supreme Court’s Work Is Not Affected by Politics,
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/13/us/politics/amy-coney-barrett-politicssupreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/9CM5-D3ZE] (Sept. 30, 2021) (“Justice Amy Coney
Barrett said on Sunday that political partisanship plays no role in decision making at the Supreme
Court. . . . Her remarks came after an introduction by Senator Mitch McConnell, the minority
leader, who helped found the [McConnell] center. Mr. McConnell was instrumental in ensuring
Justice Barrett’s rushed confirmation just weeks after the death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
weeks before President Donald J. Trump lost his bid for re-election.”); Mike Berardino & Ann E.
Marimow, Justice Thomas Defends the Supreme Court’s Independence and Warns of ‘Destroying Our Institutions’,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
16,
2021,
7:16
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/justice-clarencethomas/2021/09/16/d2ddc1ba-1714-11ec-a5e5-ceecb895922f_story.html
[https://perma.cc/C4YW-76DT] (“‘I think the media makes it sound as though you are just always
going right to your personal preference. So if they think you are antiabortion or something
personally, they think that’s the way you always will come out. They think you’re for this or for
that. They think you become like a politician,’ Thomas said in response to a question about public
misconceptions of the court.”); Ariane de Vogue, Breyer Defends State of Supreme Court in Interview with
CNN’s
Fareed
Zakaria,
CNN
(Sept.
19,
2021),
https://edition.cnn.com/2021/09/19/politics/breyer-fareed-zakaria-gps/index.html
[https://perma.cc/5NE6-DAJ7] (“As the Supreme Court finds itself in an unwelcome political
spotlight at the start of a new term, Justice Stephen Breyer defended the institution Sunday in an
interview on CNN’s ‘Fareed Zakaria GPS,’ insisting that the court is driven not by political
considerations, but by judicial philosophy. . . . [He] expressed concern about the possible erosion
of public confidence in the court’s opinions and criticized the practice of referring to justices by the
party of the president who appointed them instead of by their jurisprudential differences.”).
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issue brief, supplementary versions of their opinions that have been scrubbed
of legal jargon; others have adopted press “lock-ups” in which reporters are
allowed to review the opinions in a case, under secure conditions, before the
opinions are officially released to the public.29 Still others make judges or a
legal expert available to explain decisions to the press on the day the decisions
are announced. Some courts, such as the Supreme Court of Canada, have
adopted several of these techniques. If the Supreme Court of the United
States had been open to any of these innovations, it likely would have been
spared the circus that followed the announcement of its decision in Sebelius.30
There is no shortage of sensible, possible innovations that would improve
the Supreme Court’s communication of its decisions to the press and the
people. The goal of this Article is not to suggest that the Court should adopt
any specific menu of reforms. That is for the Court to decide. Our goal is
to show that other constitutional courts have recognized the pressing need to
reimagine the ways in which they communicate their decisions to the public,
to demonstrate that those courts have successfully adopted a range of reforms
to meet that need, and to suggest that the Supreme Court of the United
States must do so as well, if it is to continue to merit the confidence of the
people as it seeks to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities in a way that is
consistent with the demands of a democratic society.

29

30

For example, the Canadian Supreme Court has adopted the practice of advance dissemination of
judgments to selected media representatives, see Judgment Lock-Up Procedure, SUP. CT. CAN.,
https://www.scc-csc.ca/media/lu-hc-eng.aspx [https://perma.cc/P9XC-PWUQ] (July 22, 2021).
Linda Greenhouse has noted that the New York Court of Appeals used a press lock-up in
connection with its decision in the New York City bankruptcy case. Greenhouse, supra note 18, at
1544. But the practice has not caught on in the United States.
Such innovations have been suggested, but rejected. As Everette Dennis has pointed out, the
Association of American Law Schools made several recommendations along these lines in 1963,
and further proposals (including a proposed lock-up procedure) were made by reporters in 1969.
Everette E. Dennis, Another Look at Press Coverage of the Supreme Court, 20 VILL. L. REV. 765, 786–90
(1975). The American Bar Association Journal also noted the need for improvement in 1967.
Editorial, The Supreme Court and the Public, 53 A.B.A. J. 630 (1967). One proposed innovation—a
publication in which law professors and others would offer expert pre-decisional analysis of cases
on the docket—materialized and has persisted. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, DIV. FOR PUB. EDUC.,
ABA
Supreme
Court
PREVIEW,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/publications/preview_home/
[https://perma.cc/9BVC-58Y9] (last visited Feb. 10, 2021). That publication does not depend on
the cooperation of the Court. In recent years, another independent entity, SCOTUSblog, has
detailed the daily workings of the Court. See Vincent James Strickler, The Supreme Court and New
Media Technologies, in COVERING THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN THE DIGITAL AGE,
supra note 8, at 61, 74–77.
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The argument unfolds as follows: we first discuss the ways in which the
Supreme Court traditionally has approached its work and its relationship to
the press and the public. We note that the Court has traditionally spoken, as
a court, only through its formal (and, in modern times, written) opinions,
although individual Justices, at least since the time of Chief Justice John
Marshall, have sometimes defended their work in extra-curial statements.
We also show that the Court’s approach to informing the public about its
decisions has changed very little in recent decades, even as the length and
complexity of its opinions have increased. We then discuss several ways in
which three other constitutional courts—those of Canada, Germany, and
Israel—have recently attempted to improve the public’s understanding of
their decisions by working with the press to improve the quality of its
reporting on judicial decisions. We suggest that these innovations reflect a
growing institutional understanding that the political capital and legitimacy
of constitutional courts depend on the ability of those courts to make their
decisions intelligible to other participants in the political process—the
executive, the legislature, and especially the people.31 Finally, we consider the
possible application of these new approaches to the United States. We
conclude that the Supreme Court’s longstanding reluctance to entertain even
the possibility of such initiatives is inconsistent with the values and needs of
a democratic society. It is also an extravagance that the Court and the public
can no longer afford.
I. JUDICIAL OPINIONS, IN-COURT UTTERANCES, AND EXTRA-CURIAL
STATEMENTS
Much of the judicial resistance to reimagining the ways in which the
Supreme Court communicates its decisions to the public undoubtedly stems
from the presumed sanctity of the formal, written opinion as the exclusive
means whereby courts may explain their decisions. In this section, we discuss
the history and role of the formal, written opinion in the American legal
system, as well as the common understanding that courts are obliged in a
democratic society to explain their decisions to the public. While it is
generally believed that American courts communicate their decisions only
31

See NUNO GAROUPA & TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REPUTATION: A COMPARATIVE THEORY
196–97 (2015) [hereinafter GAROUPA & GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REPUTATION] (noting the tendency
of constitutional courts around the world to adopt a more open approach toward the media and to
manage the judiciary’s collective “brand,” which the authors consider “appropriate in an era of
media saturation”); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865–869 (1992).
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through formal, written opinions, we show that the Supreme Court has not
always delivered its judgments in that form; that the Court sometimes gives
no written explanations at all for important decisions it takes; and that many
individual Justices, beginning most notably with Chief Justice Marshall, have
sought to defend their judicial work through extra-curial pronouncements,
rather than letting their written opinions “speak for themselves.” Individual
Justices have also expressed their personal opinions on important issues that
have come before the Court, or seem likely to come before the Court in the
future, on numerous occasions.
A. The Norm That Courts Speak Through Written Opinions
One obstacle to the Supreme Court’s willingness to consider new ways of
communicating with the press and the public may be its attachment to the
traditional view that courts should speak only through their formal, written
opinions. That view is succinctly stated in the online “Journalist’s Guide to
the Federal Courts,” which is published by the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts and explains that “federal judges do not grant interviews about
active cases. Judges ‘speak’ through comments made in open court or
through written decisions. Reporters must rely on the official case proceeding
as their primary information source.”32 The Journalist’s Guide accurately
reflects the traditional view, namely, that courts speak only through their
public, in-court utterances or through their written opinions. But the Justices
have not always explained their decisions in written opinions, and they have
not always abstained from extra-curial discussions of their work. Indeed, the
Justices have defended their decisions in extra-curial interventions, at least
occasionally, since the earliest days of the Court.
In the beginning, the practice with respect to written opinions was
different. The filing of written opinions was not part of the judicial tradition
that the American courts inherited from England.33 Nor did the Constitution
32

33

ADMIN. OFF. OF U.S. CTS., JOURNALIST’S GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-court-media-basics-journalists-guide
[https://perma.cc/G9Q8-47U5] (last visited Feb. 10, 2021).
See KRAMER, supra note 25, at 158 (“Written opinions were practically nonexistent. Few judges
published their decisions, and the only available sources of American case law consisted of
handwritten manuscripts, which could be copied but were seldom widely available; partisan
pamphlets; and unreliable newspaper accounts from a handful of notorious cases.”); id. at 159 (“Nor
were there, as yet, treatises or systematic digests of American law to which lawyers and judges could
turn in lieu of official reports. There was only Blackstone, who became important almost by
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require that the courts prepare or publish written opinions.34 More broadly,
the oral tradition persisted, even in the Supreme Court: the argument of
cases was principally oral, with little or no written briefing,35 and the Justices
mainly delivered their opinions orally from the bench, to be transcribed and
made available to the public, if at all, by newspaper reporters and by a series
of entrepreneurial court reporters who were not paid by the government, but
depended for their profit on the sale of their reports.36 Those entrepreneurial

34

35
36

default.”). The practice of announcing opinions orally was inherited from England. See WILLIAM
D. POPKIN, EVOLUTION OF THE JUDICIAL OPINION: INSTITUTIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL STYLES
37, 82 (2007) (“In England, the writing and reporting of opinions evolved gradually out of a practice
of oral opinions that were unofficially reported through the initiative of expert legal professionals.”);
Gerald Lebovits, Alifya V. Curtin & Lisa Solomon, Ethical Judicial Opinion Writing, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 237, 243 (2008) (noting that the American legal system was originally “speech-centered”);
KRAMER, supra note 25, at 161 (“The absence of published opinions was, of course, a major
problem. ‘When I came to the Bench,’ recalled James Kent years later, ‘there were no reports or
state precedents. The opinions were delivered ore tenus [orally]. We had no law of our own, and
nobody knew what it was.”) (quoting a letter from James Kent to Thomas Washington (Oct. 6,
1828), in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 842–43 (Ass’n of American
Law Schools ed., 1907)). American courts also initially followed the English tradition of seriatim
opinions. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 40 (2001); SUNSTEIN, supra note
21, at 116–18; M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of Dissent, 2007
SUP. CT. REV. 283, 292–321 (2007).
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION—A BIOGRAPHY 214 (2005); see also Craig Joyce,
The Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on Marshall Court Ascendancy, 83 MICH.
L. REV. 1291, 1378 (1985) [hereinafter Joyce, The Supreme Court Reporter]; Erwin C. Surrency, Law
Reports in the United States, 25 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 48, 60 (1981). By contrast, the Constitution
authorizes the President to “require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the
executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices.” U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
See Sullivan & Canty, supra note 25, at 1020–22 (discussing oral argument in the early years of the
Supreme Court).
Elizabeth Feaster Baker described the arrangement in her 1937 biography of Henry Wheaton, the
third Reporter of Decisions. ELIZABETH FEASTER BAKER, HENRY WHEATON, 1785–1848, at 26–
27 (1937). Among other things, Baker notes that the position of Reporter of Decisions was “one of
honor and importance,” and that the early reporters were people of accomplishment. Alexander
J. Dallas, the first Reporter, later served as Secretary of the Treasury, and William Cranch, the
second Reporter, served simultaneously as Chief Justice of the Circuit Court of the District of
Columbia. Id. As an inducement for Wheaton to take up the position, “the justices agreed to
furnish him alone, for his sole benefit, with all writings and memoranda that they made of their
decisions to aid him in reporting the cases.” Id. Interestingly, it was not until 1834 that the Court
required the reporter to deliver to the clerk for safekeeping the opinions that he had transcribed
and published. See 131 U.S. at xvi (1888); POPKIN, supra note 33, at 83; Joyce, The Supreme Court
Reporter, supra note 34, at 1307. Wheaton, who also practiced before the Court, apparently took
some liberties in the reporting of cases. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND
CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815–1835, at 392 (abridged ed. 1991) (“Wheaton’s professional ambitions
and the discretion the Reportership permitted him in reproducing the arguments of others
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court reporters remain well known to lawyers today because it is by their
names—Alexander J. Dallas, William Cranch, Henry Wheaton, and Richard
Peters, Jr.—that the early volumes of the United States Reports continue to
be known.37 The early Justices not only delivered their opinions orally, they
seem generally to have spoken from notes, rather than from a formal text;38
and the accuracy of the court reporters’ transcriptions obviously depended
on what the person reporting on the decision was able to hear, understand,
and write down.39 It seems fair to assume that much of what the Justices said
was reported inaccurately or not reported at all, and that the ultimate
preparation of the case report was itself a somewhat creative endeavor.
Richard Peters, who succeeded Wheaton as the fourth Reporter of Decisions,
is thought to have been the first reporter to have asked that the Justices review
his transcriptions of their opinions before they were printed.40 The fact that
the early reporters depended on sales of their work for their compensation
affected the dissemination of the reports in various ways. Among other
things, the market for the reporters’ work was limited, and the early reporters

37

38

39

40

combined to create ample temptation to engage in interventionist reporting, in which he did not
merely render arguments but shaped them for his own purposes. Stating his own arguments fully
and those of his opponents cryptically was a mild version of interventionism. There were more
serious examples.”). For a fuller account of the early Reporters of Decisions, see id. at 384–426.
See Craig Joyce, The Torch Is Passed: In-Chambers Opinions and the Reporter of Decisions in Historical
Perspective, 3 RAPP’S IN-CHAMBERS OPINIONS, at vii (2004). Dallas served from 1791 to 1800;
Cranch served from 1801 to 1815; Wheaton served from 1816 to 1827; and Peters served from
1828 to 1843. Id. A dispute between Wheaton and Peters produced the first Supreme Court
copyright case. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–
1800, at xxiv (Maeva Marcus ed., 1994); Joyce, The Supreme Court Reporter, supra note 34, at 1310
n.110 (observing that Cranch relied on the Justices’ notes, which were sometimes polished and
sometimes not). The Justices may sometimes have issued written opinions in cases they considered
to be particularly momentous. See 131 U.S. at xv–xvi (1888) (J.C. Bancroft Davis’s hundredth
anniversary retrospective appendix on reporting at the Supreme Court); Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Communicating and Commenting on the Court’s Work, 83 GEO. L.J. 2119, 2119 (1995) [hereinafter
Ginsburg, Commenting on the Court’s Work].
See BAKER, HENRY WHEATON, supra note 36. William Popkin notes in this regard that “[i]t is clear
that some of the opinions reported by Dallas, Cranch, and Wheaton were delivered orally and
transcribed by the reporter (or someone on whom the reporter relied).” POPKIN, supra note 33, at
82; see also Joyce, The Supreme Court Reporter, supra note 34, at 1374 (quoting Wheaton). For example,
it may well be the case that portions of Justice Iredell’s dissenting opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), were omitted from the published report. See 5 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 38, at 164, 186.
POPKIN, supra note 33, at 83 (“[I]t is not clear whether Peters provided the Justices with his own
record of their opinions or gave them proofs of written opinions he had received from the Justices.”);
Joyce, The Supreme Court Reporter, supra note 34, at 1357–58.
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therefore tended to delay publication of the Court’s opinions until they had
a full book to publish.41
The newspapers of the period provided more timely coverage of the
Supreme Court’s activities, but even the Court’s most important decisions
were sometimes reported in a summary fashion and the case reports that
were published in newspapers were not always entirely accurate.42 Like the
official reporters, the newspaper reporters were limited by what they were
able to hear and write down.43 In addition, and unlike the official reporters,
the newspaper reporters were not usually trained lawyers, and they often
failed to grasp the legal significance of the opinions that were the subjects of
their reporting.44 Newspapers that wished to report on the Court’s decisions
without having a reporter present in the Court faced an additional obstacle

41

42
43

44

Joyce, The Supreme Court Reporter, supra note 34, at 1301. Thus, there were wide variations in the
amount of time that elapsed between the oral announcement of an opinion and its publication. For
example, “between Chisholm v. Georgia, the last decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
reported in Dallas’ second volume, and the publication of the volume itself in 1798, there was a gap
of five years.” Id. Similarly, “[t]he first volume of Cranch’s Reports, including cases decided as early
as the August 1801 Term, did not appear until June of 1804.” Id. at 1310. On the other hand,
“Volume 3 of Dallas’ Reports appeared in late 1799, less than a year following the February 1799
Term with which it concluded.” Id. at 1301.
Id. at 1310–11.
Even at the beginning of the twentieth century “there were no proofs of opinions available to the
press. Newsmen had to write up stories about Court decisions without even having a text of
opinions from which to work.” GREY, supra note 23, at 37.
For example, the newspaper coverage of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), on which
the bench, the bar, and the public were forced to rely pending the publication of Cranch’s Reports,
was skimpy. See Joyce, The Supreme Court Reporter, supra note 34, at 1310–11. Albert Beveridge
observed that the decision “received scant notice at the time of its delivery. The newspapers had
little to say about it. Even the bench and the bar of the country, at least in the sections remote from
Washington, appear not to have heard of it. . . .” 3 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN
MARSHALL 153 (1919). Although Charles Warren noted that some newspapers “contained a very
erroneous account of the point decided,” he also observed that the Marbury decision was printed in
full in several newspapers. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY 245 n.2 (1922). Of course, Marbury did not seem as salient to those who lived in the
nineteenth century as it did to later generations. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington & Amanda Rinderle,
Making a Mountain Out of a Molehill? Marbury and the Construction of the Constitutional Canon, 39
HASTINGS. CONST. L. Q. 823, 825 (2012) (“It took time to convert Marbury into a case primarily
about judicial review.”); Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetorical Uses of Marbury v. Madison: The
Emergence of a “Great Case,” 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 375 (2003). The problem persisted long after
Marbury. Cf. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 371 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring) (“There is
perhaps no area of news more inaccurately reported . . . than legal news. . . . [A] great deal of it
must be attributed, in candor, to ignorance, which frequently is not at all blameworthy. For
newspapers are conducted by men who are laymen to the law. With too rare exceptions, their
capacity for misunderstanding the significance of legal events and procedures, not to speak of
opinions, is great.”).
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in that “[t]he government did not possess any formal scheme to disseminate
the opinions of the Court [and] [t]he opinions themselves were published in
a pamphlet under copyright and at a rather high cost (50¢).”45 Thus, in
Chisholm v. Georgia,46 the clerk of the Court, “[r]ecognizing that the decision
of the Court ‘may give umbrage to the Advocates of “State
sovereignty,”’ . . . attempted to correct ‘erroneous’ reports circulating in the
papers by sending a summary of the case to the local newspapers.”47 It may
be that the deficiencies in such newspaper accounts helped to encourage the
shift to written opinions.48
As the Journalist’s Guide suggests, the tradition of written opinions is now
well entrenched in American legal culture,49 and the practice of publishing
these opinions has long been considered central to our justice system.50 In
1936, for example, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote that, “it is the
practice of the Supreme Court to hand down opinions in writing which are
summarized orally from the bench.”51 Similarly, Robert Leflar has suggested
that “[j]udicial opinions are the voices of our courts, . . . and so represent the
judiciary to the public, but they are not voices merely. They are what courts

45
46
47
48

49

50

51

DOUGLAS BRADBURN, THE CITIZENSHIP REVOLUTION: POLITICS AND THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN UNION, 1774–1804, at 83 (2009).
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
BRADBURN, supra note 45; see also WASBY, supra note 23, at 87.
See POPKIN, supra note 33, at 83 (“[T]he practice of writing judicial opinions, at least in important
cases, began as a way for the judge to deliver oral opinions efficiently (by reading from a manuscript)
and as a response to concerns about reportorial accuracy.”).
See, e.g., James Boyd White, Judicial Criticism, 20 GA. L. REV. 835, 836–37 (1986) (“[A]nyone can
vote his intuitions or biases or feelings . . . . The great contribution of the judicial mind is not the
result but the judicial opinion, the text in which . . . competing lines of argument are developed
fully and fairly, with the object of exposing to view what is most deeply problematic both in our
resources of legal meaning and in the case upon which they bear.”).
See POPKIN, supra note 33, at 84 (“[W]riting opinions for official publication eventually became the
norm in the U.S. Supreme Court, even though there is still no law or court rule that explicitly
requires written judicial opinion.”); see also Surrency, supra note 34, at 55 (observing that no law
requires the Justices of the Supreme Court to present their opinions in writing). While our study
focuses on the Supreme Court, it warrants mention that lower courts increasingly have departed
from the practice of opinion publication. See Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1
J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 219 (1999) (discussing prohibitions on citation of unpublished opinions);
Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 3 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 199 (2001) (noting that about 80% of federal circuit court opinions are
unpublished); Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Court of Appeals Decisions: A Hard Look at the Process, 14
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67 (2004); Katrin Marquez, Are Unpublished Opinions Inconsistent with the Right
of Access?, CASE DISCLOSED BLOG (Nov. 19, 2018), https://law.yale.edu/mfia/case-disclosed/areunpublished-opinions-inconsistent-right-access [https://perma.cc/7E5V-SNFG].
CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 64 (1936).
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do, not just what they say. They are the substance of judicial action, not just
news releases about what courts have done, though they have that function
too.”52 And James Boyd White has written: “The opinion is not merely an
epiphenomenon to the law, a slight adjunct to the real business of deciding
cases and predicting what officials will do, but is central to the activities of
mind and character of the law as we know and value it.”53 For all these
reasons, written opinions are generally understood to speak for themselves—
“only the words written and nothing else should be handed down as ‘the law’
in a case.”54
Notwithstanding the importance of written opinions, it would be a
mistake to think that the Court always explains its rulings, let alone that it
does so in writing. For example, the Court declines to hear far more cases
than it agrees to hear, and it rarely gives any reason for declining to exercise
its jurisdiction.55 Moreover, some of the most important decisions that the

52
53
54

55

Robert A. Leflar, Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 810, 819 (1961).
James Boyd White, Judicial Opinion Writing—What’s an Opinion For?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1363, 1368
(1995) [hereinafter White, Judicial Opinion Writing].
GREY, supra note 23, at 16; see also POPKIN, supra note 33, at 22 (“A binding judicial opinion is like
legislation, purporting to contain the law within the four corners of a single document.”); Alan F.
Westin, Out-of-Court Commentary by United States Supreme Court Justices, 1790-1962: Of Free Speech and
Judicial Lockjaw, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 633, 633 (1962) (quoting Justice William Brennan, who
observed in 1959 that judicial independence “require[s] that the opinions by which judges support
decisions must stand on their own merits without embellishment or comment from the judges who
write or join them”); William J. Brennan, Jr., The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI.
L. REV. 473, 473 (1973) (“I came to appreciate the wisdom of some of my distinguished
predecessors who believed that a Justice of the Supreme Court should speak only through his
published opinions. . . . [W]ith one important exception, I have made no speeches, written no
articles, and engaged in no outside activities. . . . [However,] those of my predecessors who
declined to make speeches nevertheless believed, as I do, that a Justice should make known his views
on proposals that would fundamentally alter the functions and procedures of the Court.”).
See, e.g., ROBERT L. STERN, EUGENE GRESSMAN & STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO, SUPREME COURT
PRACTICE 264–65 (1986) (“Most orders of the Court denying petitions for writs of certiorari do no
more than announce the simple fact of denial, without giving any reasons therefor. This practice
reflects the highly discretionary nature of the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction, whereby each
individual Justice is free to cast a negative vote for whatever reason he or she sees fit.”). In addition,
some of the Court’s most controversial rulings in the last few years have come under the Court’s
“shadow docket,” in which cases are not fully briefed or argued orally and decisions typically take
the form of short, unsigned summary orders that do not fully explain the Justices’ reasoning or
identify how each Justice voted. Furthermore, the Court has sometimes entered orders and
opinions on emergency applications late at night—in one case, shortly before midnight on
Thanksgiving eve. See William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 1 (2015); William Baude, The Supreme Court’s Secret Decisions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/03/opinion/the-supreme-courts-secret-decisions.html
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Supreme Court renders, from a practical point of view, are rulings on stay
motions, recusal suggestions, and other interlocutory motions, which are not
usually explained.56 Some of those rulings may be deeply impactful—
sometimes even resulting in the imposition of the death penalty—but there
is no law or court rule that requires reasons to be given, either orally or in
writing.57

56

57

[https://perma.cc/4AWD-K6NF]; Stephen I. Vladeck, The Supreme Court Is Making New Law in the
Shadows, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/15/opinion/supremecourt-religion-orders.html [https://perma.cc/8V95-XNEQ]; James Romoser, Lawmakers Consider
Nudging Supreme Court Toward More Transparency on the Shadow Docket, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 18, 2021,
9:26 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/02/lawmakers-consider-nudging-supreme-courttoward-more-transparency-on-the-shadow-docket/ [https://perma.cc/VNK5-B7L2] (reporting a
bipartisan discontent with the uptick in unexplained shadow docket rulings); The Supreme Court: In
the Shadows, ECONOMIST, Aug. 28, 2021, at 36, 37 (“[T]he spike in shadow-docket cases involving
issues of national importance—including battles over election rules and public-health measures to
fight covid-19—highlights a deficit of transparency and accountability. The Court usually affirms
or denies a request without a word of explanation, though sometimes a short opinion (or dissent) is
attached. Individual justices decide whether to reveal their votes—they usually remain hidden.”);
Lawrence Hurley & Andrew Chung, Analysis: U.S. Supreme Court’s ‘Shadow Docket’ Favored Religion and
Trump, REUTERS (July 28, 2021, 11:30 AM), https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/ussupreme-courts-shadow-docket-favored-religion-trump-2021-07-28/ [https://perma.cc/6QHKZVBC] (“As midnight approached on the eve of the U.S. Thanksgiving holiday, the conservativemajority Supreme Court granted emergency requests by Christian and Jewish groups challenging
COVID-19 crowd restrictions imposed by New York state.”).
See Barry Sullivan, Law and Discretion in Supreme Court Recusals: A Response to Professor Lubet, 47 VAL. U.
L. REV. 907 (2013) [hereinafter Sullivan, Supreme Court Recusals] (discussing the Justices’ practice of
deciding recusal motions without giving reasons).
The Trump administration engaged in “emergency” motion practice in the Supreme Court to an
unprecedented degree, and many important matters have been finally resolved, as a practical
matter, on emergency motions. See Stephen I. Vladeck, How the Supreme Court Is Quietly Enabling
Trump, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/17/opinion/supremecourts-trump-relief.html [https://perma.cc/ESP7-PYM7] (“[I]n just three years, the Trump
administration’s Justice Department has sought 29 emergency stays [compared to a total of 8 during
the 16 years of the last two administrations] . . . including 11 during the court’s current term alone.
And the justices, or at least a majority of them, have largely acquiesced, granting 17 of the
applications in full or in part, rulings that have had significant and lasting ramifications on the
ground — and that have often been quite divisive on the court. . . . [The] court’s behavior in these
cases gives at least the appearance of undue procedural favoritism toward the government as a
litigant . . . . [I]t gives at least the appearance that the court is bending over backward to
accommodate a particular political agenda — a message that, now more than ever, all of the justices
should be ill inclined to send.”); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133
HARV. L. REV. 123, 126 (2019) (“[T]he net effect of the Court’s actions in most of these cases has
left the Solicitor General with most of what he has asked for . . . . [E]ven in the instances in which
that has not been the case, the Court’s denial of relief has come summarily and with . . . no
suggestion from the Court that the Solicitor General is abusing his unique position, taking
advantage of his special relationship with the Court, or otherwise acting in a manner unbecoming
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Written opinions may sometimes seem like an extravagance to busy
judges, but they are central to the public’s understanding of how the judicial
system is supposed to work. It is generally recognized that judicial decisionmaking should be transparent, and that judges must be accountable to the
public for their rulings, which means that judges must give public reasons.58
The preparation of a written opinion is meant to assure the parties, the
public, and the profession that the judges have undertaken a thorough and
thoughtful review of the issues presented, which is essential to the perception
that the judiciary is the branch of government most closely identified with
reasoned decision-making, as opposed to the mere exercise of political will.59

58

59

of the office he holds.”); Garrett Epps, The Supreme Court Is Trump’s Enforcer, ATLANTIC (Sept. 15,
2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/09/the-supreme-court-is-trumpsenforcer/598081/ [https://perma.cc/QX8X-6PJD]. By the end of the Trump administration,
such cases were provoking some Justices to explain their agreements and disagreements. See, e.g.,
Jess Bravin, U.S. Carries Out Last Execution of Trump’s Term, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2021, 2:37 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-approves-last-execution-of-president-trumps-term11610770914 [https://perma.cc/G5VZ-63NX]; Adam Liptak, Splitting 5 to 4, Supreme Court Backs
Religious
Challenge
to
Cuomo’s
Virus
Shutdown
Order,
N.Y.
TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/26/us/supreme-court-coronavirus-religion-new-york.html
[https://perma.cc/Z8GV-NC33] (Apr. 5, 2021). In recent months, the “shadow docket” has
achieved even greater notoriety as the Court has issued numerous high-profile rulings without
briefing or oral argument. See, e.g., Grace Koppenheffer, Shining a Light into the Shadows of the Supreme
Court’s Shadow Docket, WAKE FOREST L. REV. CURRENT ISSUES BLOG (Sept. 28, 2021),
http://www.wakeforestlawreview.com/2021/09/shining-a-light-into-the-shadows-of-thesupreme-courts-shadow-docket/ [https://perma.cc/8KGY-WLR2]; Mark Joseph Stern, Did
Backlash Over the Shadow Docket Spook the Supreme Court?, SLATE (Sept. 10, 2021, 2:34 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/09/supreme-court-shadow-docket-death-penaltyreligious-freedom.html [https://perma.cc/LB85-34R9].
See Michael Wells, French and American Judicial Opinions, 19 YALE J. INT’L L. 81, 92 (1994) (“If judges
do not give the real reasons for their actions, it is harder to determine whether they are acting
properly. . . . Since the judicial process differs from other governmental action by its commitment
to reason, again the reasons given must be real ones. Otherwise, the exercise of giving reasons
becomes a hollow formality, thus eliminating any substantive difference between adjudication and
legislation.”); Wade H. McCree, Jr., Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 777,
780 (1981) (“[W]e expect the judge, like no other public official, to justify his decisions with
reason.”); but see Mathilde Cohen, Sincerity and Reason-Giving: When May Legal Decision Makers Lie?, 59
DEPAUL L. REV. 1091, 1097–98 (2010) (distinguishing between “motivating” and “justificatory”
reasons).
See GREY, supra note 23, at 28 (1968); Marla N. Greenstein, Judicial Ethics, Impartiality, and the Media,
JUDGES’ J., Summer 2019, at 39, 39; Leflar, supra note 52, at 810. Lord Coke wrote that, “Nihil
quod est contra rationem est licitum [Nothing that is against reason is lawful]; for reason is the life of the
law, nay the common law itselfe is nothing else but reason; which is to be understood of an artificiall
perfection of reason, gotten by long study, observation, and experience, and not of every man’s
naturall reason.” 1 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND, OR, A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 97b (London, Luke Hansard & Sons, Francis
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Judges have several different audiences,60 but, with respect to each of them,
it is through their opinions that judges demonstrate that they have heard and
considered the parties’ evidence and legal arguments, and that they have
taken seriously what they have heard.61 It is also through opinions that the
reasons supporting judicial rulings are opened to intellectual critique;62 and

60

61

62

Hargrave & Charles Butler eds., 18th ed. 1823); see also Allen Dillard Boyer, “Understanding, Authority,
and Will”: Sir Edward Coke and the Elizabethan Origins of Judicial Review, 39 B.C. L. REV. 43, 53–54
(1997) (“What appears to be the judge’s right to exercise discretion is really a duty to follow the
common law. Wherever reasoning fails to conform to the common law, it is an indiscretion, a word
which in Coke’s day already connoted moral deficiency.”).
One audience comprises the parties to the dispute immediately before the court as well as the
lawyers who represent them; another consists of those members of the business community or other
segment of the public whose activities might be particularly affected by the opinion as precedent,
as well as the lawyers who represent such clients; another consists of the judges who may have to
decide future cases with varying degrees of similarity to the decided case; and a final audience
consists of the scholars who study the particular area of law to which the decided case belongs. In
his tribute to Judge Augustus N. Hand, Judge Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr. famously observed that
Judge Hand thought of his “intended audience” not as “the bench, bar, or university world in
general, but the particular lawyer who was about to lose the case and the particular trial judge
whose judgment was being reviewed and perhaps reversed.” Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of the
Judicial Opinion, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 187, 197 (Peter
Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (quoting CHARLES E. WYZANSKI, JR., WHEREAS—A JUDGE’S
PREMISES: ESSAYS IN JUDGMENT, ETHICS, AND THE LAW 71 (1965)); see also EUGENE V. ROSTOW,
THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE QUEST FOR LAW 87–89 (1962)
(“The written opinion is of course a technical document, settling a law suit. It is designed to explain
to the litigants why their rights were determined as they were, and to guide lawyers in their practice
as to the relationship between the future of a particular branch of law and its past. The courts’
opinions are the heart and soul of the common law method of legal growth. . . . Beyond that
function, the opinion is a piece of rhetoric and of literature, intended to educate and persuade. In
the clearest possible way, it represents the conception of the judges speaking directly to the people,
as participants in an endless public conversation on the nature and purposes of law in all its
applications. . . . [F]inally, the reasoned judicial opinion bespeaks a concept of political
responsibility in the process of lawmaking and judicial administration.”).
See Barry Sullivan, Just Listening: The Equal Hearing Principle and the Moral Life of Judges, 48 LOY. U.
CHI. L. J. 351, 355 (2016) (“One answer to these questions . . . is that we expect judges to listen, to
listen carefully, and to take seriously what they hear. By ‘listening,’ we mean something more than
the physical act of hearing. We mean to say that judges should engage the litigants’ arguments
rigorously and respectfully, reflecting on the issues presented in the case as seriously as they would
if their own interests were at stake. Indeed, we expect more than that. We expect a judge to try
and see the parties’ dispute, not solely from the judge’s vantage point, but also from the perspectives
of the parties and those of the individuals and institutions that may be affected by the judge’s
decision.”); FED. JUD. CTR., JUDICIAL WRITING MANUAL: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 1 (2d
ed. 2013) [hereinafter JUDICIAL WRITING MANUAL] (“[T]he preparation of a written opinion
imposes intellectual discipline on the author, requiring the judge to clarify his or her reasoning and
assess the sufficiency of precedential support for it.”).
See McCree, supra note 58, at 790–91 (“Little need be said about the desirability of opinions. All of
us have had seemingly brilliant ideas that turned out to be much less so when we attempted to put
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it is through such opinions that judges demonstrate they were not moved by
favoritism, tribalism, or other factors that have no place in a legitimate system
of adjudication.63
Of course, judges may have strong initial intuitions about how a
particular case should be decided, and that may be especially true of
experienced judges; but intellectual openness is an essential characteristic of
the judicial office, and it is through the process of opinion-writing that such
initial intuitions are tested, and final decisions reached.64 As Eric Berger has

63

64

them to paper. Every conscientious judge has struggled, and finally changed his mind, when
confronted with the ‘opinion that won’t write.’ We can only guess at the number of decisions
‘affirmed without opinion’ that might have been reversed had a judge attempted to write an opinion
explaining the announced result.”); see also JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE
RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 241 (1985) (“[T]he hearing is the heart of the law, and that
is true; but the hearing reaches its fullest significance only where it is coupled with the obligation to
explain. Then the judicial opinion becomes a form with wonderful possibilities for meaning.”).
Interestingly, it was only in the late eighteenth century that American state courts were required to
file written opinions in support of their judgments. See Surrency, supra note 34, at 55 (noting that
Connecticut was the first state to impose this requirement in 1785, while other states soon followed
suit, with one state (Kentucky) actually memorializing the requirement in its constitution);
RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG
REPUBLIC 118 (1971) (noting that Connecticut was the first state to require judges to file written
opinions). Another important innovation was the institution of the position of official reporter, a
step that Massachusetts took in 1804, with the Supreme Court of the United States following suit
in 1817. See Surrency, supra note 34, at 56.
See ROSTOW, supra note 60, at 86–87 (“Jefferson himself, as President, affronted by the
overpowering influence of Marshall, urged that the Justices of the Supreme Court be required to
write individual opinions in each case . . . . Every judge should write his own opinion, Jefferson
urged, to ‘prove by his reasoning that he has read the papers, that he has considered the case, that
in the application of the law to it, he uses his own judgment independently and unbiased by party
views and personal favor or disfavor.’”) (quoting 2 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED
STATES HISTORY, supra note 44, at 113–14); Richard M. Re, “Equal Right to the Poor”, 84 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1149, 1151 (2017) (“In the Judiciary Act of 1789, the First Congress required that all federal
judges ‘solemnly swear or affirm’ that they would, among other things, ‘do equal right to the poor
and to the rich.’ That statutory oath requirement . . . remains in place today. Remarkably, the
language . . . long predates the United States.”).
Judge Posner has written that, “The judicial opinion can best be understood as an attempt to
explain how the decision, even if (as is most likely) arrived at on the basis of intuition, could have
been arrived at on the basis of logical, step-by-step reasoning.” RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW
JUDGES THINK 110 (2008). In addition, Judge Posner observes that,
[M]ost judges do not treat a[n] [impression] vote, though nominally tentative, as a
hypothesis to be tested by the further research conducted at the opinion-writing stage.
That research is mainly a search for supporting arguments and evidence. Justificatory
rather than exploratory, it is distorted by confirmation bias—the well-documented
tendency, once one has made up one’s mind, to search harder for evidence that confirms
rather contradicts one’s initial judgment. . . . The published opinion often conceals the
true reasons for a judicial decision by leaving them buried in the judicial unconscious. Had
the intuitive judgment that underlies the decision been different, perhaps an equally
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noted, “The writing process . . . can involve not just the articulation of
thought, but also the ‘transformation of thought.’ Occasionally, a Justice
realizes that an opinion ‘will not write’ and changes his vote or legal
rationale.”65 In addition, judges write opinions with the necessary
expectation that their decisions will be closely scrutinized by other judges, the
legal academy, the bar, and the public.66
The most obvious purpose of a judicial decision is to resolve and explain
the parties’ respective legal rights and duties, and, hopefully, to put an end to
their dispute. As Justice Antonin Scalia frequently observed, dispute
resolution is the central purpose of adjudication.67 If the most immediate
purpose of the judicial opinion is to decide a particular controversy and to
explain the judge’s reasons and reasoning to the parties before the court,

65

66

67

plausible opinion in support of it could have been written. If so, the reasoning in the
opinion is not the real cause of the decision, but a rationalization.
Id. at 110–11. Whether “most judges” view the judicial decision-making process in this way is an
empirical question. We do know, however, that this is how Judge Posner has elsewhere described
his approach. See Josh Blackman, Judge Posner on Judging, Birthright Citizenship, and Precedent, JOSH
BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Nov. 6, 2015), https://joshblackman.com/blog/2015/11/06/judge-posneron-judging-birthright-citizenship-and-precedent/ [https://perma.cc/KDA7-GY42] (discussing
Judge Posner’s account of his judicial approach). But cf. POPKIN, supra note 33, at 34 (“The job of
the French judicial opinion is to project public authority without telling the public too much about
how the decision is actually reached.”).
Eric Berger, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Absolutism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 667, 723 (2015)
(quoting Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 96 GEO. L.J.
1283, 1306, 1315, 1331–32 (2008)). Professor Berger also notes that, “Sometimes . . . Justices
conceal the parts of the opinion that ‘will not write’ and overemphasize the parts of the opinion
that will write. As Professor Chad Oldfather explains, the writing process sometimes encourages
writers to overemphasize the verbalizable aspect of an explanation, producing arguments that
sound more ironclad than they really are.” Id.
In multi-member courts, that professional scrutiny begins with the decisional process itself. See
Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1645
(2003) (“[J]udges have a common interest, as members of the judiciary, in getting the law right, and
that, as a result, we are willing to listen, persuade, and be persuaded, all in an atmosphere of civility
and respect.”). But the concern extends beyond the particular panel to the judiciary as a whole, to
the legal profession, and to the public. See, e.g., Thomas S. Morawetz, The Epistemology of Judging:
Wittgenstein and Deliberative Practice, 3 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 35, 59 (1990) (“[Judges] are constrained
individually by a particular way of addressing and understanding interpretive questions and they
are constrained collectively by the fact that the shared practice embraces a limited range of ways of
proceeding. This limitation is mutually understood and recognized.”).
See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 781 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[D]eclaring the
compatibility of state or federal laws with the Constitution is not only not the ‘primary role’ of this
Court, it is not a separate, free-standing role at all. We perform that role incidentally—by accident,
as it were—when that is necessary to resolve the dispute before us.”). See also JUDICIAL WRITING
MANUAL, supra note 61, at 1 (“[W]ritten opinions communicate a court’s conclusions and the
reasons for them to the parties and their lawyers.”).
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however, an equally important function of written opinions, at least in
common law countries, is to contribute to the body of precedent that serves
to guide conduct and provide the basis for deciding future cases.68 In a legal
system built on the notion of stare decisis, this law-announcing function, which
sets opinions as precedents, is constantly scrutinized.69 “For while the
68

69

See, e.g., ROSTOW, supra note 60, at 84 (“[T]he common law is no more than a library of judicial
decisions and opinions and the methods by which they are written. Through these opinions, judges
seek to perceive, to express, and to enforce the customs and aspirations of the communities they
serve. They do this in the course of settling disputes among people, and between people and the
state.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 62 (1993) (“[J]udicial opinions are simply explanations for judgments—
essays written by judges explaining why they rendered the judgment they did. The primary
significance of these essays for non-judicial actors is the guidance they provide in predicting future
judicial behavior.”); Jeremy Waldron, Principles of Legislation, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH:
THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 15, 22 (Richard W. Bauman &
Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006) (“[L]egislation is not the only means by which law is made or changed.
Law is also made or changed by the decisions of judges as they interpret existing legal materials,
including the work of other judges. This is unavoidable and no doubt in some cases it is also
desirable. But it has drawbacks. . . . [J]udicial decision making does not present itself in public as
a process for changing or creating law. . . . Courts perform their lawmaking function under partial
cover of a pretense that the law is not changing at all. . . . Judge-made law, according to John
Austin, is an ‘oblique’ form of lawmaking. The judge’s ‘direct and proper purpose is not the
establishment of the rule, but the decision of the specific case. He legislates as properly judging, and
not as properly legislating.’”); Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Constitutional Structure, 112 NW. L. REV. 789
(2017) (discussing the importance of judicial precedent as constitutional lawmaking); Barry Sullivan,
Precedent and Constitutional Adjudication, 3 WARSAW U. L. REV. 141 (2004) (noting special issues
concerning stare decisis in constitutional cases); see generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF
PRECEDENT (2008) (exploring theories and functions of judicial precedent); cf. Vincy Fon &
Francesco Parisi, Judicial Precedents in Civil Law Systems: A Dynamic Analysis, 26 INT’L REV. L. & ECON.
519 (2006) (suggesting that precedent plays a lesser but not insignificant role in civil law countries).
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, at xxi (4th ed. 2019) (“‘The Law’
in France and Germany is above all the law of the great codes—statutes, in other words. ‘Common
law,’ on the other hand, was ‘unwritten law,’ as Blackstone called it. ‘Unwritten’ was not meant
literally; English and American laws are, if anything, overwritten. Blackstone meant, however, that
the ultimate, highest source of law was not an enactment, not a statute of Parliament; rather, it was
‘general custom,’ as reflected in decisions of the common-law judges. . . . As a general rule,
[therefore,] common law adhered to precedent. Precedent is commonly considered one of the basic
concepts of the common law.”); EMLIN MCCLAIN, THE EVOLUTION OF THE JUDICIAL OPINION
7 (1902) (“[D]ecisions of courts under the civil law are regarded as of very slight consequence in
determining what are the general rules and principles to be recognized in the administration of
justice, while under the common law, precedents are of controlling importance.”); POPKIN, supra
note 33, at 21–23 (noting that in England the doctrine of binding precedent, in the sense that a
single case has the force of law, is a 19th-century phenomenon and that it was likely a reaction to
the dominance of legislation as the quintessential form of law); ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF
THE COMMON LAW 65 (1921) (describing the doctrine of precedent as “one of the three
distinctively characteristic institutions of the Anglo-American legal system”); Leflar, supra note 52,
at 810–11 (discussing the importance of precedent and stare decisis); Ryan Whalen, Brian Uzzi &
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judgment could only have reference to a state of law and facts existing at the
time of or prior to its rendition,” the Iowa law professor and Chief Justice
Emlin McClain rightly said, “it is plain that the reasons announced could be
of no importance or significance save as furnishing prospectively some
guidance in the adjudication of other cases. . . . The judicial opinion
remains, notwithstanding the[] efforts at reform, as the common and
convenient embodiment of the principles of the law, through which they are
announced and to which reference is made for the purpose of ascertaining
what they are.”70 Or, as Professor White has put it, “in every case the court
is saying not only, ‘This is the right outcome for this case,’ but also, ‘This is
the right way to think and talk about this case, and others like it.’ The opinion
in this way gives authority to its own modes of thought and expression, to its
own intellectual and literary forms. . . . The opinion thus engages in the
central conversation that is for us the law, a conversation that the opinion
itself makes possible.”71 Undeniably, it is this function of the written opinion
that is most important in the everyday work of judges, lawyers, and
academics, as they study opinions in order to ascertain what the law is on one
point or another.72 And, at least in a democratic society, a judicial opinion

70

71

72

Satyam Mukherjee, Common Law Evolution and Judicial Impact in the Age of Information, 9 ELON L. REV.
115, 118 (2017) (“Common law reasoning depends, fundamentally, on interpreting the past in light
of the present. As judges attempt to resolve present disputes, they apply the precedent of the past
to guide, explain, and justify the outcomes that they reach. Subsequently, the decisions that judges
write go on to become precedent for future judges to refer to and cite.”).
MCCLAIN, supra note 69, at 12, 18; see also POSNER, supra note 64, at 111 (“[Judicial opinions]
facilitate the consistent decision of future cases. The first decision in a line of cases may be the
product of inarticulable emotion or hunch. But once it is given articulate form, that form will take
a life of its own—a valuable life that may include binding the author and the other judges of his
court (along with lower-court judges) and thus imparting needed stability to law through the
doctrine of precedent, though a death grip if judges ignore changed circumstances that make a
decision no longer a sound guide. Opinions create, extend, and fine-tune rules; they are
supplements to constitutional and other legislative rules.”).
White, Judicial Opinion Writing, supra note 53, at 1366–68; see also ROSTOW, supra note 60, at 85 (“In
England, in the United States, and in the countries of the British Commonwealth, the judges write
long, personal opinions—essays on the law—good or bad as the case may be, but highly individual
and often illuminating. They dissent quite freely from majority judgments. Their opinions
frequently provide a revealing view of the process by which the law grows, in its common law way,
from case to case.”).
See FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 69, at xxi–xxii (“In the common law,
many basic rules of law are found nowhere but in the published opinions of judges. . . . What
lawyers study in law school is a body of high court cases.”); GREY, supra note 23, at 11 (“Until the
courts act, there are only opinions and guesses as to what the law is.”); William F. Fox, Jr., The
Enigma of Felix Frankfurter, 31 CATH. U. L. REV. 147, 153 (1981) (reviewing H. N. HIRSCH, THE
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may also serve as the authoritative voice of the community with respect to
the articulation and allocation of values.73
In the American judicial system, the art of opinion writing has often
reached its highest level, and certainly its most significant impact, in the
constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court.74 Almost inevitably, such
decisions reach beyond their immediate contexts to shape the general
contours of our constitutional law.75 It is unsurprising, therefore, that the
Court should frown on offering public statements or giving further
explanations for its decisions. Even when its opinions are misreported, the

73

74

75

ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (1981)) (noting that scholars must analyze the work of judges
first and foremost on the basis of their opinions); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897) (“The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing
more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”); Leflar, supra note 52, at 812 (“The ordinary lawyer
gets his understanding of the appellate judicial process from the reports, from the mass of single
opinions; and from the ordinary lawyer this understanding (or misunderstanding) sifts down by
degrees to the layman whom he counsels.”); White, Judicial Opinion Writing, supra note 53, at 1363–
64 (discussing the importance of judicial opinions); EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL REASONING 7 (1949) (“In case law, when a judge determines what the controlling similarity
between the present and prior case is, the case is decided.”): PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL
STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 44–45 (1999) (“[T]he rule of law is for
us the manner in which the authoritative character of the past appears. . . . We can imagine a
policy science that is wholly unbounded by the past, but it is not law’s rule.”); JAMAL GREENE,
HOW RIGHTS WENT WRONG 34 (2021) (“Lawyers train by learning cases, and so court decisions
lie at the heart of the legal canon.”).
See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1089 (1984) (“Civil litigation is an
institutional arrangement for using state power to bring a recalcitrant reality closer to our chosen
ideals. We turn to the courts because we need to, not because of some quirk in our personalities. . . .
I am willing to assume that no other country conceives of law and uses law in quite the way we do.
But this should be a source of pride rather than shame.”).
One thinks, for example, of Chief Justice Marshall’s opinions or those of Justice Robert H. Jackson.
See, e.g., RICHARD BROOKHISER, JOHN MARSHALL: THE MAN WHO MADE THE SUPREME
COURT 6, 93 (2018) (“Marshall’s opinion [in Marbury v. Madison] was not only oracular, it was
monumental.”); John Q. Barrett, A Commander’s Power, A Civilian’s Reason: Justice Jackson’s Korematsu
Dissent, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 59 (2005) (“[Justice Jackson’s dissent in Korematsu v. United
States] deserves to be studied, admired, and celebrated.”); Phil C. Neal, Justice Jackson: A Law Clerk’s
Recollections, 68 ALB. L. REV. 549 (2004) (discussing Justice Jackson’s writing style).
See Leflar, supra note 52, at 819; White, Judicial Opinion Writing, supra note 53, at 1367 (“One can
have law of a certain kind without the judicial opinion . . . . But with the opinion, a wholly different
dimension of legal life and thought becomes possible—the systematic and reasoned invocation of
the past as precedent. With this practice, in turn, there can emerge an institution that
simultaneously explains and limits itself over time. It is here, in the creation of legal authority,
rather than in the facilitation of prediction, that the opinion performs its peculiar and most
important task. . . . [I]t is also the invocation of the authority of prior texts to shape and constrain
what may be done in the present.”).
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Court will not normally correct the inaccuracies publicly.76 As Lord Denning
has said, “All we would ask is that those who criticise us will remember that,
from the nature of our office, we cannot reply to their criticisms. We cannot
enter into public controversy. Still less into political controversy. We must
rely on our conduct itself to be its own vindication.”77
The problem arises, of course, when the Supreme Court’s opinions—
taken to be the only way in which the Court may communicate with the
public—become so technical, fragmented, and prolix that they no longer
serve that function. There was a good reason for Chief Justice Earl Warren’s
insistence that the Court’s opinion in Brown v. Board of Education78 should be
short enough to be published in full in the daily newspapers and simple
enough in its language that it could be understood by the newspapers’
readers.79 When opinions are not written in a way that makes them accessible
to the general public, the Court fails in its fundamental obligation, not only
to “say what the law is,” but to do so in a way that is intelligible to citizens.
Other steps must then be taken if the Court’s democratic duty is to be
satisfied.
B. The Justices Have Often Engaged in Extra-Curial Speech
The tradition that judges speak only in open court or through their
written opinions may be well-established, but it has not invariably been
followed. It might be closer to the truth to say that the Justices speak about
specific cases only in open court or in written opinions, but even that would
not be entirely accurate. It would be better to say that the Supreme Court
speaks—as a court—only in open court or through its opinions. In this
respect, there may be some difference between what the Court must
76

77
78
79

See GREY, supra note 23, at 19; LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION
AS POLITICAL PROCESS 19 (1988) (“For the most part, judges release their opinions and remain
silent. If executive officials and legislatures are criticized in the press, they can respond in kind.
Judges, with rare exceptions, take their lumps without retaliation.”); cf. HENRY CECIL, THE
ENGLISH JUDGE 35 (1970) (“It is right that a judge’s conduct should be subject to public and private
criticism, but it is not always remembered that no judge may reply to such criticism. If something
which he has said is misreported, he may refer to the matter in open court, but that is all he may
do, and when people write to The Times complaining about his conduct, he does not write a letter
of explanation. There is no law to prevent him from doing this, but it is traditional that he should
not and tradition plays a very big part in the English judicial system.”).
R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn (No. 2) [1968] 2 All E.R. 319, 320.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN 3 (1977) [hereinafter
WARREN, MEMOIRS].
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invariably be seen to do and what the Justices may sometimes do individually.
At all events, it seems clear that many Justices have not been content simply
to let their opinions speak for themselves.80
Perhaps the best early example of a Justice’s extra-curial judicial speech
is to be found in the essays that Chief Justice Marshall published in 1819 in
defense of McCulloch v. Maryland.81 In McCulloch, of course, the Court upheld
Congress’s establishment of a national bank, despite the absence of any
specific constitutional authorization, under the Necessary and Proper
Clause.82 The McCulloch decision was unpopular with those who opposed a
strong national government, and some of them criticized the opinion in
anonymous essays published in the Richmond Enquirer.83 Chief Justice
Marshall published his rebuttals (also anonymously) in the Philadelphia Union
and the Alexandria Gazette.84 The Chief Justice apparently feared that his
critics’ essays, if left unanswered, might provoke the Virginia legislature to
condemn the McCulloch decision and call on other states to do the same.85

80

81
82
83

84

85

See, e.g., Christopher W. Schmidt, Beyond the Opinion: Supreme Court Justices and Extrajudicial Speech, 88
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 487, 490–91, 494 (2013) (arguing that the Justices have sometimes contributed
to public discussion through extra-curial speech). Several Justices cooperated with Bob Woodward
and Scott Armstrong in connection with The Brethren, the Washington Post reporters’ “inside account”
of decision-making at the Supreme Court. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE
BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 3 (1979) (“Most of the information in this book is based
on interviews with more than two hundred people, including several Justices, more than 170 former
law clerks, and several dozen former employees of the Court. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger
declined to assist us in any way.”); see also David J. Garrow, The Supreme Court and the Brethren, 18
CONST. COMMENT. 303, 304–305 (2001) (describing Justice Stewart’s initial contact with Bob
Woodward and his central role in the genesis of The Brethren, as well as the cooperation of several
other Justices).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
The news media of the early Republic were not neutral and objective purveyors of information but
partisan players, funded and supported by the political parties. Their purpose was not necessarily
to inform the public, but to persuade and mobilize an elite audience. The Richmond Enquirer was a
Republican newspaper closely allied with the Jeffersonian agenda. BROOKHISER, supra note 74, at
165; KIRBY GOIDEL, CRAIG FREEMAN & BRIAN SMENTKOWSKI, MISREADING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 52 (2015).
JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969); see Gerald
Gunther, Unearthing John Marshall’s Major Out-of-Court Constitutional Commentary, 21 STAN. L. REV. 449
(1969) (detailing the exchange between Chief Justice Marshall and his critics in the newspapers).
The Chief Justice initially wrote under the nom de plume “A Friend to the Union” in his two
Philadelphia Union essays, but he signed his nine Alexandria Gazette articles as “A Friend of the
Constitution.” BROOKHISER, supra note 74, at 165; GREY, supra note 23, at 52; KRAMER, supra
note 25, at 155; JOE MATHEWSON, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESS: THE INDISPENSABLE
CONFLICT 5–6 (2011).
See BROOKHISER, supra note 74, at 167; Gunther, supra note 84, at 452–53.
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Although the Justices have generally refrained from the kind of public
jousting with critics that Chief Justice Marshall practiced (albeit
anonymously) in the aftermath of McCulloch, others have felt the same need
to defend their opinions. On May 27, 1935, the Court handed down three
major decisions that rejected significant aspects of the New Deal.86 Chief
Justice Hughes arranged the delivery of these unanimous opinions with an
eye toward achieving the maximum dramatic effect in what has come to be
known as “Black Monday.”87 The unanimity of the three decisions was
distressing to President Franklin D. Roosevelt and left him bewildered.
President Roosevelt took them as a personal affront, and talking to
journalists, he heavily criticized the Court.88 In response, Justice Louis
Brandeis departed from his customary reticence in discussing judicial
business by giving a press interview in which he defended the Court’s
rulings.89 Justice Brandeis added to the President’s dismay by stating that the
day on which the three decisions were announced was “the most important
day in the history of the Supreme Court and the most beneficent.”90

86

87
88
89
90

A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Louisville Joint Stock Land
Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935); Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935);
see also BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 36 (1998) [hereinafter CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW
DEAL COURT] (reporting on a private 1937 conversation between Chief Justice Hughes and
Senator Burton K. Wheeler concerning the poor quality of government lawyering).
See MARIAN C. MCKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL WAR:
THE COURT-PACKING CRISIS OF 1937, at 96 (2002).
See id. at 98, 103; ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE 620 (1946)
[hereinafter MASON, BRANDEIS].
See KAMMEN, supra note 18, at 360.
MASON, BRANDEIS, supra note 88, at 620. As Professor Mason notes, Justice Brandeis admired
Roosevelt, but the Justice’s main concern was with bigness, and he thought that businesses should
be broken up so that the states would be able to regulate them. Id. at 621. In addition, Marian
McKenna has noted that Justice Brandeis had a message for two of Roosevelt’s key advisors who
met him in the robing room following the announcement of the decisions: “This is the end of this
business of centralization, and I want you to go back and tell the President that we’re not going to
let this government centralize everything. It’s come to an end . . . The President has been living in
a fool’s paradise.” MCKENNA, supra note 87, at 104. The three decisions, Justice Brandeis added,
meant that everything the administration had been doing must change. Id. See also MELVIN I.
UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 705 (2009) (“Why Roosevelt should have expected
[Brandeis] to support the NRA is puzzling. Throughout 1933 and 1934, Brandeis had made clear
to a number of top New Dealers and to the president himself that he considered the program
wrongheaded as well as impossible to administer.”)
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Similarly, in 1968, Justice Potter Stewart defended his opinion for the
Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,91 which the Wall Street Journal had
criticized as judicial legislation.92 Justice Stewart’s letter to the Journal was
published under the headline “Justice Stewart Dissents.”93 In the letter,
Justice Stewart explained the facts of the case, insisted that the Court’s
reading of the relevant statute was valid, and suggested that Congress could
amend the statute if it disagreed with the decision.94 Justice Harry Blackmun
often spoke publicly in defense of his opinion in Roe v. Wade,95 and Justice
Tom Clark gave a vigorous public defense of the Court’s opinion in Engel v.
Vitale.96 As Christopher Schmidt has noted, Justice Scalia also often
aggressively defended his opinions in speeches.97 More recently, Justice
Samuel Alito has defended certain “shadow docket” decisions in a speech at
Notre Dame Law School.98 Justice Alito has also publicly criticized the
Court’s century-old decision in Jacobson v. Massachusetts,99 which upheld the
constitutionality of mandatory vaccination in a public health emergency,

91

92

93
94
95

96
97

98
99

392 U.S. 409 (1968) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (which was originally enacted during
Reconstruction) had not been rendered irrelevant by Congress’s enactment of the Fair Housing Act
of 1968).
Editorial, The Alternate Legislature, WALL ST. J., June 20, 1968, at 16. The decision was also the
subject of some scholarly criticism. See, e.g., Gerhard Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Bemused and
Confused Muse, 1968 SUP. CT. REV. 89 (1968). See generally STEPHEN L. WASBY, ANTHONY A.
D’AMATO & ROSEMARY METRAILER, DESEGREGATION FROM BROWN TO ALEXANDER: AN
EXPLORATION OF SUPREME COURT STRATEGIES 6 (1977); SHIMON SHETREET, JUDGES ON
TRIAL: A STUDY OF THE APPOINTMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE ENGLISH JUDICIARY 320
(1976).
Potter Stewart, Letter to the Editor, Justice Stewart Dissents, WALL ST. J., July 3, 1968, at 6; see also
Schmidt, supra note 80, at 507 (describing Justice Stewart’s defense of Jones).
Stewart, supra note 93.
See Dennis J. Hutchinson, Aspen and the Transformation of Harry Blackmun, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 307,
317–23 (2005) (discussing Justice Blackmun’s public statements about Roe). As Linda Greenhouse
has noted, Justice Blackmun’s relationship with Roe was complicated. LINDA GREENHOUSE,
BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN 82–84, 134–39, 242, 245, 250 (2005).
370 U.S. 421 (1962); see Schmidt, supra note 80, at 506; Lain, supra note 23, at 521.
See Schmidt, supra note 80, at 508, 514–15 (detailing Justice Scalia’s public statements about his
judicial work); see also Debra Cassens Weiss, Scalia on Bush v. Gore: ‘Get Over It’, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 10,
2008, 11:02 AM), www.abajournal.com/news/article/scalia_on_bush_v_gore_get_over_it
[https://perma.cc/W7F4-DP99] (reporting on Justice Scalia’s “get over it” response to a Princeton
University student’s question about the Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)). Justice
Scalia repeated the comment a few weeks later in an interview with Lesley Stahl on the CBS News
program 60 Minutes. Lesley Stahl, Justice Scalia on the Record: 60 Minutes’ Lesley Stahl Interviews Supreme
Court Justice Antonin Scalia About His Public and Private Life, CBS NEWS (Apr. 24, 2008),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/justice-scalia-on-the-record/ [https://perma.cc/JLW4-DV9F].
Liptak, Alito Responds to Critics of the Supreme Court’s ‘Shadow Docket’, supra note 28.
197 U.S. 11 (1905).
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thereby pronouncing on a highly controversial issue that may require
resolution by the Court.100 In a slightly different vein, Justice Lewis Powell
responded to press criticism concerning the number of cases in which he
recused himself by preparing a memorandum explaining his recusal policy,
which he authorized the Court’s press officer to share with the media—but
only with those reporters who regularly covered the Court.101
Some Justices have chosen to write or speak in extra-curial settings about
their general jurisprudential views. For example, Justice Joseph Story wrote
a series of important treatises on various areas of law while on the Court.102

100

101

102

Justice Alito made this criticism in a November 2020 keynote address at the Federalist Society’s
National Lawyers Convention. See, e.g., Scott Lemieux, Supreme Court Justice Alito’s Federalist Society
Speech Shows How Political the Court Will Get, NBC NEWS (Nov. 13, 2020, 3:40 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/supreme-court-justice-alito-s-federalist-societyspeech-shows-how-ncna1247751 [https://perma.cc/6MBX-NVK6]. Justice Alito’s criticism of
Jacobson might be construed as an invitation to those opposed to vaccination to bring the issue to
the Court. See, e.g., Ethan Hauser & Azi Paybarah, The Governor of Texas Bars Covid Vaccine Mandates,
N.Y.
TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/11/us/texas-governor-covid-vaccinemandates.html [https://perma.cc/2DKB-8LQJ] (Oct. 21, 2021); Grace Panetta, Enforcing Biden’s
Workplace Vaccine-or-Test Mandate Falls to a ‘Toothless’ Federal Agency that Trump Gutted, Experts Say, BUS.
INSIDER (Sept. 13, 2021), https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/enforcing-biden-sworkplace-vaccine-or-test-mandate-falls-to-a-toothless-federal-agency-that-trump-gutted-expertssay/ar-AAOoISg [https://perma.cc/368N-3DFZ].
See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 272–81 (1994); Sullivan, Supreme Court
Recusals, supra note 56, at 913 n.12. Every now and then, as David Grey has noted, “newsmen
have . . . found a note from a member of the Court saying something to the effect, ‘You didn’t read
page 6 of my opinion.’” GREY, supra note 23, at 51. Similarly, Everette Dennis has noted that,
“Justice Thurgood Marshall once sent a note to reporters explaining why he had not taken part in
a decision.” Dennis, supra note 30, at 773.
See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833). Justice Story also wrote a series of anonymous articles on legal
topics for the Encyclopedia Americana in the 1830s, see R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC 275 (1985); and he apparently
assisted Henry Wheaton in writing up Wheaton’s reports of cases in which he had participated as
a member of the Court, see G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL
CHANGE, 1815–1835, at 390–95 (abridged ed. 1991); GERALD T. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY
AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME COURT 199, 323–24 (1970). In addition, Justice Story was
outspoken in his opposition to the Missouri Compromise, breaking “his political silence, for the first
and only time in his years on the bench, with a long and passionate speech [at a public meeting in
Salem, Massachusetts, in December 1819,] insisting ‘that the spirit of the Constitution, the
principles of our free government, the tenor of the Declaration of Independence, and the dictates
of humanity and sound policy, were all directly opposed to the extension of slavery.’” Id. at 195;
see also id. at 195–98 (detailing Story’s further efforts in opposition to the Missouri Compromise);
PAUL FINKELMAN, SUPREME INJUSTICE: SLAVERY IN THE NATION’S HIGHEST COURT 117–30
(2018) (detailing the apparent evolution of Story’s views on slavery). Justice Story also prepared
draft federal legislation and served as Chair of a Massachusetts commission on the codification of
state law. NEWMYER, supra, at 103, 277–80.
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Such activities took on greater significance, however, in the later decades of
the twentieth century. In the wake of the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board
of Education,103 much criticism was leveled at the Court for its “activism,” and
that criticism eventually gave rise to more general concerns about the
Justices’ interpretive theories and analytical methods.104 The airing of those
concerns provided the impetus for some Justices to give extensive, and
sometimes controversial, interviews.105 Justice Blackmun (much to the
chagrin of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger) gave lengthy print and television
interviews to the national media in 1982.106 But he was not the first to do so.
In 1968, Justice Hugo Black agreed to sit for a full-length television interview,
in which he discussed cases that had been decided during his long tenure on
the Court.107
103
104

105

106
107

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Particularly controversial were the Warren Court’s constitutional criminal procedure and voting
rights decisions, see generally Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century
Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1 (1995); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE
PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 17, 74–88, 91–98 (1998); and the Burger Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973). Richard M. Nixon and Ronald R. Reagan both “ran against” the Supreme Court.
See JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, PACKING THE COURT: THE RISE OF JUDICIAL POWER AND THE
COMING CRISIS OF THE SUPREME COURT 201–16 (2009).
In recent years, only Justice David H. Souter has maintained the virtually monastic passion for
anonymity espoused by some earlier Justices. See Chad M. Oldfather, The Inconspicuous DHS: The
Supreme Court, Celebrity Culture, and Justice David H. Souter, 90 MISS. L.J. 183, 187 (2020) (“[F]or as
much as he was out of step with the world of thirty years ago [when he was appointed to the Court],
he is almost inconceivably so today. This is true with respect to his lifestyle, with respect to his
resolutely apolitical professional style, and with respect to his complete lack of interest in, indeed
disdain for, the trappings of celebrity that have come to accompany a seat on the Court.”); cf. Bill
Barnhart, Justice John Paul Stevens and the Press: Extra! Extra! Read All About It!, in COVERING THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN THE DIGITAL AGE, supra note 8, at 238, 238 (noting that
Justice Stevens had no relations with the press until near the end of his more than three decades on
the bench). Indeed, some earlier Justices had no relations with the press at all and have said nothing
whatsoever about their work to outsiders. See RORIE SPILL SOLBERG & ERIC N. WALTENBURG,
THE MEDIA, THE COURT, AND THE MISREPRESENTATION 12 (2015) (“Historically, the justices
have been loath to make themselves available to the Fourth Estate or to interact with the mass
public”). Today, however, video interviews of several Justices are available on the C-SPAN website.
The Supreme Court: An Unprecedented Look at the Traditions and History of the Home to America’s Highest Court,
C-SPAN, https://www.c-span.org/series/?theSupremeCourt [https://perma.cc/GH9U-YFRN]
(last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
See Hutchinson, supra note 95, at 317–20.
See Paul R. Baier, Hugo Black and Judicial Lawmaking: Forty Years in Retrospect, 14 NEXUS 3 (2009);
Schmidt, supra note 80, at 489–91, 501, 506. Justice Black also agreed to deliver the Carpentier
Lectures at Columbia Law School in 1968, specifically to answer the criticism that he was becoming
more conservative. Id. at 489. Justice Black also broke with his usual practice and responded to
letters criticizing the Court’s decision in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). See JAMES E. CLAYTON,
THE MAKING OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT IN ACTION 21 (1964); GREY, supra note 23, at
18.
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Criticism of the Court’s analytical methodologies, together with the
Justices’ efforts to defend themselves, has also led to a never-ending battle
over competing theories of constitutional interpretation, thereby producing
a surfeit of extra-curial judicial discussions.108 For example, Justice William
J. Brennan, Jr. responded to Attorney General Edwin Meese’s insistence that
the Justices should adopt a jurisprudence of “original intent”109 by writing an
article championing living constitutionalism.110 After Justice Scalia joined
the Court, he wrote and spoke extensively about his theory of interpretation,
which he called “original understanding.”111 Eventually, Justice Scalia and
Justice Stephen Breyer would each write books explaining their theories of
interpretation,112 and they even debated each other publicly on the subject.113
Recent Justices have also been unselfconsciously outspoken in expressing
their views to friendly audiences, such as the Federalist Society and the
American Constitution Society.114
108
109

110

111
112

113

114

See generally J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (2012) (discussing
competing modes of constitutional interpretation).
Attorney General Meese gave several addresses on the subject of original intent, some of which
were later published. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5 (1988); Edwin Meese III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited
Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455 (1986); Edwin Meese III, Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 22 (1985).
See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, in TEXT AND
TEACHING: THE SEARCH FOR HUMAN EXCELLENCE 149 (Michael J. Collins & Francis J.
Ambrosio eds., 1991) (originally delivered at Georgetown bicentennial as part of a symposium on
text and teaching).
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997); STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION (2005).
See, e.g., Justices Scalia and Breyer Talk About Interpreting the Constitution, ANNENBERG PUB. POL’Y CTR.
(Feb. 15, 2016), https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/justices-scalia-and-breyer-discussinterpreting-the-constitution/ [https://perma.cc/9657-4VJ9] (discussing the Justices’ public
debate at the University of Pennsylvania); Adam Liptak, From 19th-Century View, Desegregation Is a
Test, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/10/us/10bar.html
[https://perma.cc/8QHX-QYAX] (discussing the Justices’ debate at the University of Arizona).
See, e.g., Bill Mears, Justice Ginsburg Suggests ‘Sharp Disagreement’ Over Hot-Button Cases, CNN (June 16,
2012,
11:07
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2012/06/15/us/scotus-ginsburg-healthcare/index.html [https://perma.cc/F8HA-KCQQ] (reporting Justice Ginsburg’s remarks at the
American Constitution Society’s National Convention); Adam Liptak, In Unusually Political Speech,
Alito Says Liberals Pose Threat to Liberties, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/13/us/samuel-alito-religious-liberty-free-speech.html
[https://perma.cc/L3AP-RY4E] (“The conservative justice’s pointed remarks, which he made in
a speech to the Federalist Society, reflected thoughts he has expressed in his opinions.”); Mark
Joseph Stern, Sam Alito Delivers Grievance-Laden, Ultrapartisan Speech to the Federalist Society, SLATE (Nov.
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Formal, written opinions are a central and indispensable feature of
American law. In a democratic society, it is particularly important that the
least democratic institution of government offer reasoned explanations for
the binding judgments that it issues. The reality, however, is that the Supreme
Court has not always issued written opinions, that it sometimes fails to give
any explanation whatever for important decisions, and that individual
Justices have often offered extra-curial defenses of their work since the earliest
days of the Republic. In these circumstances, the formal, written opinion
should not be fetishized or used as an excuse for the Court’s failure to
communicate its decisions to the public in a way that the public can
understand.
II. THE SUPREME COURT, THE PRESS, AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC
On the whole, it is safe to say that the Supreme Court continues to speak
as a body only through its official written opinions. It is the official written
opinion—the opinion that commands the agreement of a majority of the
Justices—that is the controlling document;115 it is through that opinion, and
only through that opinion, that the Court performs its central duty of

115

12, 2020, 11:38 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/11/alito-federalist-societyspeech-insane.html [https://perma.cc/5FYA-27ED] (“Justice Sam Alito delivered the keynote
address at this year’s all-virtual Federalist Society National Lawyers Convention. . . . Alito
abandoned any pretense of impartiality in his speech.”). Justice Samuel Alito was also the focus of
some controversy when he responded to President Obama’s criticism of the Court’s decision in
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), by mouthing the words “not true” during the President’s
2010 State of the Union Address. Lyle Denniston, Commentary: Alito vs. Obama—Who’s Right?,
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 28, 2010, 7:12 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/commentaryalito-vs-obama-whos-right/ [https://perma.cc/SN6Y-2CQS]; see also NEAL DEVINS & LAWRENCE
BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW PARTISAN DIVISIONS CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT
11 (2019) (“[T]here is a growing trend of Justices speaking to like-minded elite audiences;
conservative Justices are often featured speakers before the Federalist Society and liberal Justices
are headliners for the American Constitution Society.”); BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE
PEOPLE—HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE
MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 378 (2009) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE
PEOPLE] (“It also is sometimes the case that the justices listen to elite voices, rather than that of the
average person. To say that the justices like to be popular is to fail to ask, ‘With whom?’ . . . [Justice]
Scalia is plenty popular with his colleagues in the Federalist Society. One infers that satisfying this
particular ‘base’ sustains him well enough.”).
The holding in a case may not be obvious when no single opinion speaks in its entirety for a majority
of the Court. For example, see Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018); Marks v. United
States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
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“say[ing] what the law is.”116 Moreover, even as the Court’s opinions have
become longer and more complex, and changes in the economics and
practice of journalism have made their timely mastery more challenging for
working journalists, the Court’s method of disseminating its opinions has
remained largely unchanged.117
As in the past, the Justice who wrote the Court’s opinion will read a
summary of it aloud in the courtroom and refer those present to the full
written opinion that will be made available at the same time.118 Dissenting
and concurring Justices may also read summaries of their opinions,119 with
those opinions also being made available in writing. In addition, the written
opinions (“slip opinions”) begin with a “syllabus,” or set of headnotes, to help
the reader grasp more quickly the essence of the Court’s ruling and
supporting reasons. According to a recent Reporter of Decisions, “in this
modern age, preparing a syllabus largely involves taking a digital copy of the
principal opinion and boiling it down and down and down until all that
remains is the opinion’s essence, its bare bones.”120 The syllabus will also
116

117

118

119

120

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also Fox, supra note 72, at 153; Ginsburg,
Commenting on the Court’s Work, supra note 38, at 2119. In the long term, of course, a dissenting or
concurring opinion may take on greater importance than the opinion of the Court. See, e.g., Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
For many years, the Supreme Court did not even provide the text of announced opinions. Only
after press demands, and instances of inaccuracy in reporting, did the Justices begin to release full
texts of opinions when they announced them. According to Tony Mauro, the only recent changes
in the practice of opinion announcements have been “behind the scenes.” Mauro, Opinion
Announcements, supra note 11, at 481.
See id. at 480 (“Even as late as . . . 1968 and 1969, the reading of opinions [in full] took up entire
days on the court’s calendar. Justices William O. Douglas and Hugo Black tried to limit opinion
announcements, advocating a return to the older practice of the chief justice briefly announcing
the outcomes and the lineup of justices on both sides. ‘That aroused Felix Frankfurter’s vehement
opposition,’ Douglas later wrote.”). Justice Frankfurter “maintained that the oral announcements
put the public on a wavelength with the justices and gave them a better idea what kind of persons
the justices are. The arguments on this were long and passionate, and a majority took Frankfurter’s
view.” CLARE CUSHMAN, COURTWATCHERS: EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS IN SUPREME COURT
HISTORY 116 (2011). Chief Justice Burger failed in his efforts to end the practice of oral
announcements altogether, but he did persuade the Justices to read summaries of their opinions.
See Mauro, Opinion Announcements, supra note 11, at 481. A recent innovation has been the electronic
dissemination of opinions at the time decisions are announced in open court. See Davis, The Symbiotic
Relationship, supra note 8, at 13; Ginsburg, Commenting on the Court’s Work, supra note 38, at 2119.
See generally William D. Blake & Hans J. Hacker, “The Brooding Spirit of the Law”: Supreme Court Justices
Reading Dissents from the Bench, 31 JUST. SYS. J. 1 (2010); Timothy R. Johnson, Ryan C. Black & Eve
C. Ringsmuth, Hear Me Roar: What Provokes Supreme Court Justices to Dissent from the Bench?, 93 MINN.
L. REV. 1560 (2009).
Frank D. Wagner, How Not to Write a Syllabus, 15 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 153, 153 (2013).
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note the existence of concurring and dissenting opinions, but it will give no
account of the reasoning contained in such opinions except in the case of a
concurring opinion that is essential to the creation of a Court majority, and,
thus, to the holding of the case.121 For that reason, the syllabus does not
purport to describe all that was at stake in the case. It tells the story of the
case from the viewpoint of the prevailing Justices.
The practice of including such a syllabus or headnotes is longstanding.122
Since 1906, however, the slip opinions have carried a disclaimer to the effect
that, “The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has
been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the
reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.”123
The portion of Detroit Timber to which the citation refers responds to a party’s
reliance in that case on an erroneous headnote contained in Hawley v.
Diller.124 The relevant portion of Detroit Timber states that, “The headnote is
not the work of the court, nor does it state its decision . . . . It is simply the
work of the reporter, gives his understanding of the decision, and is prepared
for the convenience of the profession in the examination of the reports.”125
Interestingly, the current form of the disclaimer (unlike the original language
in Detroit Timber) recognizes that the Court’s audience extends beyond the
profession to the public. In either formulation, however, the Court’s point is
that the headnotes are not authoritative and should not be relied on.126 But

121
122
123
124
125

126

For an example, see Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 701–
08 (2007) (syllabus).
A syllabus has accompanied Supreme Court opinions since the earliest days of the Court. For
example, see Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801).
See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2296 (2016).
178 U.S. 476 (1900).
United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337 (1906). The statement is not
entirely accurate, however. A recent Reporter of Decisions has noted that the syllabus does not
reflect only the individual work of the Reporter. According to that Reporter of Decisions, the
precise nature of the syllabus in each case reflects the preferences as to length and detail of the
Justice who wrote the majority opinion, and the draft syllabus prepared by the Reporter of
Decisions will not be published unless it has been approved by the chambers of the writing Justice.
Wagner, supra note 120, at 153–54. In fact, Justice Ginsburg said that the disclaimer is untrue or
“a legend;” Justice Ginsburg noted that she helped edit the headnotes to her opinions. Ginsburg,
Commenting on the Court’s Work, supra note 38, at 2120 (stating that the syllabus may be edited by the
Justice who wrote the opinion—and that she in fact follows this practice invariably, “mindful that
busy lawyers and judges may not read more”).
See Davis, The Symbiotic Relationship, supra note 8, at 12.
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neither the Justices nor any representative of the Court will offer any further
official comment on the decision.127
The Justices are elusive. They appear only briefly in open court—to
question lawyers at oral argument and to announce their rulings in merits
cases—and then retreat into the secrecy that otherwise permeates all that
they do. Because the Court has chosen in recent years to hear far fewer cases
than it did in the past, even these brief appearances in the courtroom have
become less frequent.128 Moreover, as Everette Dennis wrote in 1974, the
Court’s press officer is “not a spokesman for the Court in any sense of the
word” and “carefully avoid[s] answering any questions that involve a Court
opinion or judgment.”129 Almost a generation later, New York Times
correspondent Linda Greenhouse observed that, “The Court’s habits present
substantial obstacles to conveying the work of the Court accurately to the
public.”130 Now, as in earlier times, professional journalists and other
information brokers are left with official written opinions as their primary
information source, supplemented, perhaps, by the brief sound bites they
have time to collect from experts and interest groups who typically have
strong opinions about the outcomes of cases—if not always for the fine points
of law that the Court has addressed.131 As far as official, authoritative

127

128
129
130
131

See Richard Davis, The US Supreme Court and the Journalists Who Cover It, in JUSTICES AND
JOURNALISTS: THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 281, 281 (Richard Davis & David Taras eds., 2017).
Justice Ginsburg has noted that the Justices cannot properly “spell out the real world impact” of
their decisions because a judicial decision is usually only one part of a continuing dialogue
encompassing the “other branches of government, the States, or the private sector.” Ginsburg,
Commenting on the Court’s Work, supra note 38, at 2125.
See, e.g., Sullivan & Canty, supra note 25, at 1006 (noting a decline in Supreme Court caseload).
Dennis, supra note 30, at 778–79.
Greenhouse, supra note 18, at 1558.
Interest groups seek to influence media coverage of the Court’s decisions. One of the strategies
these groups employ is to act as a source for the media reporting on the Court’s decisions, and as
sources, such groups attempt to put those decisions in the most favorable light to their objectives.
See SOLBERG & WALTENBURG, supra note 105, at 5; SAUVAGEAU ET AL., supra note 27, at 12
(discussing the reaction of interest groups to several rulings of the Canadian Supreme Court);
Greenhouse, supra note 18, at 1554 (recounting partisans’ efforts to influence reporting on Planned
Parenthood v. Casey). Richard Davis notes that following the Engel v. Vitale case, press reporting
devoted less attention to the Court’s decision than to interest group reaction, which exaggerated
the decision’s effect. RICHARD DAVIS, DECISIONS AND IMAGES: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
PRESS 11 (1994) [hereinafter DAVIS, DECISIONS AND IMAGES]; see also Robert A. Kagan & Gregory
Elinson, Constitutional Litigation in the United States, in CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN COMPARISON
25, 44–45 (Ralf Rogowski & Thomas Gawron eds., 2016) (claiming that much constitutional
litigation is brought by interest groups).

February 2022]

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PEOPLE

39

analysis is concerned, the Justices’ written opinions, no matter how many or
how complicated, stand alone. There is nothing else.
The attitude that journalists should largely fend for themselves is timehonored. Until the late 1920s, as David Grey noted, “Newsmen had to write
up stories about Court decisions without even having a text of opinions from
which to work.”132 That was the case because, some sixty years before, the
dissenting Justices in Dred Scott v. Sandford133 had released their dissents before
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney had completed his majority opinion, and the
Chief Justice had thereafter mandated that “official opinions were to be
released only after they had appeared in the official compilation of the
Court.”134 In the late 1920s, Chief Justice William Howard Taft altered that
practice, so that “proofs [of the opinions] were finally [allowed to be]
distributed” to the reporters covering the Court as soon “as the opinion had
been completely read or announced in the courtroom.”135
While Chief Justice Taft’s innovation permitted some improvement in the
quality of the media’s reporting on the Court, it also “led to . . . [reporting]
mistakes . . . and to a tendency for the press to make sometimes inaccurate
inferences from lengthy opinions.”136 Such a mistake occurred in 1935 in
connection with the Associated Press’s coverage of the very important “Gold

132
133
134

135
136

GREY, supra note 23, at 37; see also Davis, The Symbiotic Relationship, supra note 8, at 12.
60 U.S. (18 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Dennis, supra note 30, at 770. In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney read a lengthy opinion from the
bench, as did several other Justices, including Justices Benjamin Curtis and John McLean, the two
dissenters. Don Fehrenbacher recounts what happened next:
Whereas McLean and Curtis promptly released the full texts of their opinions for
newspaper publication, the Chief Justice withheld his manuscript for revision. The public
had access only to a summary of the opinion, taken down in court by an Associated Press
reporter and printed in major newspapers throughout the country. This gave Republicans
a definite advantage in the war of words. Taney found the situation embarrassing and he
nursed his resentment of the action taken by the two dissenters, which seemed not only
improper and disrespectful but deliberately intended to encourage the violent partisan
outcry against the decision.
DEN E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS 315–16 (1978). Chief Justice Taney continued to withhold his opinion from publication
and apparently made substantial additions to it, presumably in response to the dissenters’ opinions.
That led to an acrimonious exchange of correspondence between the Chief Justice and Justice
Curtis, who soon resigned from the Court. Id. at 316–21. “In virtually forcing his younger associate
off the bench, the Chief Justice was undoubtedly venting his hostility to the antislavery movement
and his resentment of the personal abuse to which he had been subjected since the announcement
of the Dred Scott decision.” Id. at 319.
GREY, supra note 23, at 37.
Id.
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Clause Cases.”137 As Professor Grey has written, “the Associated Press
misinterpreted the majority opinion and transmitted a bulletin stating the
opposite of the Court’s intent. Byron Price, who was bureau chief at the
time, admitted that the AP ‘made a serious error as a result of too much
haste.’”138 The error was soon corrected, but the erroneous report had
already gone out to news outlets around the country. It was after that error
that the Court began the practice of giving reporters proofs of opinions as
the Justices began to read them aloud.139 As of 1968, that remained the
Court’s practice, with the full text of the majority opinion being handed out
to the press as soon as the writing Justice had begun to read it from the bench,
with concurring and dissenting opinions coming later.140 Until 1973, some
reporters occupied a privileged physical space in the courtroom, which
allowed them to process the distribution of the Court’s opinions more quickly,
but that space was eliminated when the bench was redesigned in that year.141
Additional improvements in the Court’s communication practices have
been modest. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg began making available the text

137

138
139

140
141

Norman v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317
(1935); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935). These cases, which upheld the government’s
power to reduce the gold content of United States currency and nullify the gold clause in private
contracts, were among the most important of the era. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE
SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT
86–88 (1995); CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT, supra note 86, at 33–34; JAMES
F. SIMON, FDR AND CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES 253–55 (2012). Recognizing that the cases were
being closely watched, Chief Justice Hughes twice took the highly unusual step of issuing postargument statements to the effect that the Court was not yet ready to rule on the issue, as opinion
days approached. Id. at 253.
GREY, supra note 23, at 37.
Id. According to Byron Price, who was then the AP bureau chief, the change came about after a
visit that he paid to Chief Justice Hughes. Id. Price wrote:
Mr. Hughes asked many questions about the physical and technical aspects of [the
innovation of making the entire text of an opinion available to the press as soon as the
reading of the opinion began]. He also dwelt at length on the difficulty of obtaining
agreement among the Justices for reversals of procedures so firmly established by long
precedent. . . . In the end he stated his conclusion: So far as he himself was concerned, he
was in total agreement with me. He had to deal, however, with eight tough minded
colleagues, as well as precedents, and he was not at all certain his views would prevail. But
he would try.
Id. at 38 (quoting a letter from Byron Price to David L. Grey, May 24, 1965).
Id.
See Dennis, supra note 30, at 768–69 (“Until 1973, the pressroom was linked to the courtroom by
pneumatic tubes through which reporters could send copies of opinions, orders, and handwritten
notes. The tubes were attached to four news desks which were just below the bench and hidden
from view.”); Ryan C. Black, Timothy R. Johnson & Ryan J. Owens, Chief Justice Burger and the Bench:
How Physically Changing the Shape of the Court’s Bench Reduced Interruptions During Oral Argument, 43 J. SUP.
CT. HIST. 83 (2018).
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of her opinion announcements to the press in the mid-1990s, and Justice
Scalia adopted the practice shortly thereafter. “In both instances,” as Tony
Mauro has explained, “the Court stressed that this release was for the
convenience of the press in reporting on their remarks from the bench, and
not for publication. As with the syllabus prepared by the Court’s Reporter
of Decisions for each ruling, the Court did not want anyone to be citing the
oral summaries as if they were part of the decision.”142 In 1998, the Court
began piping the oral opinion announcements into the Court’s Public
Information Office, so that reporters with short deadlines could hear the
Justices’ oral summaries while they read the written opinions.143 More
recently, the Court has disseminated the opinions electronically, rather than
relying exclusively on the old-fashioned method of distributing printed
copies.144 Opinions are posted today on the Supreme Court’s official
website145 and disseminated through Project Hermes to the news media and
other institutional subscribers, within minutes after they are issued.146
Another aspect of the Court’s communications policy relates to oral
argument. Although the Justices have consistently refused to permit the live
broadcasting of oral arguments, they agreed, after the Covid-19 pandemic
required closure of the Supreme Court building, to hear oral arguments via
teleconference and allow for live audio broadcasting of the arguments for the
first time.147 Amy Howe has observed that “[t]he live audio of oral
142
143
144
145

146

147

Mauro, Opinion Announcements, supra note 11, at 482.
Id. at 481.
Davis, The Symbiotic Relationship, supra note 8, at 13.
The Court’s website contains information such as order lists, oral argument calendars, occasional
press releases, and texts of speeches by the Justices. The Court normally makes oral argument
transcripts available on its website on the day of the argument, and audio recording is normally
released at the end of the week.
Slip opinions remain on the Court’s website until the opinions of the entire Term are published in
the bound volumes of the United States Reports. The Court’s website contains this cautionary
note: “In case of discrepancies between the print and electronic versions of these bound volume
materials, the print versions control. Only the bound volumes of the Unites States Reports contain
the final, official text of the opinions of the Supreme Court.” Information About Opinions, SUP. CT.
U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/info_opinions.aspx [https://perma.cc/BA9BFLPR] (last visited Feb. 4, 2021). In 2014, Richard Lazarus showed that the Court had been
changing the text of previously published opinions without providing the public with notice that
such changes had been made. Richard J. Lazarus, The (Non)Finality of Supreme Court Opinions, 128
HARV. L. REV. 540 (2014). According to Amy Howe, the Court thereafter began flagging such
revisions. Testimony of Amy Howe, supra note 19.
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Virus Pushes a Staid Supreme Court into Revolutionary Changes, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/03/us/politics/supreme-court-coronavirus.html
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arguments at the Supreme Court was an overwhelming success. Although it
is difficult to arrive at exact numbers because the oral arguments were
streamed on multiple platforms, it appears that hundreds of thousands of
people tuned in to listen to some of the high-profile arguments. And the live
audio served as a jumping-off point for a national civic lesson of sorts.”148 In
fall 2021, when the Court resumed in-person oral arguments (albeit without
opening the courtroom to the public), it continued the live audio
broadcasting of oral arguments to allow the public to hear the exchanges
between the Justices and counsel in real time.149
Nonetheless, it remains the case, as Professor Dennis has observed, that
“[r]eporters in this Spartan setting must be quite self-sufficient as they receive
no assistance in the form of briefings, press conferences, or mimeographed
releases.”150 He has also called attention to the Court’s “traditionally
oblivious attitude toward the deadline problems of the media.”151 That
obliviousness has manifested itself in various ways, but, perhaps most
importantly, in the number of highly salient decisions the Court announces
at one time. The Court previously announced its decisions on only one day
a week, making it difficult for reporters to give thoughtful or thorough

148
149

150
151

[https://perma.cc/4YX5-4GHZ] (Nov. 1, 2021); Clare Cushman & Jim Duff, Oral Argument:
Significant Changes in Format, SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y, https://supremecourthistory.org/scotus-scooporal-argument-significant-changes-in-format/ [https://perma.cc/3WLL-DXSQ] (last visited Oct.
15, 2021). The Court has consistently refused to have its proceedings televised. See, e.g., Bruce
Collins, At Long Last, The Supreme Court Is Going Live on Air, WASH. POST (May 1, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/05/01/long-last-supreme-court-is-going-liveair/ [https://perma.cc/DKW2-NAPJ]; Tony Mauro, Let the Cameras Roll: Cameras in the Court and the
Myth of Supreme Court Exceptionalism, 1 REYNOLDS CTS. & MEDIA L.J. 259 (2011); Kyu Ho Youm,
Cameras in the Courtroom in the Twenty-First Century: The U.S. Supreme Court Learning from Abroad?, 2012
BYU L. REV. 1989 (2012).
Testimony of Amy Howe, supra note 19.
Cushman & Duff, supra note 147; Press Release, SUP. CT. U.S. (Sept. 8, 2021),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/pressreleases/pr_09-08-21
[https://perma.cc/V5AM-VR34] (“Courtroom access will be limited to the Justices, essential
Court personnel, counsel in the scheduled cases, and journalists with full-time press credentials
issued by the Supreme Court. Out of concern for the health and safety of the public and Supreme
Court employees, the Courtroom sessions will not be open to the public.”). C-SPAN remarked on
its official Twitter account that, “The Court’s live audio throughout COVID pandemic leads to a
more informed American citizenry. Still hope for #SCOTUS video one day.” @cspan, TWITTER
(Sept. 8, 2021, 2:50 PM), https://twitter.com/cspan/status/1435691955661443088
[https://perma.cc/ZJ5F-FD9E].
Dennis, supra note 30, at 769.
Id. at 771. In recent years, of course, the Justices have tended to be seen as public figures in a way
that was not previously the case. See Barry Sullivan & Cristina Carmody Tilley, Supreme Court
Journalism: From Law to Spectacle?, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 343, 390 & n.184 (2020).
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treatment to all of the decisions rendered on that day.152 The Court
abandoned that practice in 1965, but even now the Court may announce
several important decisions at the same time, particularly near the end of the
term.153 Linda Greenhouse notes that she once suggested to Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist, Jr. that the press might do a better job of reporting
on the Court’s decisions if several important cases were not announced on
the same day. According to Greenhouse, the Chief Justice replied that, “Just
because we announce them all on one day doesn’t mean you have to write
about them all on one day. . . . Why don’t you save some for the next day?”154
“On one level,” Greenhouse writes, “this was harmless, and cost-free, banter.
On another, it offered a dramatic illustration of the gulf between us.”155
While Chief Justice Rehnquist obviously took Greenhouse’s suggestion as
special pleading for journalists, her point was that “the decisions would all be
reported on the day they were released in any event, and that a slight change
in the Court’s management of its calendar could substantially increase the
odds that the decisions would be reported well, or at least better—an
improvement the Court might see as serving its own interest as well as the
interest of the press.”156 But the Court has generally agreed with Chief
Justice Rehnquist that this is the press’s problem to solve, and that the press
should simply take as much time as it needs to get the story right,
notwithstanding the public’s expectation that the press will provide real-time
reporting on the Court, just as it does in other areas.
The Court may well view its adherence to traditional limitations on
communications as essential to maintaining public respect for the Court as
an institution, protecting its independence, integrity, and gravitas, and
endowing the Court with a certain sense of mystery and air of detachment
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153

154
155
156

See GREY, supra note 23, at 35–36.
That was the case, for example, in the last week of October Term 2019, when the Court announced
two important decisions on July 6, two important decisions on July 8, and three important decisions
on July 9. On July 6, the Court announced the decisions in Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct.
2316 (2020), and Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335 (2020). On July 8,
the Court announced the decisions in Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v.
Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020), and Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morissey-Berru, 140 S.
Ct. 2049 (2020). On June 9, the Court announced the decisions in Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP,
140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020), Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020), and McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140
S. Ct. 2452 (2020). See also supra note 17.
Greenhouse, supra note 18, at 1558.
Id.
Id. at 1558–59.
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from the affairs of the everyday world.157 In the Court’s view, there may be
something to be gained from being perceived as a “remote and mysterious
oracle”158—nine Justices who are thought to be cool, cloistered, disinterested,
and dispassionate,159 and who do most of their work behind closed doors.160
157

158
159
160

See Ginsburg, Commenting on the Court’s Work, supra note 38, at 2122 (“[T]he Supreme Court press
corps still lacks the inside information that is grist for reporters’ mills in other places. Because
confidentiality is vital to the way the Third Branch works, that lack of information is likely to persist
as long as the Court exists.”); Schmidt, supra note 80, at 510, 512 (“[T]he assumption of reticence
is bolstered by the common belief that the dignity of the Supreme Court, that essential requirement
of judicial legitimacy, depends on a certain perception of detachment from the roiling waters of
American political life. . . . The trope of the justice as standing above public controversy has long
been and remains today a powerful ideal.”); see generally Dahlia Lithwick, The Supreme Court and New
Media, in COVERING THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN THE DIGITAL AGE, supra note 8,
at 187, 189; John R. Schmidhauser, Larry L. Berg & Justin J. Green, Judicial Secrecy and Institutional
Legitimacy: Max Weber Revisited, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 867 (1973). In some states judges are elected
officials who campaign for office. In California, the judicial ethics rules were recently amended to
permit judges to defend their decisions in connection with a judicial election or recall election. See
Maria Dinzeo, California Supreme Court to Decide if Judges Can Speak Out on Their Decisions,
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Nov. 10, 2019), https://www.courthousenews.com/californiasupreme-court-to-decide-if-judges-can-speak-out-on-their-decisions/ [https://perma.cc/7UB96BNR]. Of course, the Incompatibility Clause of the federal Constitution prohibits legislators from
holding positions in the Executive Branch, but it does not prevent members of the judiciary from
undertaking assignments for the Executive. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2; Harold H. Bruff, The
Incompatibility Principle, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 225, 235 (2007) (“The new Constitution contained no
bar against joint judicial-executive service, probably because the judiciary was only beginning to be
separated clearly from its executive roots in England.”); id. at 235 (“[In Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 316 (1989), the Court] noted that although the Incompatibility Clause would forbid
policymaking by a combination of congressional and executive officers, judges were not forbidden
to perform executive functions when not sitting on the bench, and many had done so.”). Indeed,
several Justices have done so. See, e.g., JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN CREATION: TRIUMPHS AND
TRAGEDIES AT THE FOUNDING OF THE REPUBLIC 197 (2007) (noting Washington’s appointment
of Chief Justice John Jay to negotiate a treaty with Great Britain); R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN
MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT 141 (2001) (noting Chief Justice
Marshall’s simultaneous service as Secretary of State); WILLIAM DOMNARSKI, THE GREAT
JUSTICES 1941–54: BLACK, DOUGLAS, FRANKFURTER & JACKSON IN CHAMBERS 27 (2006)
(noting Justice Jackson’s service as lead prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials); BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT—A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 425–26
(1983) (noting Chief Justice Warren’s appointment to investigate the assassination of President
Kennedy).
Greenhouse, supra note 18, at 1538.
Fox, supra note 72, at 153.
SOLBERG & WALTENBURG, supra note 105, at 12 (“[T]he operation of the Supreme Court is far
from transparent. Many of its most consequential actions . . . occur out of the view of the press and
public.”); Davis, The Symbiotic Relationship, supra note 8, at 4; Dennis, supra note 30, at 771. However,
the notion that the Court exists separate and apart from the affairs of the everyday world is far from
the truth. See William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
751, 768 (1986) (“The Judges of any court of last resort, such as the Supreme Court of the United
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That sense of secrecy gives authority to the Court’s work161 and promotes the
notion, as Richard Davis has observed, “that the Court is separated from the
ongoing political process and the forces that determine the outcomes of the
process.”162
To be sure, some Justices have realized the importance of accurate
communication with the press and the link between such communication and
public understanding of—and respect for—the Court’s decisions.163 They
have understood, in other words, that the Court does not operate in a

161

162

163

States, work in an insulated atmosphere in their courthouse where they sit on the bench hearing
oral arguments or sit in their chambers writing opinions. But these same judges go home at night
and read the newspapers or watch the evening news on television; they talk to their family and
friends about current events. Somewhere ‘out there’—beyond the walls of the courthouse—run
currents and tides of public opinion which lap at the courthouse door. . . . Judges, so long as they
are relatively normal human beings, can no more escape being influenced by public opinion in the
long run than can people working at other jobs.”).
Justice Frankfurter once said that: “The secrecy that envelops the Court’s work is not due to love
of secrecy or want of responsible regard for the claims of a democratic society to know how it is
governed. That the Supreme Court should not be amenable to the forces of publicity to which the
Executive and the Congress are subjected is essential to the effective functioning of the Court.”
Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 313 (1955); see also HIRSCH, supra note
72, at 3 (“The secrecy protecting the Court’s deliberations and the reverential awe usually accorded
by the general public to both the Court and its decisions have helped shroud the members of the
Court in a mystery almost as black as their robes.”).
DAVIS, DECISIONS AND IMAGES, supra note 131, at 6 (noting, however, that historically such
aloofness has not been constant, and that some Justices have been involved in partisan politics,
political appointments, congressional lobbying, and presidential decision-making); see also
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 197 (1962) (“The Justices have their
being near the political marketplace, in which the effects of their judgments are felt. But the system
embodies elaborate mechanisms for their insulation.”); GREY, supra note 23, at 21 (observing that
the administration of justice demands objectivity and independence); SOLBERG & WALTENBURG,
supra note 105, at 1–3 (“The ‘myth of legality’ is the belief that the law, precedent, and fidelity to
the Constitution alone guide the Supreme Court’s decisions. . . . According to the myth, the justices
arrive at their decisions impartially, free of influence of political and/or ideological biases. In short,
the justices operate ‘above’ the bare knuckles of the political process. . . . In addition, the press’s
heavy use of the Court’s own language in its reports of the Court’s actions (a mode of press behavior
consistent with a media norm of reliance upon ‘official,’ authoritative sources) helps to ensure the
Court is presented as an institution separate from politics.”); MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE
SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND JUDICIALIZATION 3 (2002) (“In democratic states most
government officials achieve legitimacy by acknowledging their political rule and claiming
subordination to the people through elections or responsibility to those elected. Judges, however,
claim legitimacy by asserting that they are non-political, independent, neutral servants of ‘the
law.’”).
See DAVIS, DECISIONS AND IMAGES, supra note 131, at 10; see also Fred Graham, Foreword to
MATHEWSON, supra note 84, at xii (“What seems to have happened in recent years is that the
justices have realized that, given the growing importance of the Court’s work, the Court needed to
become more transparent in its dealings with the outside world. The result has been an evolution
in the relationship between the Court and the media toward more openness.”).
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vacuum, and that the public’s perception of the wisdom—or at least the
integrity—of the Court’s rulings depends in part on how decisions are
reported.164 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes apparently once took pity on a
young reporter who could not understand one of the Justice’s opinions.
According to the reporter’s much later account, Justice Holmes was expecting
guests when the reporter arrived unannounced at his home, but the Justice
led the reporter to his study, where he “patiently and clearly spelled out the
story to the scribe, literally dictating much of the article in newspaper
language. It ran . . . a couple of columns in the [Louisville] Courier-Journal
and was esteemed as a clear and intelligible newspaper story.”165
Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone also was more aware than others about
the extent to which the Court depends on the press for the public’s
understanding of its work, and he was “really shocked” by some of the press’s
“misleading, not to say completely inaccurate, statements” about the Court’s
decisions.166 For example, then-Justice Stone was apparently astonished that
the press had not understood the importance of the Court’s 1938 decision in
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins167—holding that federal courts lack the power to
create general federal common law in diversity cases—and had not written
about it in the days following its announcement. Justice Stone therefore
wrote privately to Arthur Krock, the Washington bureau chief for the New
York Times, calling Erie Railroad “the most important opinion since I have been
on the Court.”168 By the time he became Chief Justice, he had come to
realize that inaccuracies in reporting arose from “the fact that the Court is
constantly dealing with more and more technical and complex questions

164

165
166

167
168

See, e.g., Ginsburg, Commenting on the Court’s Work, supra note 38, at 2121 (“Mass media reporters are
the people in fact responsible for translating what courts write into a form the public can digest.”).
As Stuart Hampshire has written, “No one is expected to believe that [the Supreme Court’s]
decisions are infallibly just in matters of substance; but everybody is expected to believe that at least
its procedures are just because they conform to the basic principles governing adversary reasoning:
that both sides in a conflict should be equally heard.” STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT
95 (2000).
Greenhouse, supra note 18, at 1560.
ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 626 (1956) [hereinafter
MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE]; see also Greenhouse, supra note 18, at 1544 (“[Other courts] are
similarly reticent about speaking directly to the public, but judges of lower federal courts and state
courts are at times willing to help reporters understand opinions.”).
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, supra note 166, at 476–77 (quoting Louis Lusky); see also Ginsburg,
Commenting on the Court’s Work, supra note 38, at 2121 (“[Justice Stone’s] message took hold, and the
next day, Krock devoted his column to the ‘Momentous Decision.’”); Greenhouse, supra note 18,
at 1549–50.
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than perhaps ever before in its history, and the layman who undertakes to
comment on it is often undertaking to write about something which he does
not understand.”169 As an antidote, Chief Justice Stone urged newspapers to
retain a competent professor of constitutional law to read and criticize their
stories before publication.170
Similarly, Justice Felix Frankfurter expressed his concern for the public’s
understanding of Supreme Court decisions in a column he wrote in the New
York Times years before he joined the Court: “The evolution of our
constitutional law is the work of the initiate. But its ultimate sway depends
upon its acceptance by the thought of the nation. The meaning of Supreme
Court decisions ought not therefore to be shrouded in esoteric mystery. It
ought to be possible to make clear to lay understanding the exact scope of
constitutional doctrines that underlie decisions. . . .”171 After joining the
Court, he famously compared press coverage of the Court to sports coverage
and challenged the press to cover the Court’s decisions at least as well as it
covered the World Series.172 Justice Frankfurter was instrumental in
persuading the New York Times to hire a Supreme Court reporter trained in
law.173
Chief Justice Warren wrote that, “The importance of a proper
understanding of the Court’s work can hardly be overemphasized. The
decisions of the Court, spanning as they do almost the entire spectrum of
our national life, cannot realize true fulfillment unless substantially accurate
accounts of the holding are disseminated.”174 In that vein, he endeavored to
speak directly to the public in Brown v. Board of Education,175 by announcing
the Court’s decision in a unanimous opinion that was sufficiently short and

169
170
171

172
173
174
175

MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, supra note 166, at 626.
Id.
Felix Frankfurter, A Notable Decision: The Supreme Court Writes a Chapter on Man’s Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 1932, at 1E (writing about Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (Scottsboro Boys case));
see also Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 292 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that
the Court should not be “a mystical entity or the judges as individuals or as anointed priests set
apart from the community and spared the criticism to which in a democracy other public servants
are exposed”).
LIVA BAKER, FELIX FRANKFURTER 218 (1969).
Id.; GREY, supra note 23, at 52 (citing an interview with James Reston of the New York Times who
apparently was Justice Frankfurter’s friend).
DAVIS, DECISIONS AND IMAGES, supra note 131, at 10 (quoting Chief Justice Warren’s statement
in the Report of Special Committee of Supreme Court Decisions, September 12, 1966).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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simple that it could be published in full in newspapers throughout the country
and be readily understood by the public.176
Justice Powell took a somewhat different approach in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke,177 in which a badly splintered Court delivered
opinions amounting to 151 pages. In his announcement of the decision,
Justice Powell attempted to connect all of the opinions together, explaining
at length what the points of agreement and disagreement were. As Joseph
Goldstein has written:
Apparently, the justices in Bakke recognized that their many opinions, totaling
151 pages, failed as a communication to and for We the People. Justice
Powell drafted and circulated a “Proposed Statement from Bench,” which he
gave orally in announcing the Bakke decision. In an accompanying memo,
he wrote, “My primary purpose was to assist the representatives of the media
present in understanding ‘what in the world’ the Court has done!” It was as
if he were acknowledging that the Court’s public is to be informed not
primarily by the opinions of the Court, but by the media, and that
professional law correspondents cannot, by reading the opinion alone, be
expected to understand what the Court has decided and why.
Justice Powell’s oral statement is the kind of communication that would
satisfy the demand placed on the justices not to forget that it is a constitution
they are expounding. Yet it has no authoritative value. It was not even
published. One can only wonder why it did not find a place in (or take the
place of) his official opinion announcing the Court’s two judgments.178

These examples from Brown and Bakke are unusual, to say the least.179
The Court’s attitude towards the public and the press is not usually so
176

177
178
179

See WARREN, MEMOIRS, supra note 79; John G. Roberts, Jr., 2019 Year-End Report on the Federal
Judiciary, SUP. CT. U.S. 2 (Dec. 31, 2019), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/yearend/2019year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JDF-KZ8U] (suggesting that the current federal
court practice of posting opinions online reflects the same spirit that motivated Chief Justice
Warren’s decision to write a short opinion in Brown). Chief Justice Warren’s opinion has long been
criticized, however, for not thoroughly or persuasively explaining the Court’s reasoning. The
brevity of the opinion may well have contributed to this criticism. See, e.g., LEARNED HAND, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES 54–55 (1958) (critiquing the
Court’s performance in Brown); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 31–34 (1959) (same); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND
HIS SUPREME COURT—A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 124 (1983) (describing the segregationists’
rejection of Brown); Adam J. White, The Lost Greatness of Alexander Bickel, COMMENT. MAG., Mar.
2012, at 35, 36 (recounting Judge Learned Hand’s and Herbert Wechsler’s well-publicized
criticisms of Brown).
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20, at 97–98.
However, even Chief Justice Burger, who was not known as a friend of the press (see, e.g., New York
Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 750 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Al Kamen, Warren
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mindful of their needs nor of the Court’s real self-interest in ensuring that its
decisions are understood. This general attitude was exemplified by the
observation of Banning Whittington, a previous Public Information Officer
of the Court, who stated that, “the Court does not and should not give the
press much help—that the institution is a Court of law, not a legislature.”180
In 1968, David Grey concluded that the Court was making “a deliberate
effort to avoid appearing to be in the business of widespread dissemination
of judicial opinions.”181 In other words, the Court thought that it “should be
above the commonplace of image-making or of forcing its opinions on
others.”182
Over the course of time, most of the Justices—and the Court as an
institution—have shown little interest in the plight of journalists who must
attempt to deal with increasingly complex (and often prolix) written opinions
within time constraints and in circumstances that have become increasingly
challenging.183 To do so, the Court apparently believes, would risk
descending into the realm of everyday affairs and forfeiting the aura that
comes from being an institution set apart. The Court’s attitude to the press
might be summed up by a statement that Chief Justice Rehnquist apparently
made to an informal gathering of journalists: “The difference between us

180
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183

Burger’s Media Screed, WASH. POST (July 9, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-theloop/post/warren-burgers-media-screed/2012/07/09/gJQAFKSEYW_blog.html
[https://perma.cc/2RVF-58MB]), invited two reporters into chambers in 1970 for a “backgrounder” on a specific Court order. Dennis, supra note 30, at 777. Of course, the Justices also
meet members of the press at Washington social events. See, e.g., Garrow, supra note 80, at 305
(reporting that Woodward and Armstrong’s book on the Burger Court resulted from a chance
encounter between Bob Woodward and Justice Stewart at a Washington garden party); see also
Davis, The Symbiotic Relationship, supra note 8, at 19 (“Justices incorporate the press into their
strategies to influence public opinion.”); GREY, supra note 23, at 17, 51 (showing that the Justices
have considerable contact with journalists at official and social gatherings).
GREY, supra note 23, at 47. Whittington served as the Court’s Public Information Officer from
1947 to 1973. See also Max Freedman, Worst Reported Institution, 10 NIEMAN REPS. 2 (1956) (“A
judge’s vanity may be ruffled for an hour or so by some indignant blast from somebody’s editorial
page but basically the Court is indifferent because it feels that the editor has failed to pay the
intellectual dues of hard work which should precede the right to an opinion.”).
GREY, supra note 23, at 21. Professor Grey based his conclusion on interviews with two Justices,
Mr. Whittington, and two other court officials. He further noted that “the general policy of the
Court staff is that it should not take the initiative in disseminating information about the Court.”
Id.
Id.
See Greenhouse, supra note 18, at 1558–59.
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and the other branches of government is that we don’t need you people of
the press.”184
In truth, public confidence in the Court is essential, and it requires that
the public understand what the Court is doing, and why the Court is doing
what it does. For most Americans, that does not mean understanding the
Court’s opinions; it means understanding what the press says about the
Court’s opinions. In other words, Chief Justice Rehnquist could not have
been more wrong. As Professor Russell has rightly observed, “Journalists are
the managers of the political life of judicial decisions.”185 Nonetheless, the
Court has continued to act as if the understanding of the press—and the
public—does not matter. As we shall see, other constitutional courts have not
been blind to the wisdom expressed by Professor Russell. These courts have
understood the challenge, and they have acted accordingly.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS ACROSS THE WORLD HAVE ADOPTED
NEW STRATEGIES FOR COMMUNICATING DECISIONS TO THE PUBLIC
For a long time, the assumption among scholars and professional
observers was that courts should speak for themselves only by speaking as
courts do, that is, through their formal, written opinions or judgments. Too
often, indeed, we have thought of courts as fulfilling their proper role when
they are silent, defending their legitimacy by confining their speech to the
dry, technical language of judicial opinions.186 But faced with fast-changing
media and the emergence of populist politics that distrust expertise and
frequently call for restrictions on judicial power,187 many constitutional courts

184

185
186

187

MATHEWSON, supra note 84, at 8; but cf. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, supra note
160, at 769 (“Judges need not and do not ‘tremble before public opinion’ in the same way that
elected officials may, but it would be remarkable indeed if they were not influenced by the sort of
currents of public opinion which were afoot in the Steel Seizure Case.”).
SAUVAGEAU ET AL., supra note 27, at 8 (quoting Peter Russell, Comments at the Media–Supreme
Court Research Workshop, Ottawa (Nov. 7, 2002)).
See Stephen Sedley, Lord Denning Obituary: A Benchmark of British Justice, GUARDIAN (Mar. 6, 1999,
3:05
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/news/1999/mar/06/guardianobituaries
[https://perma.cc/9F6Z-KEAN] (“Denning’s judgments in case after case performed the feat,
achieved by no other judge, of speaking directly and compellingly to ordinary people in wellconstructed and lucid prose. Concepts which lawyers had struggled to articulate, clashes of doctrine
which seemed insoluble, would emerge in his judgments as crystalline statements of principle. . . .
Denning’s simple language went with a penetrating mind.”).
See Beverley McLachlin, The Role of Judges in Modern Society: Remarks of the Right Honourable Beverley
McLachlin, P.C., Chief Justice of Canada, SUP. CT. CAN. (May 5, 2001), http://www.scc-csc.ca/judges-
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have acknowledged the vital importance of correct, complete, and timely
accounts of their work. These courts, showing an increased awareness of
developments in technology and the social transmission of knowledge that
not infrequently lead to the distortion of truth, have adopted new means of
communicating with the public through the press and across the
contemporary information ecosystem.188 Three simultaneous forces are at
play: first, an attempt to make it easier for the representatives of the
mainstream media to understand and broker judicial decisions; second, a
desire to reach out directly to the general public and to make judicial
determinations more accessible; third, a strategic use of new channels of
communication to signal which cases are more important and which are less
so and thus shape the way in which decisions are received.
In this section we explore these important contemporary developments,
detailing the various practices that some other constitutional courts have
adopted to improve the accuracy of the press’s coverage and the public’s
understanding of their rulings. Considered together, they reflect a greater
degree of openness and a growing recognition that the constitutional courts
of democratic societies are institutionally and professionally obliged to make

188

juges/spe-dis/bm-2001-05-05-eng.aspx [https://perma.cc/G8M7-UYJN] (“In Canada hardly a
day goes by now without some criticism being levied against the judiciary. . . . [S]ome of the
comment and criticism on courts we more and more commonly see in the press is not so much the
result of a change in the role of the courts as a result of a change in the way citizens relate to public
institutions, including the courts.”); see also TOM GINSBURG & AZIZ Z. HUQ, HOW TO SAVE A
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 189 (2018) (“[T]he very power of constitutional courts makes
them attractive targets for the forces of erosion.”); Burkhard Hess & Ana Koprivica Harvey, Open
Justice in Modern Societies: What Role for Court?, in OPEN JUSTICE: THE ROLE OF COURTS IN A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 9, 28 (Burkhard Hess & Ana Koprivica Harvey eds., 2019) (noting the
recent attacks on the independence of the judiciary in both Hungary and Poland); Thomas
Giegerich, Transparency in the Selection of Constitutional Court Judges: Contextualised Comparison between the
USA, Germany and the European Courts in Luxembourg and Strasbourg, in OPEN JUSTICE: THE ROLE OF
COURTS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, supra, at 143, 144 (“Recently, constitutional courts in
Europe have come under attack from populists and autocrats.”); William A. Galston, The Populist
Challenge to Liberal Democracy, 29 J. DEMOCRACY 5, 14–15 (2018) (“[S]ometimes the populist
challenge does directly threaten liberal democracy. Left unchecked, moves to undermine freedom
of the press, weaken constitutional courts, concentrate power in the hands of the executive, and
marginalize groups of citizens based on ethnicity, religion, or national origin will undermine liberal
democracy from within.”); see generally JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 3–4 (2016)
(“[P]opulists are always antipluralist. Populists claim that they, and they alone, represent the
people. . . . [T]hey also treat their political opponents as ‘enemies of the people’ and seek to exclude
them altogether.”).
See GAROUPA & GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REPUTATION, supra note 31, at 49 (observing that secular
pressures and the increasing importance of the media force courts in many countries to consider
public relations).
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their judgments more intelligible to the rest of us. These emerging trends
also seem to reflect a judicial awareness that a proactive stance with respect
to the media is desirable to protect the perceived legitimacy of the judiciary
at a time when public debate over the proper role of the courts is especially
heated and polarized.189 Interestingly, the various constitutional courts differ
in terms of the precise measures they have undertaken, but they all seem to
have manifested a determination to make their decisions more transparent
and intelligible by reforming the ways in which they communicate those
decisions to the press and the public.
A. The Supreme Court of Canada—The Most Open Court
The Supreme Court of Canada has long been a leader in terms of its
conscious effort to better organize—some would say orchestrate—its
relationship with the media.190 The Canadian Court still communicates its
binding decisions through classic written opinions, but, as Chief Justice
Beverley McLachlin has acknowledged, “the news media is the principal
means” through which Canadians can come to understand the Court and its
work.191 Likewise, Justice Frank Iacobucci has pointed out that the legitimacy
of the Canadian Court, and indeed the democratic process, depends, at least
to some degree, on the Court’s ability to get its message out: “The
danger . . . is that if the media are inaccurate in conveying the information
to the public, you are dealing with a misinformed public.”192 According to
Justice Iacobucci, “Decisions are enforced because people accept the
decisions as the law. If confidence is eroded, then we worry about the
189

190
191

192

See Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2240, 2240–42,
2272–73 (2019) (reviewing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME
COURT (2018)) (noting that the Supreme Court has become a focal point for partisan battles,
threatening to undermine public confidence in the Court’s independence); Beverley McLachlin,
The Relationship Between the Courts and the Media: Remarks of the Right Honourable Beverley McClachlin, P.C.,
Chief Justice of Canada, SUP. CT. CAN. (Jan. 31, 2012), https://www.scc-csc.ca/judges-juges/spedis/bm-2012-01-31-eng.aspx [https://perma.cc/BTA3-QTLZ] (hereinafter McLachlin, The
Relationship Between the Courts and the Media); Jean-Claude Wiwinius, Public Hearings in Civil Proceedings:
From the Perspective of a Luxembourgish Judge, in OPEN JUSTICE: THE ROLE OF COURTS IN A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, supra note 187, at 97, 98.
SAUVAGEAU ET AL., supra note 27, at 12–13; McLachlin, The Relationship Between the Courts and the
Media, supra note 189.
Susan Harada, The “Uncomfortable Embrace”—The Supreme Court and the Media in Canada, in JUSTICES
AND JOURNALISTS: THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 127, at 81, 82 (citing a conversation
with Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin in July 2015).
SAUVAGEAU ET AL., supra note 27, at 9–10 (quoting an interview with Justice Frank Iacobucci on
Oct. 26, 2001).

February 2022]

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PEOPLE

53

legitimacy of the court and the role of the court to settle disputes through
the rule of law in our country and that’s an absolutely priceless commodity
in a constitutional democracy. So those are the stakes.”193
Doctrinally, the Canadian Court sees its willingness to accommodate the
news media as an important element in realizing the principles of “open
court” and freedom of expression.194 The Canadian Court has construed
these constitutional principles to encompass a general obligation to provide
the public with all the information necessary to understand its decisions:
“The freedom of the press to report on judicial proceedings is a core value.
Equally, the right of the public to receive information is also protected by the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression . . . . The press plays a
vital role in being the conduit through which the public receives that
information regarding the operation of public institutions . . . .
Consequently, the open court principle, to put it mildly, is not to be lightly
interfered with.”195
As Professor Sauvageau and his co-authors have observed, the Supreme
Court of Canada’s decision to enter the world of media relations and address
the issue of accuracy in reporting was made incrementally and in slow,
halting steps.196 Further, as Susan Harada has noted, these steps “can be
categorized in two ways: those aimed at making it easier for journalists to
report on the court’s business—the hearings and decisions; and, those aimed
at opening up the court as an institution.”197 Chief Justice Brian Dickson,
who held that position between 1984 and 1990, broke down some of the old
taboos and lifted the curtain that hid the Canadian Court from the public.198
He created the position of the Executive Legal Officer (ELO), a senior lawyer
or legal academic whose duties include briefing journalists who cover the
Court.199 Chief Justice Dickson also began the practice of meeting with
193
194

195
196
197
198
199

Id. at 10.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B
to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.) § 2(b); Adam Dodek & Richard Devlin, ‘Fighting Words’:
Regulating Judges in Canada, in REGULATING JUDGES: BEYOND INDEPENDENCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 92 (Richard Devlin & Adam Dodek eds., 2016).
Vancouver Sun v. Attorney General of Canada, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332, 346–347 (Can.).
SAUVAGEAU ET AL., supra note 27, at 12, 199.
Harada, supra note 191, at 86.
Id. at 89.
SAUVAGEAU ET AL., supra note 27, at 12, 200–01 (discussing the origin and role of ELOs); id. at 201
(“ELOs are appointed for a term of no more than five years and are normally drawn from law
faculties.”); Harada, supra note 191, at 87; see also ROBERT J. SHARPE & KENT ROACH, BRIAN
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newspaper editorial boards, giving interviews, and releasing texts of his
speeches in advance.200 In addition, the Chief Justice ensured that the
Canadian Court would space out the announcements of its decisions so that
reporters would not be overwhelmed.201 He also invited, for the first time, a
documentary camera crew into the Canadian Court’s inner sanctum: the
hallways, offices, and conference and dining rooms to which the public had
previously been denied access.202
Chief Justice Dickson’s colleague, Justice John Sopinka, expressed the
sentiment that drove the Canadian Court to move away from deep-rooted
tradition and experiment with new channels of communication. Justice
Sopinka believed that, “A judge can and ought to speak on the work of the
court. It is absolutely essential that the workings of the court be demystified.
Otherwise how can the public have confidence in it?”203 He thought “that
there should be no ‘absolute rule that prevents a judge from explaining his or
her decision to the public if failure to do so has led or may lead to confusion
or misunderstanding.’”204 Chief Justice Antonio Lamer, who held the
position from 1990 to 2000, opened up the Canadian Court even further.205
During his tenure, cameras were allowed into the courtroom and oral
arguments were televised live on the Canadian Parliamentary Affairs
Channel (CPAC).206 To ease the work of reporters, the Court also decided,
under Chief Justice Lamer’s leadership, that judgments would be released
over a two-day period when a nest of decisions was scheduled to be handed
down during a particular week.207
In the last two decades, the Supreme Court of Canada has continued to
foster a modern communication environment aimed at ensuring the accurate
and complete reporting of its judicial decisions. First, the Canadian Court
set a goal of making its “judgments as clear as possible.”208 Professor
Sauvageau and his colleagues note that “there is little doubt that for crucial
decisions . . . the court trie[s] to anticipate the needs and reactions of
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DICKSON: A JUDGE’S JOURNEY 285–96 (2003) (discussing Chief Justice Dickson’s efforts to
modernize the Court, including the improvement of its media relations).
SAUVAGEAU ET AL., supra note 27, at 200.
Id.; Harada, supra note 191, at 87.
SAUVAGEAU ET AL., supra note 27, at 200; Harada, supra note 191, at 89.
SAUVAGEAU ET AL., supra note 27, at 12.
Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 13, 200; Harada, supra note 191, at 87.
SAUVAGEAU ET AL., supra note 27, at 13, 200.
McLachlin, The Relationship Between the Courts and the Media, supra note 189.
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reporters by writing its decisions in language that [may] be easily
understood.”209 As part of this initiative, the Court provides “head-notes that
summarize the essential points of each decision.”210 Second, the ELO
frequently briefs journalists before sessions begin and provides them with
briefings on every important judgment released by the Canadian Court.211
These briefings are normally held a day or two before the release of the
judgment, are off the record, and serve as a great source of information for
the media. “The ELO . . . provide[s] a capsule summary of the facts of the
case at hand,”212 the legal issues presented in the case, the parties’ arguments,
and the Court’s reasoning.213 The ELO, however, is not a spokesperson or
apologist for the Court and does not spin its rulings.214 Rather, the explicit
goal of the media briefing is “to assist members of the media to understand
the reasons for [a] decision.”215 The Sauvageau study points out that “the
ELOs do not consult with the justices or receive instructions about what they
can or cannot say. They are positioned as neutral and independent experts;
they explain the law, describe the options the justices face, and point
journalists to the key parts of decisions.”216 Third, to help reporters get the
news out in a timely way, the Canadian Court allows so-called lock-ups in
which journalists accredited by the Canadian Parliamentary Gallery can
receive advance access to the Court’s decision, under carefully secured
conditions, before its official release.217 During the lock-up, the ELO
conducts an off-the-record briefing on the decision and allows the journalists
to ask questions or seek clarifications.218 The idea is to facilitate early news
209
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216
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SAUVAGEAU ET AL., supra note 27, at 205.
McLachlin, The Relationship Between the Courts and the Media, supra note 189.
SAUVAGEAU ET AL., supra note 27, at 13.
Harada, supra note 191, at 87.
McLachlin, The Relationship Between the Courts and the Media, supra note 189.
Id.; Harada, supra note 191, at 87; Judgment Lock-Up Procedure, supra note 29.
Access to Court Facilities, Media Briefings and Lock-Ups, SUP. CT. CAN., https://www.scccsc.ca/media/acc-eng.aspx [https://perma.cc/K9YN-8BNK] (July 22, 2021).
SAUVAGEAU ET AL., supra note 27, at 201.
“Before entering the lock-up, [the participating journalists] must surrender all phones and other
electronic communication devices to a Court staff member for the duration of the lock-up.”
Judgment Lock-Up Procedure, supra note 29. Journalists must also “sign a written undertaking [to
comply with certain contractual requirements, including a duty of pre-release non-disclosure]
prepared by the Court for the media.” Id. In addition, reporters are not allowed to leave the lockup room, contact their newsrooms, or report anything about the ruling until the judgment is
released to the public. Id.; Undertaking for Media Lock-Up at the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC), SUP. CT.
CAN., https://www.scc-csc.ca/media/um-em-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/EE8K-S5G4] (last
visited Feb. 10, 2021).
SAUVAGEAU ET AL., supra note 27, at 203; Harada, supra note 191, at 88.
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coverage that is accurate and gives the public a sense of the finer points of
the decision.
Clearly, the Supreme Court of Canada has acknowledged its dependence
on the press.219 “The fundamental problem for the justices,” according to
the Sauvageau study, “is that their messages cannot get through to society
without being altered by the journalistic lens. In a sense, journalists have the
last word.”220 Professor Sauvageau and his colleagues further argue that the
Canadian Court “has carefully constructed a system which ensures that not
only are its points of view clearly communicated to the public but that it can
play a role in setting the agenda and enhancing its prestige. While the court
is engaged in what is clearly an important public service, it is also a political
institution that is attempting to ensure that its judgments are understood by
journalists.”221
In the past three years, the Canadian Court has increased its efforts to
reach out directly to the public and make its work more accessible and
transparent to all Canadians. In 2018, the Canadian Court introduced what
it calls “Cases in Brief ”—“short summaries of the Court’s written decisions
drafted in reader-friendly language, so that anyone interested can learn about
the decisions that affect their lives.”222 The Cases in Brief are prepared by
the Court’s communications staff to help lay people better understand the
Court’s judgments. They are published on the Court’s website and shared
on the Court’s official Facebook and Twitter accounts.223 According to a
press release recently issued by the Canadian Court, “Cases in Brief have
been viewed almost a million times on the Court’s website.”224 Even so,
Chief Justice Richard Wagner has noted that, “We discovered that we don’t
seem to be reaching as many Canadians in smaller communities as we would
like. We know that not everyone is online, or wants to get their news online.
We know that people rely on, and very much want to support, their local
news sources. And while we are always looking for new ways to reach out to
219
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221
222
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A media committee meets periodically with the Supreme Court of Canada and members of the Bar
about improving media access to the Canadian Court. See SAUVAGEAU ET AL., supra note 27, at
13, 234.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 31.
Cases in Brief, SUP. CT. CAN., https://www.scc-csc.ca/case-dossier/cb/index-eng.aspx
[https://perma.cc/J59R-P2Y9] (last visited Nov. 18, 2021).
News Release, SUP. CT. CAN. (Mar. 22, 2018), https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scccsc/news/en/item/5774/index.do [https://perma.cc/2M5Q-CGTB].
News Release, SUP. CT. CAN. (Oct. 8, 2020), https://decisions.scc-csc.ca/scccsc/news/en/item/6964/index.do [https://perma.cc/8ZGA-WKZF].
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people, ‘new ways’ doesn’t have to mean ‘new technology.’”225 The Court
therefore decided that local newspapers could republish its Cases in Brief
free of charge. According to Chief Justice Wagner, “Letting these papers
republish our Cases in Brief will bring the Court’s daily work closer to all
Canadians. And it will help the public better understand how our decisions
affect their daily lives.”226
In a similar vein, the Canadian Court recently decided to “ride circuit,”
hearing oral arguments outside of Ottawa for the first time.227 Hundreds of
local people were able to see the Canadian Court in action in Winnipeg,
Manitoba, as the Justices heard two appeals—one on the right to a trial
within a reasonable time, the other on minority language education rights.
On the same occasion, the Canadian Justices spoke to thousands of high
school students, met with members of Indigenous groups and the
francophone community, and participated in a public event at the Canadian
Museum for Human Rights, where members of the public were able to speak
one-on-one with the Justices. In its annual Year in Review publication for
2019, the Canadian Court observed: “The judges of the Supreme Court of
Canada believe it is important for Canadians to see how our justice system
works, and who its judges are. This is why the Court decided to hear cases
outside of Ottawa. It gave more people the opportunity to see Canada’s
highest court in person.”228
B. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany—A Popular Court
The German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) is a
specialized court empowered to determine the constitutionality of legislation
and executive actions under the Constitution—the Basic Law (Grundgesetz)—
and to adjudicate disputes between the other branches of the federal
government or between the federal government and the states.229 The Court
225
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228
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Id.
Id.
Year in Review 2019, SUP. CT. CAN. 8, https://www.scc-csc.ca/review-revue/2019/yr-ra2019eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/2W9V-DKNX] (last visited Nov. 11, 2021).
Id.
See generally DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 10–17 (3d ed. 2012); GEORG
VANBERG, THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN GERMANY 77–81, 93 (2005);
Wolfgang Zeidler, The Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany: Decisions on the
Constitutionality of Legal Norms, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 504, 504, 522–23 (1987); Hans G. Rupp,
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was founded in the post-War period and was influenced by the models of the
Supreme Court of the United States and of the Constitutional Court of
Austria as originally devised by Hans Kelsen.230 Over time, the Federal
Constitutional Court has gained a central position in the German
governmental system and has become the most powerful constitutional court
in Europe.231 These facts have led Franco-German political scientist Alfred
Grosser to call it “without doubt the most original and most interesting
instance of the German constitutional system.”232 The German Court has
been referred to as a popular court because it is open to the complaints of all
citizens who feel that their constitutional rights have been violated.233 The
result, according to John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino, is a unique
dialogue between the Federal Constitutional Court and the German people
about the meaning of their Constitution.234 Similarly, the German Court’s
President Andreas Vosskuhle has pointed out that “[t]his proximity to
citizens’ everyday life is the foundation of Germans’ evident trust in the
Federal Constitutional Court.”235 Thomas Hochmann has added that the
Court has been very sophisticated—and successful—in using methods of
communication to develop public support.236 For all these reasons and
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The Federal Constitutional Court in Germany: Scope of Its Jurisdiction and Procedure, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW.
548 (1969).
For historical background on the Federal Constitutional Court, see JUSTIN COLLINGS,
DEMOCRACY’S GUARDIANS: A HISTORY OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
1951–2001, at xv-xlii (2015); CHRISTIAN BUMKE & ANDREAS VOSSKUHLE, GERMAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: INTRODUCTION, CASES, AND PRINCIPLES 9–11, 21–27 (2019);
KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 229, at 3–10; VANBERG, supra note 229, at 62–66; Christoph
Schönberger, Karlsruhe: Notes on a Court, in THE GERMAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT:
THE COURT WITHOUT LIMITS 1 (Jeff Seitzer trans., 2020) (2011). On Hans Kelsen’s model for a
specialized constitutional court, see LARS VINX, THE GUARDIAN OF THE CONSTITUTION: HANS
KELSEN AND CARL SCHMITT ON THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 22–78 (2015); Nuno
Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Building Reputation in Constitutional Courts: Political and Judicial Audiences, 28
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 539, 540–41 (2011).
See VANBERG, supra note 229, at 61.
Christina Holtz-Bacha, Germany: The Federal Constitutional Court and the Media, in JUSTICES AND
JOURNALISTS: THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 127, at 101, 102.
See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication, Italian Style, in COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 294, 296 (Tom Ginsburg ed., 2012).
Id. at 314.
BUMKE & VOSSKUHLE, supra note 230, at 27–28. Ironically, secrecy surrounds both the manner
in which Justices are chosen and the ways in which certain operations of the Court are performed.
See Thomas Hochmann, La Communication de la Cour Constitutionnelle Allemande [The Ways in Which the
German Constitutional Court Communicates], 33–2017 ANNUAIRE INTERNATIONAL DE JUSTICE
CONSTITUTIONNELLE 17, 18 (2018) (Fr.).
Hochmann, supra note 235, at 18–19.
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others, the Federal Constitutional Court is often described as one of the most
important courts in the world; it has served as a model for newer
constitutional courts, such as those of Spain, Portugal, South Africa, and
South Korea.237
The Federal Constitutional Court has traditionally been cautious with
respect to the press and has preferred to speak for itself through its written
decisions.238 It should be noted that the German Court’s written decisions
compete in terms of length with those of the United States Supreme Court,
as Donald Kommers and Russell Miller have pointed out.239 Although the
German Court is not required to deliver its opinions in open court, it
sometimes does so in cases that it deems to be particularly important, and its
rules permit the announcements to be recorded as well.240 But the German
Court has a particular difficulty to overcome in that its opinions are very
detailed, as well as long, and they are written in a style that is difficult for a
general audience to comprehend, so that only a summary can be read in the
context of an oral announcement.241 “We cannot expect that these decisions,
which sometimes go on for hundreds of pages, will be understood without
providing some assistance by way of explanation,” President Vosskuhle has
stated.242 This recognition has led the German Court in recent years to
modify its communications policy to try and help as many people as possible
make sense of its decisions. But the German Court has attempted to walk a
fine line—to find a middle ground between the inaccessible doctrinal
language usually used in its decisions and the language common in ordinary
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See VANBERG, supra note 229, at 61; Holtz-Bacha, supra note 232, at 102; Donald P. Kommers, The
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are rare. See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 229, at 27; BUMKE & VOSSKUHLE, supra note 230,
at 24; Hochmann, supra note 235, at 20–21; Meyer, Explaining Media Coverage of Constitutional Court
Decisions, supra note 237, at 432.
See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 229, at xxi.
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speech.243 To achieve this goal, the German Court has relied on a method
of communication with the public that is rather indirect and focuses to a
large extent on enhancing its relationship with the media. This attitude has
been underscored by Vice-President Winfried Hassemer who has
acknowledged that “[t]he media are the mouthpiece of the judiciary.”244
In 1996, the German Constitutional Court centralized its public relations
activities and established a press office that regularly prepares press releases
with detailed descriptions of selected decisions and also handles inquiries
from the media.245 This innovation occurred at a time when the German
Court’s popularity had suffered because of a series of controversial
decisions.246 The German Court’s press releases, written by the press office
in collaboration with the reporting Justice, remain relatively complex and
technical.247 But for the most part they fulfill their purpose: they allow
243
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Id. at 24 (noting the opinion of some that inaccessibility enhances authority).
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verbatim copies.”). The German Court’s press releases are also available in English and French on
the Court’s website. For example, see Press Release No. 31/2021: Constitutional Complaints
Against the Federal Climate Change Act Partially Successful (Re: Order of Mar. 24, 2021, 1 BvR
2656/18),
FED.
CONST.
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2021),
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journalists who are well-versed in constitutional law to quickly understand
the decisions in order to thoughtfully communicate their meaning to the
public.248 And there is some evidence that this tool has proven effective. For
example, a recent study found that the media are more likely to cover a
decision when the Federal Constitutional Court calls attention to it in a press
release.249 Christoph Engel has noted that “[a] press release indicates that,
in the Court’s perception, the wider public has an interest in the particular
case, or in the reasons for deciding it.”250 Hence, the German Court has
learned to use this powerful institutional tool to increase the visibility of a
decision and, therefore, the likelihood that it will be covered by the media.251
As President Vosskuhle explained: “Today, good press releases are
indispensable for serious press coverage. Specialized legal journalists are
rarely found even in national daily newspapers. It is all the more important
therefore to reduce the risk of misunderstandings or even false news reports
by formulating clear press releases.”252
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[https://perma.cc/2ZB8-TFMA].
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coverage of FCC decisions is higher for those that were promoted with a press release and had high
news value.”).
Christoph Engel, Does Efficiency Trump Legality? The Case of the German Constitutional Court, in
SELECTION AND DECISION IN JUDICIAL PROCESS AROUND THE WORLD: EMPIRICAL INQUIRES
261, 270 (Yun-Chien Chang ed., 2020); see also Meyer, Communicating Judicial Decisions, supra
note 245, at vii (“The findings of my dissertation confirm that press releases help a court
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The German Court also allows members of the Judicial Press Conference
of Karlsruhe (JPK)253 to receive access to information about important
judgments ahead of their official pronouncement.254 In some cases, this select
group of journalists can pick up the press release in person from the German
Court’s building on the evening before the oral announcement of a decision;
in other cases, they will be notified the day before a written decision is posted
online and will receive the press release an hour before the decision is made
public.255 Either way, journalists who receive the advance information are not
allowed to publish anything until the judgment is officially released. But the
time advantage given to the members of the JPK to read and process the
press release is meant to facilitate a more accurate and nuanced immediate
reporting of the German Court’s decisions.256 Furthermore, to provide
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additional background on the German Court’s deliberative process and
explain the jurisprudential basis of highly sensitive decisions, the Justices may
provide members of the JPK with confidential off-the-record briefings.257
There is another feature in the German Court’s decisions themselves that
makes those decisions more accessible to a wide audience of the legal
community and public officials. The German Court’s decisions are preceded
by several sentences, sometimes taking up several pages, which summarize
the main doctrinal bases for the Court’s opinion.258 Craig Smith has
explained it well:
The opinions begin with an admirable, lawyer-friendly feature: the Leitsätze,
or literally “leading sentences.” These court-written statements give readers
a boldly stated, extremely concise, and accurate account of the binding rules
that the court has articulated in the opinion. They are thus far more
satisfying and useful than the rambling reporters syllabus that, alongside an
explicit warning that it “constitutes no part of the opinion,” typically
precedes and simply summarizes a [U.S.] Supreme Court opinion.
American lawyers can appreciate the FCC’s Leitsätze best if they recall the
hours of work they must spend tracking down and searching through lengthy
cases, only to see their German colleagues progress more quickly through a
comparable research task simply by pulling the (Grundgesetz), a few
commentaries, and a Leitsatz or two off the shelf.259

As Professor Smith further notes, “[t]he FCC also speaks with a
remarkably coherent, authoritative voice. Moreover, the opinions have an
organizational and rhetorical similarity that suggest a firm unanimity of
purpose among the justices.”260 In addition:
Such unanimity seems stunning in light of both the unabashedly political
process by which the Republic selects the justices and the court’s crucial,
unavoidably political function. The court’s capacity for consensus is likewise
striking. Unlike in the U.S. Supreme Court, decisions are not rendered with

257
258

259
260

Lawful: Tagesspiegel Correspondent Would Not Receive Any Advance Information], LEGAL TRIB. ONLINE
(Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.lto.de/recht/justiz/j/bverfg-1274-691-20-vorab-informationennur-an-vollmitglieder-justizpressekonferenz-ungleichbehandlung-gerechtfertigt-tagesspiegelkorrespondent/ [https://perma.cc/5GBU-38D2]; Öffentlichkeitsarbeit des BVerfG [Public Relations
Work of the FCC], INSTITUTE FÜR URHEBER-UND MEDIENRECHT (Dec. 10, 2020, 5:42 PM),
https://www.urheberrecht.org/news/6497/ [https://perma.cc/5EL5-N2VC] (“[T]he court does
not see any violation of the right to equal treatment in journalistic competition in its practice.”).
See Holtz-Bacha, supra note 232, at 111–12, 115.
See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 229, at xxii; Hochmann, supra note 235, at 22; Engel, supra
note 250, at 269. The Leitsätze is not an element unique to the Federal Constitutional Court, but
rather an element common to German decisions, especially federal court decisions.
Craig Smith, An American’s View of the Federal Constitutional Court: Karlsruhe’s Justices, 2 GERMAN L. J.
E2 (2001).
Id.
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five different opinions, in which Justice X joins Justice Y only in Parts I.B.
and III.C. of her opinion and then, with a feisty rhetorical scalpel,
unapologetically slices to bits the ideas of Justice Z. Nor will a German judge
singlehandedly and openly put forth an official opinion that—despite a
nearly complete refusal of fellow justices to join that opinion—nonetheless
becomes widely accepted as constitutional law. That of course is what Justice
Powell did when his solo opinion in the Bakke case set parameters for racial
preferences in state university admissions that only now, more than two
decades later, courts are gradually supplanting.261

To be sure, there is an ongoing debate in Germany as to the desirability
of “popularizing” the German Court’s opinions—or making them more
accessible to the public. Some believe that the German Court’s concern with
public relations contributes to its special position in German society and to
the acceptance of its decisions by the German public. In fact, some have
called for even greater openness on the part of the Federal Constitutional
Court and for a further adaptation of its work product to accommodate
current realities.262 Others, however, have expressed the view that the
German Court’s media initiatives are unnecessary and potentially damaging
to the Court’s image. According to those critics, it is the formal, esoteric
language of the law—and the distance that separates the German Court and
the public—that accounts for the prestige of the judiciary and is the reason
that the public holds the Court in high regard: “The opacity gives the Court
its dignity, and its dignity is the foundation of its legitimacy.”263 Finally, some
criticism of the German Court’s media practices emanates from politicians
who feel that the Court has become too effective in media relations, so that
the Court oversteps its boundaries and competes with the politicians for
public attention.264 In other words, some German politicians resent the fact
that opinion polls indicate that the Federal Constitutional Court is the most
trusted governmental institution.265
Notwithstanding these criticisms, recent developments indicate that the
German Court remains strongly committed to adopting a proactive
approach to communicating and transmitting information about its decisions
to the press and the public. The German Court published a detailed annual
report for the first time in 2021, noting that: “With this new format, the Court
261
262
263
264
265

Id.
See Holtz-Bacha, supra note 232, at 116.
Hochmann, supra note 235, at 24.
See, e.g., Holtz-Bacha, supra note 232, at 115 (discussing a particular incident in which politicians
criticized the FCC president).
See Hochmann, supra note 235, at 18–19.
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aims to reach out to the public and to domestic and foreign institutions in
particular, seeking to provide information about the Court’s role and its work,
its structure and the different types of proceedings. Going beyond the
publication of mere statistical data, the Court has created the annual report
to make it easier to access and comprehend the information provided and to
put it in context.”266 The 100-page report, which provides an accessible and
comprehensive account of the German Court and its work, was made
available in both German and English versions on the Court’s website.267
Besides providing general information about the German Court’s structure,
its institutional role in the overall constitutional order, and the Court’s daily
work, the report contains a detailed overview of several important judicial
decisions that were rendered in the previous year, together with short
summaries of other decisions in a section entitled “Cases in Brief.” The
report concludes with an outlook on cases expected to be decided by the
German Court in the following year.
More recently, on the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Federal
Constitutional Court, the Court launched a series of short films aimed at the
general public.268 These films, which feature the Justices themselves, along
with dramatic music and advanced cinematic techniques, are sophisticated
and highly professional examples of public relations work. The first film,
“Behind the Justices’ Decisions—An Inside Look at the Federal
Constitutional Court,” takes viewers behind the scenes at the Court, showing
how judgments and orders are prepared; introducing the Justices, the law
clerks, and other members of the Court’s staff; explaining the Court’s role in
the German constitutional scheme as well as its internal procedures; and
providing a unique glimpse inside the Court’s building in Karlsruhe. Another
film presents a compilation of news broadcasts by German television
channels on major decisions issued by the German Court over the years.
266

267

268

Press Release No. 19/2021: Federal Constitutional Court Publishes Annual Report for the First
Time,
FED.
CONST.
C T.
(Mar.
3,
2021),
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2021/bvg21019.html [https://perma.cc/7QTJ-4TCL].
FED. CONST. CT., ANNUAL REPORT 2020 (Wiebke Ringel & Stefanie Schout trans., 2020),
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Jahresbericht/jahresbe
richt_2020.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5 [https://perma.cc/BME8-PAEN] (last visited Nov.
11, 2021).
Press Release No. 86/2021: New Films Marking the Court’s 70th Anniversary, FED. CONST. CT.
(Sept.
28,
2021),
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2021/bvg21086.html [https://perma.cc/CH7R-S3BD].
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This film includes audio-visual footage of the German Court’s judgment
concerning the prohibition of the communist party KPD in 1956 as well as
a news report on the German Court’s 2021 order concerning climate change.
At bottom, the publication of the annual report and the new “corporate
videos” represent the most obvious attempt by the German Court to find
new ways to reach out to the public and to additional audiences, and it
exemplifies President Vosskule’s emphatic assertion that “courts . . . must
repeatedly confront themselves critically with the question of how the law
can be made clearer and more understandable.”269
C. The Supreme Court of Israel—The Citizens’ Court
The Supreme Court of Israel has been regarded since its inception as a
strong, independent, and prestigious institution within the Israeli polity.
Israel’s Supreme Court wears two hats: it is the highest Court of Appeals and
it also sits as the High Court of Justice (Bagatz).270 Like several other formerly
British-ruled territories, Israel inherited the British common law and
continues to function without a formal, integrated document known as “the
constitution.”271 Instead, the legislature (Knesset) has enacted several Basic
Laws272 that the Supreme Court of Israel proclaimed—in a landmark

269
270
271

272

Vosskuhle, supra note 252.
MENACHEM MAUTNER, LAW AND THE CULTURE OF ISRAEL 56–57 (2011).
See SUZIE NAVOT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN ISRAEL 23 (2d. ed. 2016) (“Under the powerful
influence of its English legacy, Israeli law shares many features with the common law tradition.
Until 1980, by force of Article 46 of the Palestine Order in Council, Israeli Courts were bound to
follow English judge-made law. This article was abolished in 1980, but even so, the custom of
following English and American traditions still prevails.”); id. at 23–24 (“The structure of the legal
system and its legal institutions is undoubtedly influenced by common law tradition. Judicial
decisions are considered a source of law, often referred to as ‘the Israeli common law,’ and the
principle of binding precedent governs the creation of judge-made law.”); YAACOV S. ZEMACH,
POLITICAL QUESTIONS IN THE COURTS: A JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN DEMOCRACIES ISRAEL AND
THE UNITED STATES 21–22 (1976) (“Israel began as a conglomerate of disparate legal sources
inherited from the Mandate including ‘the substance of the common law, and the doctrines of
equity in force in England,’ as of May 14, 1948. The legal philosophy and experience of England
has thus affected Israel’s emerging jurisprudence.”); RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY:
THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 21 (2004) (noting that
Israel’s constitutional system at its founding was based on parliamentary supremacy).
See YAACOV S. ZEMACH, THE JUDICIARY IN ISRAEL 23 (3d. ed. 2002) (“[T]he First Knesset decided
in 1950 that the constitution of the State be enacted gradually, chapter by chapter. Each was to be
a Basic Law of its own. The Basic Laws, on completion, would be consolidated to form the
Constitution of the State.”); NAVOT, supra note 271, at 50–51 (discussing the characteristics of the
Basic Laws); Ruth Gavison, Legislatures and the Quest for a Constitution: The Case of Israel, 11 REV.
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decision in 1995—to enable it to review the constitutionality of ordinary
laws.273 Thus, in its capacity as the HCJ, the Israeli Court functions today as
a court of first instance, the original jurisdiction for all constitutional review
cases in the country: petitions are brought to it directly, rather than coming
up on appeal from lower courts.274 Moreover, access to the HCJ is extremely
easy.275 The Israeli Court has virtually eliminated judicial access doctrines,
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274
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CONST. STUD. 345, 365–74 (2006) (explaining Israel’s constitutional history); Tom Ginsburg,
Economic Analysis and the Design of Constitutional Courts, 3 THEO. INQ. L. 49, 74 (2002) (“Faced with
deeply divided society at independence in 1948 (as today), Israel’s founders chose not to adopt a
constitution but, rather, to use a series of incrementally enacted non-entrenched Basic Laws to
embody the nation’s central political principles.”).
CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village 49(4) PD 221 (1995) (Isr.),
translation
at
https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/opinions/United%20
Mizrachi%20Bank%20v.%20Migdal%20Cooperative%20Village_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N66Y-4VHS]; see also NAVOT, supra note 271, at 42–50 (discussing the
“constitutional revolution” that ensued from the United Mizrahi Bank decision); id. at 166 (“In a
manner similar to the American ruling in Marbury v. Madison, it was the constitutional status of
Israel’s basic laws that provided the basis for the Court’s power to judicially review laws that
contradicted basic laws.”); ZEMACH, THE JUDICIARY IN ISRAEL, supra note 272, at 103–04
(discussing constitutional review in Israel); Daphne Barak-Erez, From an Unwritten to a Written
Constitution: The Israeli Challenge in American Perspective, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 309 passim
(1995) (providing an historical overview of the political and legal circumstances leading up to the
United Mizrahi Bank decision); Rivka Weill, Hybrid Constitutionalism: The Israeli Case for Judicial Review
and Why We Should Care, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 349, 350 (2012) (“[I]n the 1995 United Mizrahi
Bank decision, the Israeli Supreme Court seized upon this opportunity to declare not only the
existence of a formal Constitution in the form of Basic Laws, but also the resulting Court power of
judicial review over primary legislation.”); Rivka Weill, Reconciling Parliamentary Sovereignty and Judicial
Review: On the Theoretical and Historical Origins of the Israeli Legislative Override Power, 39 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 457 (2012) (analyzing the revolutionary effect on Israeli constitutional law of the
United Mizrahi Bank decision); Adam Shinar, Israel’s External Constitution: Friends, Enemies, and the
Constitutional/Administrative Law Distinction, 57 VA. J. INT’L. L. 735, 738–40 (2018) (providing a brief
overview of Israeli constitutional law and explaining the significance of the United Bank Mizrachi
decision); Ginsburg, Economic Analysis and the Design of Constitutional Courts, supra note 272 (“The Israeli
system illustrates how judicial review can also be adopted in established democracies as political
configurations change.”).
NAVOT, supra note 271, at 168–69.
See AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 298–99 (2006) (“Our point of departure in
Israel has been that the doors of the Supreme Court . . . are open to anyone wishing to complain
about the activities of a public authority. There are no black holes where there is judicial review.
The open door approach is expressed in a number of ways. First, it is very rare that the court would
close its doors on the ground of non-justiciability. . . . Second, the court opens its doors to anyone
claiming that civil rights have been violated. Everyone has standing.”); YOAV DOTAN, LAWYERING
FOR THE RULE OF LAW 29 (2014) (“I doubt whether there is any other Supreme Court around the
world to which access is as easy as the HCJ.”); ZEMACH, THE JUDICIARY IN ISRAEL, supra note 272,
at 75 (noting that the court fees for filing a petition are low and that the procedure is simple and
flexible); MAUTNER, supra note 270, at 57 n.12 (explaining that an application to the HCJ is
inexpensive, representation is not needed, and there are no witnesses or regular trial procedures).
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such as standing and justiciability, and it has severely curtailed or softened
other procedural barriers.276 Today, therefore, as Yoav Dotan observes,
“whenever a petition raises an issue of important constitutional merit, or
when there is a suspicion of serious governmental violations of the principle
of the rule of law, any person is entitled to bring the petition into court,
regardless of their personal interest in the outcome of the litigation.”277
Professor Dotan further asserts that “[t]here is hardly a political controversy,
an issue of public importance, or a contemporary moral dilemma that does
not find its way, sooner rather than later, as a subject of a petition to this
judicial forum.”278 Robert Bork has been more critical in his assessment:
“Pride of place in the international judicial deformation of democratic
government goes not to the Unites States, nor to Canada, but to the State of
Israel. The Israeli Supreme Court is making itself the dominant institution
in the nation, an authority no other court in the world has achieved.”279
The growing role of the Supreme Court of Israel and the ensuing
criticism from politicians and academics has been accompanied by an
increase in coverage of legal affairs by the press.280 These developments have
pushed the Israeli Court to acknowledge over the years that it has something
to gain from a more open communications approach. To be sure, judicial
distance from the media and an ethos of letting the decisions “speak for
themselves” still dominate the attitude of the Justices on the Israeli Supreme
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277
278

279
280

See DOTAN, supra note 275, at 26–28, 125, 128; MAUTNER, supra note 270, at 57–68; see also Bryna
Bogoch & Anat Peleg, Carping, Criticizing, and Circumventing: Judges, the Supreme Court, and the Media in
Israel, in JUSTICES AND JOURNALISTS: THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 127, at 164, 165;
Matt Malone, Standing in the Way: Comparing Constraints on Access to Justice After the Liberalization of Public
Interest Standing in Canada and Israel, 46 ADVOCS.’ Q. 451 (2017).
DOTAN, supra note 275, at 37.
Id. at 41. If there is one thing that epitomizes the activism of Israel’s Supreme Court, it is a saying
by Justice Aharon Barak, the Court’s Chief Justice for twelve years and the person most closely
identified with the Court’s current jurisprudence: “The whole earth is full of law. Any human
conduct is the object of a legal norm.” MAUTNER, supra note 270, at 3.
ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 111 (2003).
See MAUTNER, supra note 270, at 166–69 (“References to the Supreme Court in insulting and
offensive terms, unimaginable in any Western country, began to appear as a matter of routine.”);
Bryna Bogoch & Yifat Holzman-Gazit, Mutual Bond: Media Frames and the Israeli High Court of Justice,
33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 53, 54 (2008) (“In Israel, as elsewhere, there has been an expansion of
the role of the Supreme Court and a growing media concern with rights consciousness, alongside a
shift to a more aggressive style of journalism.”); Bogoch & Peleg, supra note 276, at 166–68 (finding
that the Supreme Court of Israel’s increased activism was accompanied by an increase in media
coverage of the Court’s activities).
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Court.281 Indeed, the Code of Judicial Ethics,282 which several Justices helped
to draft, includes ethical canons that underscore the fact that judges should
avoid all direct interactions with the media.283 The Code states, for example,
that “a judge speaks only through written judgments and decisions. As a rule,
a judge should not grant interviews or give any sort of information to the
media.”284 The Code further provides that “a judge should refrain from
appearing or giving interviews to the media. An appearance or interview of
a judge in the media—including in the press, radio, television, internet, at a
press conference, or in any other way—must get a prior approval of the
President of the Supreme Court.”285 Perhaps most notably, the Code of
Judicial Ethics requires that “a judge should refrain from publicly expressing
an opinion on a matter that is essentially non-legal and is publicly
controversial.”286 But it seems that the Israeli Supreme Court, as an
institution, is refusing to stay passive in light of attacks against it and is
beginning to test new ways of communicating its work to the media and the
public.
Cameras and audio recordings—except on very rare occasions—are
banned from all Israeli courtrooms.287 Aside from photographing the judges
entering the courtroom, or broadcasting ceremonial occasions such as when
a judge reads his or her last decision before retiring, there is a strict
prohibition on any type of broadcast from any courtroom.288 In 2014,
281
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Bogoch & Peleg, supra note 276, at 164, 177 (“There is seemingly a paradox between the Supreme
Court’s powerful position in Israeli society, its current concern for its image in the media, and its
conservative position on transparency and media access.”).
Code of Judicial Ethics, 2007, KT 6591 p. 934 (Isr.).
See generally Shimon Shetreet, The Status of Codes of Judicial Conduct in Comparative Perspectives, in THE
CULTURE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: RULE OF LAW AND WORLD PEACE 292, 293 (Shimon
Shetreet ed., 2014).
Code of Judicial Ethics, supra note 282, § 39(a).
Id. at § 39(c).
Id. at § 18.
The Courts Act of 1984, SH No. 1123, § 70 (as amended) (Isr.).
Bogoch & Peleg, supra note 276, at 172 (“In a very small number of cases, the Courts have permitted
broadcasts. These include the Holocaust-related trials of Adolf Eichmann, and Ivan Demjanuk,
which were filmed and broadcast almost in entirety; the radio and television broadcast [of] a
summary of the conviction of Yigal Amir, who assassinated Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin; and the
radio broadcast of a summary of the conviction of Arye Deri, a former Minister of the Interior, for
taking bribes.”). In January 2022, the President of the Supreme Court of Israel announced a new
initiative for the live broadcasting of oral announcements of lower court decisions in selected cases
of public interest. Ayelet Filo, Press Release: Live Broadcasting of Oral Announcements of
Decisions in the District and Magistrates’ Courts, ISR. JUD. AUTH. (Jan. 4, 2022),
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however, the Israeli Court decided for the first time to allow the live
broadcasting of oral arguments in a constitutional case.289 This was part of
an experiment to test the viability of televising cases deemed to be of special
public interest.290 There was some speculation at that time that the only
reason the Israeli Court permitted this broadcast was to forestall the
enactment of proposed legislation that would have allowed unrestricted radio
and television broadcasts of hearings at the HCJ.291 After that bill failed to
gain momentum, and until recently, it seemed that the 2014 broadcast was
indeed a one-off. However, at the beginning of 2020, Justice Esther Hayut,
the President of the Supreme Court of Israel, announced her support for a
more open communications approach and set out a tentative plan for
streaming proceedings from the HCJ.292 This announcement came at a time
when strict restrictions and lockdowns went into effect due to a widespread
surge in Covid-19 infections. President Hayut emphasized the significance
of allowing the public a chance to tune in to live broadcasts from the HCJ,
given the limits that were imposed on large gatherings.293 While the
pandemic that restricted the access of journalists and citizens to courtrooms

289

290

291
292

293

https://www.gov.il/he/departments/news/spokemenmessage040122 [https://perma.cc/9G9PR67U].
Bogoch & Peleg, supra note 276, at 172; Chen Maanit, For the First Time: A Live Television Broadcast of
a
Hearing
at
the
Supreme
Court,
GLOBES
(Nov.
18,
2014),
https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000987193 [https://perma.cc/Y5UH-Y88S]
[hereinafter Maanit, First Television Broadcast from the Supreme Court].
A committee headed by Justice Dorit Beinisch, who later assumed the position of President of the
Supreme Court of Israel, recommended the approval of live broadcasting of hearings from the High
Court of Justice in 2004. DORIT BEINISCH ET AL., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER
THE
OPENING OF COURTS IN ISRAEL TO ELECTRONIC MEDIA (2004),
https://elyon1.court.gov.il/heb/doch%20electroni.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2X9-M8JY]; see also
Bogoch & Peleg, supra note 276, at 172; Netael Bandel, Hayut Approves Preparations for Live Broadcasting
of
Selected
Hearings
from
the
Supreme
Court,
HAARETZ
(Mar.
22,
2020),
https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/law/.premium-1.8698965 [https://perma.cc/3ULZ-P2WU].
Bogoch & Peleg, supra note 276, at 172; Maanit, First Television Broadcast from the Supreme Court, supra
note 289.
See Yair Sheleg, Live Broadcasts from the Supreme Court Will Shine Sunlight on Proceedings, JERUSALEM
POST (May 14, 2020, 11:00 PM), https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/live-broadcasts-from-thesupreme-court-will-shine-sunlight-on-proceedings-628085 [https://perma.cc/X93L-6JHR] (“The
decision of the chief justice of the Supreme Court, Esther Hayut, to allow live broadcasts of the
court’s recent proceedings may prove to be one of the most important rulings in the history of the
court.”); Bandel, supra note 290.
Ayelet Filo, Press Release: The Supreme Court Will Soon Begin an Experimental Project in Which
Supreme Court Hearings Will Be Broadcast Live, ISR. JUD. AUTH. (Apr. 13, 2020),
https://www.gov.il/he/departments/news/spokemenmessage13042020
[https://perma.cc/A8HT-33KZ].
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was a notable catalyst, it should be noted that plans to allow television
broadcasts from the Supreme Court of Israel had long been contemplated.
The Israeli Court has since authorized the broadcasts of hearings in
several constitutional cases. Perhaps most prominent was the challenge that
the HCJ heard to then-Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s leading a new
government while facing criminal indictments for potential bribery and
fraud. Interestingly, President Hayut offered at the beginning of each
hearing day an introduction to the issues in ordinary language. This had
never been done before, and it surely was intended to help the national
audience better understand the case. The ratings were exceptional. The
overall viewing across the range of broadcasting platforms during the two
days the hearing took place was estimated at about one and a half million
views.294 Nitzan Chen, the Director of the Government Press Office who
orchestrated the recent broadcastings from the HCJ, has noted that “it was
an unforgettable, fascinating, and historical learning experience.”295 Chen
believes that “the ratings show that we may have spotted a real need in the
Israeli society to understand the legal debate not through intermediaries but
directly. Until today, only journalists would come to the hearing. There is
something in this new development that can be taught in journalism and
media schools. The quality of journalistic reporting has definitely improved
thanks to the broadcasts.”296 Jacob Turkel, a retired Justice, has objected in
the past to the idea of allowing cameras inside the Supreme Court’s
courtrooms. But after watching the live broadcast, he acknowledged that he
might have overlooked its merits: “When I saw the hearings on television, I
realized that there might also be a positive educational side to it, that the
public can see that a discussion can be conducted with civility. It can also
affect the way other debates are handled, not necessarily in the Court.”297
Furthermore, the Israeli Court is trying to facilitate timely and accurate
news reporting through short summaries of important decisions, which are
distributed to reporters at the same time that the decisions are released to the
public. This facilitates the work of journalists and helps them grasp more
quickly the finer points of the decisions. Indeed, these summaries are often
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Ayelet Kahana, Behind the Scenes of the High Court of Justice Reality Show, MAKOR RISHON (May 7,
2020, 4:26 PM), https://www.makorrishon.co.il/news/227337/ [https://perma.cc/LLR59V3M].
Id.
Id.
Id.
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used in the hours after a decision is announced when reporters are searching
for the quintessential excerpts from the Justices’ opinions. It is noteworthy
that each Justice is allowed to write his or her own outline of the opinion to
be included in the summary. While this means that summaries still make use
of complex legal jargon, it maintains the autonomy of the Justices and their
distinctive views on the matters at issue. More recently, the Israeli Court took
the unusual step of releasing a Q&A document shortly after the
announcement of a major constitutional ruling on the right to citizenship for
foreigners who converted to Judaism in non-Orthodox communities within
the state of Israel.298 The document was written in plain language, with the
deliberate purpose to better explain the reasons for the long-awaited and
contested decision to reporters and the public.299 Furthermore, at the end of
each year the Israeli Supreme Court prepares and publicizes reviews of its
most important decisions divided into the various areas of law. In contrast
to the summaries mentioned above, the reviews are drafted in reader-friendly
language with “ready-to-use” information that is routinely reprinted by the
press. This technique enables the Israeli Court to encourage the media to
report on the decisions in more mundane cases and thereby draw more
attention to the work of the Justices that affects the daily lives of citizens.
In recent years, some Presidents of the Supreme Court of Israel have
reportedly consulted public relations experts. Justice Dorit Beinisch, who
served as the President of the Israeli Court from 2006 to 2012, was reported
to have secretly consulted with a private public relations firm that volunteered
to plan a campaign against reforms that were proposed by the Minister of
Justice and would have purportedly constrained the Court’s jurisdiction.300
In 2018, President Hayut also reportedly hired a public relations advisor
whose main task was to build a digital media strategy and improve the Israeli
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HCJ 11013/05 Dahan v. Minister of Interior (3.1.2021) (Isr.); see generally Patrick Kingsley, Israeli
Court Says Converts to Non-Orthodox Judaism Can Claim Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/01/world/middleeast/israel-jewish-convertscitizenship.html [https://perma.cc/CE5E-GA2F] (Mar. 23, 2021).
The Q&A document was republished verbatim in several newspapers and contained such questions
as: Why did the Court have to decide the issue of non-Orthodox conversion? Did the Court
consider the religious validity of non-Orthodox conversion? Is there legal novelty in the decision?
What was the law before the decision, and what is the binding law after the decision? Does the
ruling close the door for other political arrangements? What did the concurring opinion suggest?
See, e.g., Chen Maanit, The Conversion Case: What Does It Mean, Is There a Legal Change, and What Is the
Next Step?, GLOBES (Mar. 1, 2021), https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001362497
[https://perma.cc/PS8D-B6PC].
Bogoch & Peleg, supra note 276, at 177.
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Court’s public image.301 One reporter recently noted that, “President
Hayut’s decision to hire a professional communications consultant was
largely at odds with the Supreme Court’s ethos—an ethos in which the
Justices, distanced from the people, ‘speak’ to the public only through the
written decisions. Hayut has apparently come to the conclusion that the oldfashioned ethos is no longer relevant, and that it can no longer exist in a world
of social networks, frenetic public discourse, and weekly attacks on the
Supreme Court’s Justices and their rulings by highly-regarded politicians.”302
The reporter went on to say that “the President realized that times had
changed, that the Justices could no longer afford the luxury of sitting in the
ivory tower and treating the media as a nuisance—a luxury that led the
Supreme Court to become the punching bag of right-wing politicians looking
to gain sympathy in their electoral base.”303 Taken together, these recent
developments seem to reflect the Israeli Supreme Court’s understanding that
it must engage in “the media wars” or suffer the consequence of a diminished
public image.304
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES CAN BENEFIT FROM
THE STRATEGIES THAT OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS HAVE
ADOPTED
As constitutional courts across the world have come to play a more pivotal
role in their respective democracies,305 citizens have become more interested
301
302

303
304

305

Avishai Grinzaig, Esther Hayut, Using the Media Is a Legitimate Tool in Defending the Justice System, GLOBES
DECADE IN REVIEW: 2010–2019, Dec. 27, 2019, at 184.
Chen Maanit, No Prior Communications Experience: Third Communications Consultant in Two Years for
President
Hayut,
GLOBES
(Sep.
2,
2020),
https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001341299 [https://perma.cc/P9DK-J93N]
(noting some criticism from journalists about the function of the Supreme Court’s public relations
advisor).
Id.
Cf. Ayala Procaccia, Media, Law, and the Court, in ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN BOOK 1297 (Aharon Barak
et al. eds., 2021) (arguing that the judiciary should play a larger role in strengthening its relationship
with the media and the public).
See, e.g., THEUNIS ROUX, THE POLITICO-LEGAL DYNAMICS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 (2018) (“The
adoption of a system of ‘strong-form’ judicial review poses the perennial question of law’s
relationship to politics in a particularly stark form . . . . Unless and until judicial review is
disestablished, the judiciary may assert final decision-making power over aspects of public policy
formerly reserved to the political branches. Political actors, in turn, may either embrace this move,
cognizant of judicial review’s legitimating potential, or push back against it, arguing that the
judiciary has overreached its authority.”); GAROUPA & GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REPUTATION, supra
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in the judgments of these courts and in the ways in which the courts’ activities
may affect their lives and livelihoods. As we have seen, some constitutional
courts have met this challenge by demonstrating a more proactive approach
in their communications with the press and the public. The judicial trend
toward greater and more effective communications seems consistent with the
fundamental values of a modern democratic society and shows that the
United States Supreme Court’s hard line against change cannot be justified
on grounds of principle.
At the most basic level, what makes the judiciary unique is its institutional
obligation to explain its decisions. As we have shown, it is the essence of the
judicial office that judges must explain the reasons for their actions. Truly,
“the legal mind must assign some reason in order to decide anything with
spiritual quiet.”306 As Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 78, “The
judiciary . . . has no influence over either the sword or the purse, no direction
either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active
resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither Force nor Will, but
merely judgment.”307 And, as Herbert Wechsler famously wrote, “The virtue

306

307

note 31, at 188 (arguing that audiences outside the judiciary have gained importance relative to
internal audiences due to the increasing visibility of the law and the global rise in judicial power);
HIRSCHL, supra note 271, at 1 (“Around the globe, in more than eighty countries and in several
supranational entities, constitutional reform has transferred an unprecedented amount of power
from representative institutions to judiciaries.”); A. P. Le Sueur, The Judges and the Intention of
Parliament: Is Judicial Review Undemocratic?, 44 PARLIAMENTARY AFFS. 283, 283 (1991) (“Even in a
constitution without a Bill of Rights, judicial review gives the courts considerable powers to
intervene in government decisions.”); see also George Williams, The High Court and the Media, 1 UTS
L. REV. 136, 140 (1999) (“The Australian community is almost totally dependent upon the media
for explanation and analysis of the work of the High Court. Hence the relationship between the
High Court and the media is crucial to public confidence in the Court. This is particularly true at
a time when the High Court has acknowledged its law-making role, and has exercised it in
protecting fundamental rights and freedoms against governmental action.”).
McCree, supra note 58, at 797 (quoting United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake
Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 1008 (S.D.N.Y 1915) (Hough, J.)); see also Rex v. Sussex Justices [1924]
1 KB 256, 259 (“[J]ustice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen
to be done.”).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); see also
WILLIAM BONDY, THE SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS: IN HISTORY, IN THEORY,
AND IN THE CONSTITUTIONS 153 (New York, Columbia College 1896) (“Courts have no means
and no power to avoid the effects of non-action by the legislature or the executive.”); Keith E.
Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United
States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583 (2005) (describing the dependence of judicial review
on the support of political institutions).
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or demerit of a judgment turns . . . on the reasons that support it.”308 Justice
Ginsburg made the same point when she observed that, “A judgment
expressing no reasons presents the appearance of arbitrariness.”309 Most
important, as Joseph Goldstein has pointed out, “[t]he notion that the socalled counter-majoritarian branch of the government need not tell all the
reasons or the ‘real’ reasons for its decisions is a form of secrecy that offends
democracy.”310
But it is not enough that reasons be given in some form that might be
decipherable by some citizens having specialized knowledge. Courts should
not only explain the reasons for their decisions, they should do so in a way
that can be understood by those whose lives are affected by them.311 This is
especially important in the case of the Supreme Court, which “makes
independent and impartial decisions about issues that matter to everyone.
This is a crucial task. That’s why it is important that people understand how
and why a given decision was reached.”312 And it is most important when

308

309
310

311

312

Wechsler, supra note 176, at 19–20; see also John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Courts
as Deliberative Institutions: Towards an Institutional Theory of Constitutional Justice, in CONSTITUTIONAL
JUSTICE, EAST AND WEST: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN
POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 21, 22 (Wojciech Sadurski ed.,
2002) (“[D]eliberation and reason-giving seem especially valuable (and familiar) aspects of
adjudication.”).
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Obligation to Reason Why, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 205, 221 (1985).
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20, at 115; see also ROSTOW, supra note 60, at 83 (“In the climate of a
democracy, I hope it will never be enough for those whom we have chosen to govern us to say:
‘Obey us, for we are the law. Hold your peace, and do what you are told to do by a policeman, a
judge, or a legislature.’ We are a law-abiding people. . . . But we want to know—we have the right
to know—why the law we must obey is what it is.”); Gerard Brennan, The Third Branch and the Fourth
Estate, 32 IRISH JURIST (N.S.) 62, 67 (1997) (“By sitting in public and by publishing their reasons
for judgment, the judges give an account of the exercise of their judicial powers.”).
See Brett M. Kavanaugh, The Judge as Umpire: Ten Principles, 65 CATH. U.L. REV. 683, 690 (2016)
(“[T]o be a good judge or a good umpire, you have to be clear in explaining why you have made
the decision you made.”).
Year in Review 2019, supra note 227 (emphasis removed); see also GAROUPA & GINSBURG, JUDICIAL
REPUTATION, supra note 31, at 6–7 (noting Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s particular interest in the
intelligibility of her opinions, as evidenced by the clarity of her dissent in Schuette v. Coalition of Defend
Affirmative Action); David Fontana, The People’s Justice?, 123 YALE L.J. F. 447, 447 (2014) (observing
Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s distinctive approach “to communicate outside of [her] judicial opinions
with average Americans” in order to make her “liberal perspective on the Constitution more known,
more liked, and more comprehensible.”); Barry Sullivan, The Honest Muse: Judge Wisdom and the Uses
of History, 60 TUL. L. REV. 314, 325 (1985) (discussing Judge Wisdom’s view that judicial opinions
should be comprehensible to the public); Brennan, The Third Branch and the Fourth Estate, supra note
310, at 62 (“In a democracy, the rule of law is not achieved by raw power but by public acceptance
of the law and by public confidence in the institutions which promulgate and administer it.”).
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the Court is deciding constitutional questions.313 In McCulloch v. Maryland,
Chief Justice Marshall emphasized that “only [the] great outlines [of a
constitution] should be marked, its important objects designated,” because,
otherwise, the Constitution would require the “prolixity of a legal code” and
“could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would, probably, never
be understood by the public.”314
The written Constitution was intended, as Michael Kammen has
observed, to be accessible and fully comprehensible to the American
313

314

Justice Joseph Story believed, for example, that it was his “duty” in constitutional law cases “to give
a public expression of [his] opinions, when they differed from that of the Court,” explaining that
“upon constitutional questions, the public have a right to know the opinion of every judge who
dissents from the opinion of the Court, and the reasons of his dissent.” Briscoe v. Bank of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257, 329, 350 (1837) (Story, J., dissenting); see also
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 223 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring) (“I feel my duty to
the public best discharged, by an effort to maintain my opinions in my own way.”); KRAMER, supra
note 25, at 248 (“[We should refuse] to be deflected by arguments that constitutional law is too
complex or difficult for ordinary citizens. Constitutional law is indeed complex, for legitimating
judicial authority has offered an excuse to emphasize technical requirements of precedent and legal
argument that necessarily complicated matters. But this complexity was created by the Court for
the Court and is itself a product of judicializing constitutional law.”).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). It could not be otherwise because “[t]he government of the
Union, . . . is, emphatically, and truly, a government of the people. In form and in substance it
emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them,
and for their benefit.” Id. at 404–05; see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576
(2008) (“‘[T]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters.’”) (quoting United States
v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)); LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING
THE CONSTITUTION 1 (1991). President Franklin Roosevelt also emphasized that the Constitution
“was a layman’s document, not a lawyer’s contract” in his 1937 Constitution Day Address.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address on Constitution Day (Sept. 17, 1937) (transcript available at
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-constitution-day-washington-dc
[https://perma.cc/SC7X-XU8V] (last visited Jan 23, 2021)). Interestingly, Roosevelt made that
observation in a speech that he delivered shortly after a series of adverse Supreme Court decisions
and the defeat of his “court-packing” plan. See, e.g., CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL
COURT, supra note 86, at 11–32 (discussing Roosevelt’s court-packing plan); LEUCHTENBURG,
supra note 137, at 82–154 (same). One historian has described the speech as “a scorching
Constitution Day speech . . . [in which he] blast[ed] those who cried ‘unconstitutional’ at every
effort he made to improve the condition of the American people.” SUSAN DUNN, ROOSEVELT’S
PURGE: HOW FDR FOUGHT TO CHANGE THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY 13 (2010). In his First
Inaugural Address, President Roosevelt had stated that, “Our Constitution is so simple and
practical that it is possible always to meet extraordinary needs by changes in emphasis and
arrangement without loss of essential form. That is why our constitutional system has proved itself
the most superbly enduring political mechanism the modern world has produced. It has met every
stress of vast expansion of territory, of foreign wars, of bitter internal strife, of world relations.”
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Inaugural Address, Mar. 4, 1933, in 2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES
OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 11, 14–15 (compiled by Samuel I. Rosenman, 1938). The Supreme
Court, of course, did not share that vision of the Constitution. See, e.g., LEUCHTENBURG, supra note
137, at 132–33.
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people.315 And Eugene Rostow has noted that, “the people cannot do their
part in the constitutional process unless they understand it. It is therefore a
matter of the utmost importance that the people know about the
Constitution and its history, and about the way in which it has been
interpreted and applied, decade after decade, as the basic law of a vast,
complex, and dynamic society.”316 For that reason, as Professor Goldstein
emphasized, “the justices, as members of a collective body, have an
obligation to maintain the Constitution, in opinions of the Court and also in
concurring and dissenting opinions, as something intelligible—as something
that We the People of the United States can understand. Whether the
justices be activists or passivists, they have a professional obligation to
articulate in comprehensible and accessible language the constitutional
principles on which their judgments rest. . . . It is to ensure the continuing
accessibility of the Constitution to the People.”317 It is important that
constitutional decisions be intelligible to the public, but it is equally important
that they be intelligible to the other branches of government, which are
responsible both for enforcing those decisions and for acting in conformity
with them.318
The current, widespread availability of judicial decisions and other forms
of juristic commentary in electronic form might lead some to conclude that
citizens can easily acquaint themselves with the content of those materials.319
The reality, however, is more complicated. The meaning of the Constitution
315

316

317
318

319

KAMMEN, supra note 18, at 3; see also H. J. FENTON, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 22 (rev. ed. 1914)
(“[T]he Federal Constitution can be read through in less than half an hour. It was made short for
a purpose. It was intended to be a people’s Constitution, easily to be read and understood.”).
ROSTOW, supra note 60, at 83; see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis &
Holmes, JJ., concurring) (“Those who won our independence believed that . . . . the greatest
menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should
be a fundamental principle of the American government.”).
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20, at 19, 112; see also Lerner, supra note 26, at 180.
See, e.g., VANBERG, supra note 229, at 48–49 (“The more clearly an opinion enunciates the
constitutional principles that sustain the decision, as well as the implications of the decision for
policy, the easier it is to verify whether a legislative response complies with the ruling. . . . Specificity
of judicial language may be a response to the problem of transparency.”); CHARLES R. EPP, THE
RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 6 (1998) (“[P]roponents of expanded judicial protection for rights should not place
all hope in judges or constitutional reform but should provide support to rights-advocacy lawyers
and organizations. . . . [F]or they establish the conditions for sustained judicial attention to civil
liberties and civil rights and for channeling judicial power toward egalitarian ends.”).
Roberts, supra note 176, at 2 (suggesting that the posting of an electronic copy of a lengthy decision
is helpful to readers in the same way that Chief Justice Warren intended for the Court’s brief
opinion in Brown v. Board of Education to aid readers in understanding that decision.).
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is not always obvious;320 nor is “the law of the Constitution,” that is, the
jurisprudence or body of judicial opinions expounding the meaning and
proper application of the Constitution,321 which build one upon another.322
Indeed, in our tradition of common-law constitutionalism,323 precedents
320

321

322

323

See, e.g., John Paul Stevens, Judicial Restraint, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 437, 437 (1985) (“The
Constitution of the United States is a mysterious document. The wisdom that created the
Constitution is evidenced not only by the handful of clues that are set forth in its text, but also by
what the document does not say.”); Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1996)
(“[J]udging is a difficult challenge because the Constitution itself is written in broad and sometimes
ambiguous terms. Unfortunately, the Constitution does not come with Cliff’s Notes or a glossary.
When it comes time to interpret the Constitution’s provisions, such as, for instance, the Speech or
Press Clauses of the First Amendment, reasonable minds can certainly differ as to their exact
meaning.”); Antonin Scalia, Is There an Unwritten Constitution?, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (1989)
(“Many, if not most, of the provisions of the Constitution do not make sense except as they are
given meaning by the historical background in which they were adopted.”); THE FEDERALIST NO.
37, supra note 307, at 236 (James Madison) (“All new laws, though penned with the greatest
technical skill, and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or
less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of
particular discussions and adjudications.”); ROSTOW, supra note 60, at 93 (“The political content
of the judge’s work is therefore to interpret and enforce the broad intention of the Constitution.
That task is rarely easy, since few provisions of the Constitution are beyond ambiguity.”); GREENE,
supra note 72, at 91 (“The U.S. Constitution is not a code. Many of the rights Americans hold most
dear, and nearly all the rights we argue about, are absent from the text. . . . [And] most of its rights
provisions are surprisingly vague.”); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The
Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1979) (“The values that we find in our Constitution—liberty,
equality, due process, freedom of speech, no establishment of religion, property, no impairments
and unusual punishment—are ambiguous. They are capable of a great number of different
meanings.”).
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”); Felix Frankfurter, The United States Supreme
Court Molding the Constitution, 32 CURRENT HIST. 235, 240 (1930) (“In good truth, the Supreme
Court is the Constitution.”); Robert G. McCloskey, Principles, Powers, and Values: The Establishment
Clause and the Supreme Court, 2 RELIGION & PUB. ORD. 3, 3 (1964) (“American constitutional history
has been in large part a spasmodic running debate over the behavior of the Supreme Court.”).
See, e.g., Kenneth F. Ripple, On Becoming a Judge, 34 FED. B. NEWS & J. 380 (1987) (“Continuity is a
constitutional character of the federal judiciary.”); Arthur S. Miller, Constitutional Decisions as De Facto
Class Actions: A Comment on the Implications of Cooper v. Aaron, 58 U. DET. J. URB. L. 573, 583–84
(1981) (“To expect a ‘coherent’ body of constitutional law from a telocratic Supreme Court is to
ask for the impossible. Law is a process, not a set of internally consistent principles; it is Darwinian,
not Newtonian.”); cf. Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346,
1381 (2006) (“One lesson of American constitutional experience is that the words of each provision
[of the Bill of Rights] tend to take on a life of their own, becoming the obsessive catchphrase for
expressing everything one might want to say about the right in question.”).
See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 5 (1991) (“The ways in which
Americans interpret the Constitution could have been different; indeed the forms of constitutional
discourse are very different in other societies. For Americans, however, these ways have taken the
form of common law argument, those forms prevailing at the time of the drafting and ratification
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necessarily accumulate, and the Justices speak about the cases they decide in
terms of analogies to previous cases, more often than they resort to the text,
which may be incapable of providing an unambiguous answer in any
event.324 As former Solicitor General Charles Fried has noted, “Argument
from precedent and by analogy . . . allow[s] the Constitution to be applied to
changing circumstances. . . . [E]ven in constitutional cases, precedent and
analogy are the stuff of legal argument, and . . . legal argument is what moves
the Court—or moves it when all involved are doing their work right.”325 It
is clear, therefore, that a case decision seldom stands on its own, conveying
the whole of the relevant law. Each judicial opinion must be understood in
its context and case law antecedents.326 This requirement creates complexity

324

325

326

of the US Constitution.”); ROSTOW, supra note 60, at 84 (“[T]he common law is the matrix of our
constitutional law, providing its atmosphere, its modes of action, and the creative vigor with which
it defines the role of judges.”); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 3 (2010) (“Our
constitutional system . . . has become a common law system, one in which precedent and past
practices are, in their own way, as important as the written U.S. Constitution itself.”); William H.
Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976) (discussing the concept of
a “living Constitution” and tracing the origin of the term to Howard Lee McBain’s 1927 book The
Living Constitution); K. N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1934)
(“A recanvass of the nature of any working constitution, and especially ours, as being in essence not
a document, but a living institution built (historically, genetically) in first instance around a particular
Document, would make clear both the fact of and the reasons for the major vagaries of the Court’s
action.”); see also Edwards v. Canada (Attorney General) [1930] AC 124, 1929 UKPC 86 [44]
(appeal taken from Can.) (articulating the Canadian “living tree” constitutional doctrine); Arthur
W. Machen, Jr., The Elasticity of the Constitution (part 1), 14 HARV. L. REV. 200, 204–05 (1900)
(rejecting the view that the Constitution “ought to prove elastic and adaptable to changed
conditions; . . . . [And that it is] not dead but living.”); YANIV ROZNAI, UNCONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 147 (2017) (“[E]ven if we conceive of the constitution as a living
tree that must evolve with the nation’s growth and develop with its philosophical and cultural
advancement, it has certain roots that cannot be uprooted through the growth process. In other
words, the metaphor of a living tree captures the idea of certain constraints: ‘trees, after all, are
rooted.’”); see generally Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutions as “Living Trees”? Comparative Constitutional Law
and Interpretive Metaphors, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 921 (2006).
Sometimes the Court’s decisions differ considerably from the language of the text of the
Constitution. The Eleventh Amendment is, of course, a prime example of this phenomenon. See,
e.g., Louis H. Pollak, Judging Under the Aegis of the Third Article, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 399, 408–
12 (2001) (discussing Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), as an example of the
Supreme Court’s deviation from constitutional text).
CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION–A FIRSTHAND
ACCOUNT 66 (1991); see also Frederick Schauer, Is the Common Law Law?, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 455,
470 n.41 (1989) (“American constitutional adjudication in the Supreme Court seems a central case
of common law methodology.”).
See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (Holmes, J.) (“[W]hen we are dealing with words
that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they
have called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by
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because the task of integrating new judicial opinions into the story of past
decisions and other legal sources is only occasionally straightforward.327 And
this complexity is especially difficult for lay people—including journalists.328
As Akhil Amar has said, journalists “may well be unaware of the deep
wisdom of the past. . . . Many journalistic writers who lack extensive legal
expertise may not be up to the task of a detailed and critical appraisal of
judicial opinions and judicial practices.”329 Thus, one veteran journalist has
referred to the Court as “the worst reported and worst judged institution in
the American system of government.”330
Against this background, the Supreme Court’s apparent lack of concern
for the press, and its reluctance to take steps to make it easier for the press to
report on the work of the Court, seem especially rigid, if not self-defeating.
The Court’s basic posture ignores the critical role of professional journalists
as information brokers as well as the fact that it is through the press that
judicial decisions are communicated to the public. As Justice Brennan said,
“the Court has a concomitant need for the press, because through the press
the Court receives the tacit and accumulated experience of the nation, and—
because the judgments of the Court ought to instruct and inspire—the Court
needs the medium of the press to fulfill this task.”331 Correspondingly,
Professor Amar has pointed out that while the Supreme Court’s current

327

328

329
330
331

the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created
an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove
that they created a nation. The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole
experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago.”); Joseph Vining, Theorists’
Belief: A Comment on the Moral Tradition of American Constitutionalism, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 15, 23
(1996).
See William Lucy, Access to Justice and the Rule of Law, 40 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 377, 382 (2020)
(“The governing idea here is that the law as a whole, and its particular doctrinal departments,
should be a coherent system. One aspect of legal complexity therefore arises from this aspiration,
since the task of integrating current legal developments into the story of recent and older legal
history is only occasionally straightforward.”).
See WASBY, supra note 23, at 85 (“Not only do Justices on the Court differ concerning particular
cases, but judges at one time differ with their predecessors and overturn precedents. This aspect of
our legal process, based on our common-law tradition, is not understood and creates problems in
understanding the Court’s messages.”); id. (“The Court’s ability to change its mind, however
necessary to adapting the law to modern conditions, has as its price confusion and
misunderstanding, which ‘brings on much of the heated criticism and unsophisticated praise of the
Court.’”) (quoting GREY, supra note 23, at 23).
AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION TODAY, supra note 10, at 406–07.
Editorial, The Supreme Court and the Public, 53 A.B.A. J. 630, 630 (1967).
William J. Brennan, Jr., Why Protect the Press?, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., JAN.–Feb. 1980, at 59,
59.
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communication practices may not literally abridge freedom of speech, they
are inconsistent with the Court’s own teaching about free expression and the
role of public discourse in a democracy; they violate the presumption of
governmental openness that should generally apply to American institutions;
and they are contrary to the practices of every comparable court in the
land.332 Professor Amar rightly argues that the Court’s practices inhibit the
kind of robust and timely public discourse that, according to the Court’s own
doctrine, lies at the heart of the First Amendment and at the core of our
constitutional values.333
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s unbending position overlooks the
fundamental changes that journalism in the United States has experienced
in recent years. As we have noted, the ownership of traditional media has
passed to conglomerates, hedge funds, and other corporate interests that are
often more interested in profit than in journalism. Certainly, these owners
have little cause to be interested in the particular well-being of the local
communities in which they happen to have invested. At the same time,
newspaper readership has fallen, together with advertising revenue.
Traditional newsrooms have been decimated in efforts to cut costs, and only
a few news outlets are able or willing to pay for specialized reporting such as
international news, sophisticated financial reporting, or reporting on the
courts. Professor Amar may have understated the case when he observed
that, “[I]n the complex encounter between journalism and constitutionalism,
professional journalists generally lack the time, the temperament, and the
training to do all that needs to be done to keep the constitutional system
honest.”334 Traditional media have also become more ideologically
differentiated and more closely identified with a particular political party,
faction, or belief system; and diversified media companies have concentrated
on developing the more profitable aspects of their businesses—a trend that
often privileges entertainment over journalism. As politics in the United
332
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334

AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION TODAY, supra note 10, at 113–14, 119; see also Gravel v. United States,
408 U.S. 606, 661 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting the importance of the public being
informed “about matters relating directly to the workings of our Government.”).
AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION TODAY, supra note 10, at 119; see also Thomas I. Emerson, Legal
Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L. Q. 1, 2 (1976) (“It is clear . . . that the right to
know fits readily into the [F]irst [A]mendment and the whole system of freedom of expression.”);
Barry Sullivan, FOIA and the First Amendment: Representative Democracy and the People’s Elusive “Right to
Know,” 72 MD. L. REV. 1, 39 (2012) (“‘What . . . would be the use of giving to American citizens
freedom to speak if they had nothing worth saying to say?’”) (quoting ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN,
FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 102 (1948)).
AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION TODAY, supra note 10, at 111.
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States has become more polarized, and facts more relativized, the traditional
media have followed suit. The world of journalism has also become more
fragmented, with traditional media sharing the market for news with various
electronic platforms to which many actors contribute information and
opinion, often with little or no editing, fact-checking, or curation.335 In
addition, powerful political figures have sought to discredit mainstream news
outlets as purveyors of “fake news.”
Indeed, the appearance of new forms of media may seem to have moved
the goal posts. The need to interact with web-based media like online blogs,
Twitter, Facebook’s News Feed, and other similar platforms put today’s courts
to the test.336 These new media constitute powerful means to provide
information to the public about judicial decisions, but they also enable the
rapid spread of false and misleading information.337 In that regard, Chief
Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. has warned about the dangers of misinformation
in the internet era, saying that “[i]n our age, when social media can instantly
spread rumor and false information on a grand scale, the public’s need to
understand our government, and the protections it provides, is ever more
vital.”338 Similarly, Justice Neil Gorsuch has recently written about the
changing media landscape and the possible dangers of new online
platforms.339 “The bottom line,” Justice Gorsuch observed, “[is] that

335

336

337
338
339

See GREENE, supra note 72, at 142–43 (“The reasons for polarization are many. . . . [And the] trend
is amplified by broader, and independently challenging, changes to the media environment. Even
as technology has made it easier for us to get around and to connect with others, our lives have
become Balkanized. We are segregated, both residentially, subdivided into ‘communities’ and
‘developments,’ and socially, hived off into online networks whose members share our background
and values. Trusted intermediaries, the Walter Cronkites of old, are increasingly hard to come by,
leaving us with personalized Facebook and Twitter feeds and citizenship in either a Fox News
America or an MSNBC America. They are easy to mistake for two different countries.”).
HESS & HARVEY, supra note 187, at 21, 34 (explaining that the dissemination of the content of
judicial proceedings through social media “means that anyone may ‘report’; anyone may act as a
journalist without being one by profession. Such new possibilities also raise the question of whether
there is a need to distinguish more clearly between professional journalists, who are generally
subject to their own codes of conduct, and members of [the] general public sitting in the audience”).
See McLachlin, The Relationship Between the Courts and the Media, supra note 189.
Roberts, supra note 176, at 2.
Berisha v. Lawson, 141 S. Ct. 2424, 2427 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Court
should have heard a challenge to its 1964 landmark holding in New York Times v. Sullivan) (“Since
1964, however, our Nation’s media landscape has shifted in ways few could have foreseen.”); id.
(“[T]hanks to the revolutions in technology, today virtually anyone in this country can publish
virtually anything for immediate consumption virtually anywhere in the world.”) (citing David A.
Logan, Rescuing Our Democracy by Rethinking New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 759,
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publishing without investigation, fact-checking, or editing has become the
optimal legal strategy. . . . Combine this . . . with the business incentives
fostered by our new media world and the deck seems stacked against those
with traditional (and expensive) journalistic standards—and in favor of those
who can disseminate the most sensational information as efficiently as
possible without any particular concern for truth.”340 But the Court’s
practices seem contrary to Chief Justice Roberts’s and Justice Gorsuch’s
exhortations and are lagging considerably behind what would be required to
make judicial decisions more accessible and understandable to the public in
today’s world.
The public’s perception that the Supreme Court, like other constitutional
courts, has now become an important player in the political system, with
vastly greater power and influence, only enhances the Court’s need to be
more attentive to its communications policy. Indeed, the trend exemplified
by the Canadian, German, and Israeli courts’ efforts to engage more
effectively with the press and the public is not unrelated to the fact that
constitutional courts in liberal democracies have sometimes found themselves
under attack by various groups across the political spectrum.341 Being called
upon to resolve highly sensitive and significant issues in the context of
sometimes fraught politics, constitutional courts will often disappoint one
faction or another, sometimes earning its genuine, lasting enmity.342 It is not
enough for courts to pretend that their judgments have no effect on political
or economic life. Indeed, these courts have increasingly recognized the need
to tell their side of the story. President Vosskule of the German Court has
recently argued that the public’s increased skepticism toward legal
institutions “can only be counteracted through offensive public relations

340
341

342

803 (2020)); id. (“No doubt, this new media world has many virtues—not least the access it affords
those who seek information about and the opportunity to debate public affairs. At the same time,
some reports suggest that our new media environment also facilitates the spread of disinformation.”)
(citing Logan, supra, at 804).
Berisha, 141 S. Ct. at 2428 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
See GAROUPA & GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REPUTATION, supra note 31, at 49 (“If judges are having a
greater impact on matters of political and social importance, it is only natural that there will be
greater interest in the operation of the judiciary and demands for greater judicial accountability.”).
See, e.g., Wojciech Sadurski, Polish Constitutional Tribunal Under PiS: From an Activist Court, to a Paralysed
Tribunal, to a Government Enabler, 11 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 63 (2019); Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz,
The Capture of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and Beyond: Of Institution(s), Fidelities and the Rule of Law in
Flux, 43 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 116, 122 (2018) (noting political attacks against the Polish
Constitutional Court).
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work.”343 He has further argued that “ultimately, there must be a rethink in
the judiciary when it comes to communication. Judges can no longer retreat
to the traditional position of speaking only through their decisions, not about
their decisions. In particular, it is essential that the president of the court
come out and, on appropriate occasions, explain how the judiciary works
beyond the individual decisions.”344 If courts are unable to tell their side of
the story successfully, they may well lose public confidence and find
themselves unable to function effectively or at all.345
American democracy has not been spared from these dynamics; nor has
our constitutional system escaped the consequences of growing polarization
and political conflict, to say nothing of a more general skepticism and distrust
of government and its institutions.346 In this context, the Supreme Court of
the United States has become a focal point for partisan battles that threaten
to undermine public confidence in its independence and legitimacy.347 Some
of the Supreme Court’s critics have even called for “massive resistance” to its

343
344
345
346

347

Vosskuhle, supra note 252.
Id.
See, e.g., WOJCIECH SADURSKI, POLAND’S CONSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN (2019) (detailing the
erosion of press freedom as well as judicial independence).
See generally SANFORD LEVINSON & JACK M. BALKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DYSFUNCTION (2019);
Jennifer Hochschild, What’s New? What’s Next? Threats to the American Constitutional Order, in
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? 85 (Mark A. Graber, Sanford Levinson & Mark
Tushnet eds., 2018); Eric A. Posner, The Trump Presidency: A Constitutional Crisis in the United States?, in
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS?, supra, at 103.
See, e.g., DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 114, passim (suggesting that the rise of ideology in judicial
appointments has had negative effects in voter attitudes toward the Supreme Court); Grove, supra
note 189, passim (examining recent attacks on the Supreme Court and arguing that in politically
divisive moments like today the Court faces a legitimacy problem); see also Bruce Ackerman, Trust
in the Justices of the Supreme Court Is Waning. Here Are Three Ways to Fortify the Court, L.A. TIMES (Dec.
20, 2018, 3:15 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-ackerman-supreme-courtreconstruction-20181220-story.html [https://perma.cc/4TSL-G7DZ] (suggesting that “[t]he
Supreme Court has taken some serious hits to its reputation for independence and impartiality in
these polarized times,” and that absent reform, political partisanship “will predictably destroy the
court’s legitimacy in the coming decade”); Erwin Chemerinsky, With Kavanaugh Confirmation Battle,
the
Supreme
Court’s
Legitimacy
Is
in
Question,
SACRAMENTO
BEE,
https://www.sacbee.com/opinion/california-forum/article219317565.html
[https://perma.cc/Z744-48KF] (Oct. 5, 2018, 10:50 AM) (discussing “the cloud over the court’s
legitimacy”); Michael Tomasky, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/05/opinion/supreme-courts-legitimacy-crisis.html
[https://perma.cc/3USV-SR2V] (suggesting that several Justices are less legitimate because they
were placed on the bench by a President and a Senate who represent the will of a minority of the
American people).
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decisions.348 Hence, it might be helpful for the Court to look at the ways in
which constitutional courts in other liberal democracies have responded to
the challenge.349
One of the primary functions served by constitutional courts, including
the United States Supreme Court,350 is to articulate limits to what the political
branches can and cannot do under their constitutions.351 Because
constitutional courts lack their own coercive powers, however, they depend
on public opinion to encourage the political branches to comply with their
decisions.352 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor was straightforward in

348

349

350

351

352

See Mark Joseph Stern, How Liberals Could Declare War on Brett Kavanaugh’s Supreme Court, SLATE (Oct.
4, 2018, 6:53 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/10/brett-kavanaugh-confirmationconstitutional-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/3SG6-4DCK] (suggesting that there could be
“massive liberal resistance” to the Supreme Court, including defiance of court orders).
See generally Barry Sullivan & Bilal Zaheer, Constitutional Interpretation as ‘Interfaith Communion’—the Use
of Foreign Legal Materials in US Courts, INT’L LITIG. NEWSL., May 2007, at 41; Barry Sullivan, The
Irish Constitution: Some Reflections from Abroad, in THE IRISH CONSTITUTION: GOVERNANCE AND
VALUES 1, 1-6 (Oran Doyle & Eoin Carolan eds., 2008).
See generally Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court as a Constitutional Court, 128 HARV. L. REV. 124 (2014);
Laurence P. Claus & Richard S. Kay, Constitutional Courts as “Positive Legislators” in the United States,
58 AM. J. COMP. L. 479 (2010).
See, e.g., Jay N. Krehbiel, The Politics of Judicial Procedures: The Role of Public Oral Hearings in the German
Constitutional Court, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 990, 1002 (2016) (“By enhancing the public’s ability to
observe and evaluate instances of potentially unconstitutional behavior, hearings serve as a valuable
institutional [tool] for courts tasked with holding governments accountable for breaches of their
constitutional obligations.”); see also VANBERG, supra note 229, at 13–14:
Do legislators have reason to respect a [constitutional court] ruling, even when doing so is
contrary to their immediate interest in the continuation of a policy that has been struck
down? A number of alternative enforcement mechanisms have been proposed in response
to this question. I focus on one particular central mechanism: the role of popular support.
I argue that the principal inducement for governing majorities to comply with high court
decisions is the threat of a loss of public support for elected officials who refuse to be bound
by them. That is, governing majorities will be motivated to respect court decisions
primarily when they are concerned about the electoral consequences of not doing so.
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s authority—
possessed of neither the purse nor the sword—ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its
moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by the Court’s complete detachment, in fact and
in appearance, from political entanglements and by abstention from injecting itself into the clash of
political forces in political settlements.”); FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 114, at
375 (“The most telling reason why the justices might care about public opinion, though, is simply
that they do not have much of a choice. At least, that is, if they care about preserving the Court’s
institutional power, about having their decisions enforced, about not being disciplined by politics.”);
STEPHEN BREYER, THE AUTHORITY OF THE COURT AND THE PERIL OF POLITICS 7 (2021) (“The
Court’s ability to punish or to provide rewards or benefits it limited. Its ability to act justly, at least
in my view, does play a major role in obtaining the public’s respect and consequent obedience.”);
Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122
HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1814 (2009) (“The Court’s ability to settle constitutional disagreements
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explaining that “[w]e don’t have standing armies to enforce opinions, we rely
on the confidence of the public in the correctness of those decisions. That’s
why we have to be aware of public opinions and of attitudes toward our
system of justice, and it is why we must try to keep and build that trust.”353
For that reason, several scholars have pointed out that public relations efforts
can provide constitutional courts with an effective institutional tool capable
of giving force to their judgments in the face of possible noncompliance. In
other words, improving their communication practices can provide
constitutional courts with the means for promoting governmental
compliance with their decisions and for effectively constraining governing
majorities.354 Justice William O. Douglas expressed his understanding of this
imperative when he wrote that, “A judiciary that discloses what it is doing
and why it does it will breed understanding. And confidence based on
understanding is more enduring than confidence based on awe.”355
The media are critically important to that endeavor. As Jeffery Staton
has argued, media relations allow courts to publicize decisions, increasing the
people’s awareness, and, as a consequence, raising the costs for the other
branches of government to resist a judicial ruling (out of a fear of losing some

353
354

355

depends on the extent to which officials and citizens are willing to accept its decisions as
authoritative.”); Edward Douglass White, The Supreme Court of the United States, 7 A.B.A. J. 341, 341
(1921) (observing that the power of judicial review rests “solely upon the approval of a free people.”);
see also ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 142 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba
Winthrop eds. & trans., 2000) (“[The] power [of the Supreme Court Justices] is immense; but it is
a power of opinion. They are omnipotent as long as the people consent to obey the law; they can
do nothing when they scorn it.”).
Sandra Day O’Connor, Public Trust as a Dimension of Equal Justice: Some Suggestions to Increase Public
Trust, CT. REV., Fall 1999, at 10, 13.
See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 16 (2d. ed. 2008) (“If the separation of powers, and the placing of the power to enforce
court decisions in the executive branch, leaves courts practically powerless to insure that their
decisions are supported by elected and administrative officials, then they are heavily dependent on
popular support to implement their decisions. If American citizens are aware of Court decisions,
and feel duty-bound to carry them out, then Court orders will be implemented.
However, . . . survey data suggest that the American public is consistently uninformed of even
major Supreme Court decisions and thus not in a position to support them.”); FRIEDMAN, THE
WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 114, at 375 (“When the public has a view, its elected officials tend
to heed it. The Court has to be attuned to aroused public opinion because it is the public that can
save the Court in trouble with political leaders and likewise can motivate political leaders against
it.”).
William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 754 (1949).
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public support).356 Chief Justice McLachlin of the Canadian Court has also
observed that “a free press and an independent judiciary must work together
to foster a society committed to the rule of law. The rule of law cannot exist
without open justice and deep public confidence in the judiciary and the
administration of justice. And the media is essential to building and
maintaining that public confidence.”357 Similarly, Stephen Wermiel, a
former legal correspondent for the Wall Street Journal, has argued that at “a
theoretical level [the] news media coverage of the United States Supreme
Court, by creating an informed public that extends beyond the organized bar,
is an essential element in the goal of guaranteeing respect for the United
States Supreme Court and of fostering compliance with its decisions, which
are the hallmarks of judicial independence.”358 At the very least, this all
suggests that the Supreme Court could benefit from ensuring that its opinions
make the constitutional bases for decisions understandable to the press and,
through the press, to the people.359
We should emphasize, however, that these suggestions for improving the
Supreme Court’s communications with the press should not be taken as an
356

357
358

359

JEFFERY K. STATON, JUDICIAL POWER AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN MEXICO 7, 14–17
(2010) (“[B]ecause the media is not an arm of the judiciary, courts cannot fully control what is
reported about them. For that reason, the tension is not easily resolved, and courts under serious
political constraints may confront a power trap: promote transparency and risk undermining
legitimacy or do not promote transparency and risk political irrelevance.”); see also Meyer,
Communicating Judicial Decisions, supra note 245, at vi (“[J]udicial authority depends on their
reputation and support within the public, as they are unable to enforce their decisions and sanction
noncompliance. Only if the public is aware of the courts and their actions and lends them their
support, elected politicians will more likely comply with court decisions. To create awareness and
to enable public scrutiny, courts have several tools. Among others, a proactive strategy to
communicate and transmit information on court decisions and, thus, to increase transparency and
openness is perceived to be an essential tool that courts have at their disposal.”).
McLachlin, The Relationship Between the Courts and the Media, supra note 189.
Stephen J. Wermiel, News Media Coverage of the United States Supreme Court, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1059,
1059 (1998); see also Richard L. Vining, Jr., & Phil Marcin, Explaining Intermedia Coverage of Supreme
Court Decisions, in COVERING THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN THE DIGITAL AGE, supra
note 8, at 89, 89 (“This lack of understanding can have significant consequences for the judiciary,
especially if it is seen as biased or overtly political, because its authority depends largely on public
and elite acceptance of its legitimacy. News about courts, including the Supreme Court of the
Unites States, is central to the elite discourse that influences public attitude about them.”).
See FISHER, supra note 76, at 222 (“One source of noncompliance is poor communication of judicial
opinions. Scholars have found that most people do not know or understand decisions rendered by
the courts. Instead, they receive abbreviated interpretations, often erroneous, from the media and
local officials. For various reasons, the media has difficulty providing adequate coverage of the
courts.”); cf. Or Bassok, The Supreme Court’s New Source of Legitimacy, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 153 (2013)
(arguing that the Supreme Court in recent times has partly lost the ability to base its legitimacy on
its legal expertise and adopted instead public support as its basis of legitimacy).
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alternative or substitute for conscientious, independent, and thorough
reporting. Although the Supreme Court clearly can do a better job of
helping the press understand its decisions, and thereby better communicate
its decisions to the public, the press must be careful not simply to defer to the
Court’s interpretation of what has been decided. Journalists must continue
to do their own work, seeking out a variety of independent interpreters and
commentators on the Court’s decisions, and come to their own
understanding of those decisions.360 If the Court has done its job, however,
journalists will be better able to evaluate the interpretations of other
commentators from a position of greater knowledge and understanding as to
what the case involves and what is at stake. It also goes without saying that
the Court’s additional communications and interactions with the press must
be candid and truthful. Indeed, the Court and the press must both be alert
to the possibility of developing too close and uncritical a relationship with
each other; but there may be little reason to believe, either in theory or based
on the experience of other constitutional courts, that that danger is likely.

360

A quarter century ago, Chief Justice Gerard Brennan of the High Court of Australia expressed his
opposition to earlier versions of some of the reforms discussed in this article. Among other things,
Chief Justice Brennan feared that judges might take advantage of the opportunity to place a
favorable “spin” on their decisions, and that the press might fail to discharge its proper
responsibilities, if the courts adopted such innovations.
Accurate reporting and critical analysis of the work of the courts require some legal skills
and experience. Who should provide them? Public confidence in the rule of law is not to
be won by the issuing of media statements nor by background briefings that might be
suspect as putting a favourable spin on the work of the courts. The media would abandon
their responsibility if they were to publish uncritically summaries of cases or other media
releases issued with the authority of the courts. The media must themselves probe and
analyse the reasons for judgments of public importance. The basic justification for
freedom of the press is the employment of an informed and critical faculty and the
employment of that faculty is a source of pride to the competent journalist. If the courts
were to furnish digests of information for the media to publish, they would abandon the
independence which both must assert and defend in the public interest. Better by far that
the media should sense that there are stories of vital public interest in the dramas of a
trial, . . . in the priorities of tensions between the organs of government, constitutional
rights or immunities, in the interplay of legal rules and in the exposition of principles under
which society lives.
Brennan, The Third Branch and the Fourth Estate, supra note 310, at 75. Chief Justice Brennan was
correct to note these dangers. Certainly, additional assistance from the Court should not take the
place of independent reporting. It is essential, as Chief Justice Brennan noted, that the press
continue to “probe and analyse the reasons for judgments of public importance.” On the other
hand, the complexity and prolixity of judicial opinions, at least in the Supreme Court of the United
States, has increased greatly since Chief Justice Brennan was writing, and journalists now have a
far greater need for assistance than previously was the case.
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The essential relationship between the Court and the press is—and likely will
remain—one that is properly adversary.361
Finally, while the trend among constitutional courts toward greater
judicial engagement with the press and the public is clear, there is little
consensus as to which methods should be used or to what extent they should be
used, let alone how much such courts should abandon their traditional
practices to accommodate the needs of the press and the public. Different
courts have given different answers about where the line should be drawn. It
is beyond the scope of this Article to suggest which of these various
mechanisms would be best suited to our specific conditions. On the other
hand, none of them should be dismissed out of hand.362 It might be argued,
for example, that our judicial culture, which gives voice to each of the Justices
who chooses to write separately, and also encourages each to express his or
her unique views of the relevant law, would make it impossible for the Court
to agree on a synthesis or summary of its opinions. But the United States
Supreme Court’s judicial culture is neither unique nor exceptional in that
respect.363 The Canadian and Israeli Courts share that aspect of judicial
culture and have adopted changes to the way they communicate with their
respective citizenries. Furthermore, creating a better communication
environment, as Professor Goldstein said, is not intended to deprive the
361

362

363

See id. at 65 (“It is tempting to say that the third branch — the judiciary — and the Fourth Estate
— the media — share a responsibility to create or maintain confidence in the work of the courts.
But that would cast the media in the role of apologists for the courts and thus undermine the
independence of the media and their proper relationship with the public. The media’s function is
quite different from the court’s. The court’s function, entrenched in public expectation, is to decide
cases and, in doing so, to apply the law competently and impartially. The media’s function is to
report and critically to analyse the work of the courts. So we are speaking in the present context of
disparate but interlocking functions which, if properly performed by both institutions, should
produce public confidence in the maintenance of the rule of law by the courts.”).
For example, Justice Abe Fortas once suggested that “he would, if he could convince his brethren
on the Court, make law professors provided by the [Association of American Law Schools] more
available to newsmen to explain decisions immediately after they were handed down. . . . [And]
he would suggest some radio and TV coverage of delivery of judges’ decisions from the bench.”
WASBY, supra note 23, at 87. In a similar vein, Amy Howe has recently proposed that the Court
consider allowing the live coverage of opinion announcements to prevent confusion and
mischaracterization of the Court’s decisions. Testimony of Amy Howe, supra note 19.
Cf. Newland, supra note 23, at 26 (“[T]he justices may be expected to concentrate attention on the
Court as an institution, or, when impelled to express separate opinions, to exercise individual
restraint. Such self-limitation by individual justices may be especially necessary on an activist
Court. This attitude may be impossible for the justices. If so, this research suggests, it may be
equally impossible for the press and the people to understand this key political institution,
intelligently communicate about it, and provide it with essential popular support and reasoned
criticism.”).
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Justices of their individualist ways or to achieve either unvarying unanimity
or exceptional harmony.364 “Rather, it is meant to cultivate greater
recognition on their part that each opinion in a constitutional law decision is
also to be viewed as part of a whole, as one communication. The goal is not
simply that each opinion be coherent by itself, but that, taken together, the
opinions in a single case constitute a comprehensible message about the
Constitution.”365 Why, then, should the Supreme Court of the United States
not consider improving the way in which it communicates with the people?
In the end, it all seems to be a matter of complacency—an attitude that
reflects a bygone era that has yet to adapt to modern times.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of the United States keeps faith with a notion that
judges must speak only through their written opinions, which must then speak
for themselves. The Justices enter the courtroom, deliver a short summary
of their opinions, and leave. At the same time, the Court publishes online
the full texts of the decisions, sometimes running to hundreds of pages and
often with multiple voices. It is only in this way that the Court, as an
institution, discharges its duty to “say what the law is” and communicates its
understanding of the Constitution to the people and to the other branches
of government. The Court’s aloofness generates an air of mystery around
itself, and it promotes the idea that the judiciary, unlike the elected branches,
is far removed from everyday life and all that that entails. More important,
given the prolixity, complexity, and nuance of its opinions, the Court has
sometimes generated a similar air of mystery around what it understands the
Constitution to mean. Since few people read the Court’s opinions, and fewer
still can understand them without help, most people rely on the press for what
they know about the Court’s pronouncements. But reporters who cover the
Court are invariably left to their own devices as they attempt to decipher the
Court’s opinions and write stories about them under strict time constraints.
The Court’s seeming indifference hinders the people’s understanding of their
Constitution and distances us from the ideal of a republican government.
364
365

GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20, at 110–11.
Id. at 110; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 110 (1992) (“The
Court is under no duty to announce Delphic rules or to leave the country guessing about its
intentions. On the contrary, it has some responsibility to give lower courts guidance and to permit
the American people to order their affairs with confidence in the lay of the legal land and to seek a
constitutional amendment if there is overwhelming consensus that the Court is wrong.”).
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But the Court has steadfastly refused to consider innovations that might make
its opinions more accessible and easier for the press to translate to the public.
The Court’s uncompromising stance not only interferes with its
expounding of the Constitution in a way that the people can understand, it
is hardly inevitable. As we have shown, the notion that the Court has always
spoken only through the Justices’ written opinions and in-court utterances is
something of a myth. In the beginning, the Justices mainly delivered their
decisions orally. Furthermore, since the earliest days of the Supreme Court,
the Justices have from time to time ignored the convention that the Court
speaks only through its opinions, thereby suggesting an acknowledgment that
the Court’s aloofness is self-defeating. Starting with Chief Justice Marshall,
the Justices have often sought to defend their decisions in a variety of extracurial settings—in the pages of newspapers, in television interviews, in
lecture halls, and even in Zoom meetings with like-minded partisans. These
Justices and others have understood the importance, in a democratic society,
both of the public’s understanding of the Court’s work and the press’s
invaluable role in informing and educating the public. In other words, the
legitimacy of the Court depends in part on the way in which its decisions are
reported and how they are understood beyond the realm of professional
elites.
It is hard to square the Court’s apparent lack of concern about the way
in which its decisions are communicated to the citizenry with the needs and
values of a modern democratic society. As we have demonstrated, some
other constitutional courts have taken a proactive approach to their
relationships with the press and the public. Faced with a changing media
environment and the rise of populist politics (which renders institutions as
well as professional and scientific knowledge suspect), these courts have taken
the initiative to increase transparency. The practices that the apex courts of
Canada, Germany, and Israel have adopted reflect their recognition that
constitutional courts in democratic societies must make their decisions more
intelligible to the public and to the other branches of government. Moreover,
these developments point to a growing judicial awareness that harnessing the
power of the media to inform the public about the courts’ decisions is also
an important tool for encouraging the political branches to respect and
comply with those decisions. We offer this account of what some other
constitutional courts have done, not to recommend any specific steps for our
Supreme Court to take, but to suggest that more can—and must—be done
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to ensure that We the People understand what the Court has decided, why it
has done so, and to what effect.366

366

See Lerner, supra note 26, at 179 (“In a Government founded on opinion, it is necessary that the
People should be satisfied with judicial decisions.”) (quoting 2 REG. DEB. 1100 (1826) (statement of
Rep. Kerr)).

